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Abstract
This thesis examines the process by which Korean voters come to their voting 
decision, especially in the era of democratic transition (1985-1992). The main 
focus of this study is on the political cleavage structures that have led Korean 
voters to choose one party over the others in elections. By analysing two sets of 
sample survey data, which cover the elections in the period of democratic 
transition, it attempts to unravel the nature of the two main dimensions of 
political cleavage: that is, the urban-rural and regional differences in electoral 
support, which are in essence descriptions of vote distribution at the aggregate 
level.
The impact of changes in the party system on the voters during this period is 
discussed with reference first to the patterns of movement of voters across the 
subsequent elections and second to the patterns of voter alignment on the two 
main dimensions. In general, the movements of voters were quite stable along 
the line of government versus opposition. Patterns in electoral support along the 
urban-rural dimension depict ‘continuity’ across the elections, whereas patterns 
in electoral support based on regionalism suggest ‘change’ as much as 
‘continuity.’
The past cleavage of regime versus pro-democratic support, which was often 
reflected in urban-rural differences in electoral support, is found to consist more 
of differences in socialisation. The different composition of socialisation 
variables, age and education in particular, between urban and rural areas accounts 
for the yocK on yado (government-rural, opposition-urban) phenomenon. The 
regional differences in voting, which appeared as a new (and most important) 
political cleavage in the elections of this period, are mainly due to ‘personalism.’ 
The voters, who heavily rely on personality factors for their voting decision,
seem to have used the regional traits of the candidates and their parties for the 
evaluations of candidates most importantly.
This thesis argues that voter alignment along regional lines - lines which are 
vertically drawn rather than cross-cutting; highly personalised and emotion- 
charged rather than interest oriented; and which exhibit a centrifugal tendency - 
may hinder democratic stability based on the presidential system of government. 
Moreover, it would be unfortunate if the current pattem of regional alignment 
entails the permanent exclusion of some population from political power. For the 
formation of a more responsive political system, more care is needed for the 
political actors and the voters alike. Given the ideological rigidity of the society 
on the Right-Left continuum, the converting of the old pro-government versus 
pro-democratic cleavage into a conservative versus liberal framework, and, 
further, the rendering of the converted cleavage to a central place in electoral 
competition, can be a viable option in the foreseeable future if the presidential 
system in Korea continues to prosper.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948, Korean 
voters have been to nationwide polls more than 30 times. Except for the period 
of Park Chung-hee’s Yus hin regime and “the Fifth Republic” of Chun Doo-hwan, 
Presidents have been elected by popular vote although it is questionable whether 
most of the elections prior to 1987 were fair. The National Assembly has also 
been constituted by popularly elected members. However, only a little has been 
known of the characteristics of South Korean voters, especially regarding the 
question of how Korean voters have made their voting choices.1 One of the 
obvious reasons for this negligence may be that elections prior to 1987 were not 
so meaningful in terms of deciding who should run the country, and thus, were 
not of great interest.
Elections in Korea have not yet produced alternation in office between 
competing political parties. Changes of government occurred, but not until 1987 
by election. The government under President Rhee Syngman (1948-60) was 
ousted by the student uprising of April 19, 1960, and the democratic period of 
“the Second Republic” (1960-61) was ended by a military coup. The government 
under President Park Chung-hee (1961-79) was dissolved after his assassination.
1 See, for a review of the studies on Korean elections and electoral behaviour in general, Ahn, 
Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, Elections in Korea, Seoul Computer 
Press, 1988, pp. 53-81.
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The government under fixed seven-year one-term President Chun Doo-hwan 
(1980-87) was succeeded by President Roh Tae-woo (1988-92), who was a ruling 
party candidate in the 1987 presidential election - an election process restored 
after 16 years of suspension initiated by Park in 1972. In the recent 1992 
presidential election, President Kim Young-sam (1993-1997(7)) won his fixed 
five-year one-term presidency, but as a ruling party candidate. Although Kim 
had been a main opposition party leader in the Park and Chun eras, and even in 
the beginning of Roh’s era, he and his party merged into the ruling party in 1990, 
relinquishing the opposition parties’ majority status - witnessed for the first time 
in Korean electoral history in the 1988 National Assembly election.
The dominance of ruling parties in the National Assembly elections has also 
largely been maintained. Although at times elections have been subject to 
irregularities and fraud, governments in power have been successful in retaining 
enough electoral support. Governments in power may have been very adept in 
mobilising some segments of Korean voters. Election rigging may have been a 
factor, but this alone cannot explain the dominance of ruling parties in the 
Korean elections: indeed, the mass scale election fraud in the 1960 elections 
resulted in the student uprising which cost Rhee’s presidency.
This leads us to the question of why the Korean voters cast their votes the 
way they did. Viewed from the impressions gathered by observations on Korean 
political affairs, which are usually dominated by mass demonstrations or by 
fierce confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties, the dominance of
ruling parties in elections looks unusual. Perhaps it is because elections may 
have played only secondary roles in legitimising the changes of political system 
which occurred from outside the electoral process. That is, because there had 
usually been a collapse of the political system by external forces in circumstances 
where an election might have produced a change of government in power,2 
elections thereafter were most likely to be maintaining ones. However, the 
elections following the 1987 one were qualitatively different from those which 
had periodically legitimated the existing political power structure in the past. 
There had been a real risk of failure for the governing party in contesting the 
election in 1987, and the risk was finally realised in the 1988 National Assembly 
election.
Nonetheless, it is obvious that a majority of Korean voters have voted for 
stability rather than change, even in the period of democratic transition. Who, 
then, are those people that regularly support a governing party or opposition? 
Are there social groups which support one party against the others in a consistent 
manner? Are there changes in the structure of electoral alignment in the period 
of democratic transition comparable to that of the past? The question, “who 
votes for whom,” will be a major concern of this thesis, especially for the 
elections in the period of democratic transition.
- 3-
2 See, for a discussion of such elections that Ahn identified as the “crucial” elections, Ahn, 
Byong-man, “Korean Political Parties and Political Development: Crucial Elections and the 
Process of Institutionalisation of the Political Party System,” Korea Journal, 18 (1), 1978, pp. 
30-41; “The Process of Political Changes in Korea: An Analysis of Crucial Elections and Party 
Politics,” Korea & World Affairs, 9(4), 1985, pp. 625-646; and Han' guk Chongbu-ron (Essays 
on Korean Government), 2nd ed., Seoul: Tasan, 1989, pp. 153-183.
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One of the most compelling approaches to this question is to examine the 
structure of political cleavages in Korean society. For example, as 
democratisation of the authoritarian political system has become one of the most 
important issues in Korean politics since the mid 1950s, one of the main 
configurations of voters’ partisan allegiance has become a polarisation around 
this dimension.3 Indeed, the “yoch’on yado (government rural, opposition 
urban)” phenomenon - which describes the tendency that the governing parties 
mobilise traditional sectors of the public such as farmers, the less-educated, or 
elders predominantly in the rural areas, whereas the opposition parties’ strength 
lies in the urban areas where the well-educated and the young voters are in a 
relative majority - was a dominant pattem in most of the elections prior to 1987.
A new cleavage that came to play a central role in partisan support since 
1987 may have been regionalism. No one would hesitate to point out that one of 
the most astonishing characteristics in the elections of 1987 and thereafter has 
been profound regional differences in party support. Parties and their candidates 
had been dominant over others in the provinces in which the leaders of the parties 
had their origin. As there has been rapid progress in the process of Korea’s 
democratisation in recent years, it would be natural to expect some changes in the 
pattem of electoral cleavages, which was formerly centred on the issue of the
3 See Lee, Kap-yun, “Urinara Son’gogwajong-ui Minjuhwa (Democratisation of Electoral 
Process in Our Country),” in Han’guk Chongch’ihakhoe (Korean Political Science Association), 
ed., Han’guk Chongch’ i-ui Minjuhwa (Democratisation of Korean Politics), Seoul: Pobmunsa, 
1988, p.194.
democratisation of the authoritarian political system, but it is rather surprising 
that the variation of regional attributes became a dominant factor that virtually 
determined the patterns of partisan support. It is important, therefore, to 
explicate why regionalism rather than other factors appeared to be the most 
important factor in electoral competition during this period of democratisation.
The main thrust of this thesis is, thus, to explore the nature of electoral 
cleavages that lead Korean voters to choose one party against the others in 
elections. Part 1, which consists of two chapters, will provide background for 
this study. Chapter 1 will discuss development of the Korean party system, with 
particular attention to electoral meanings in it, and political issues involved. 
Chapter 2 will review the literature dealing with Korean voting behaviour: 
propositions developed to explain the observed patterns of partisan alignment are 
discussed, and similarities and differences are identified in comparison to the 
development of European patterns of voter alignment.
Empirical analyses follow in Part 2, by utilising two sets of sample survey 
data.4 Chapter 3 will discuss the impact of party splits and mergers witnessed 
during the period of democratisation in terms of voters’ responses - that is, 
movements of votes and changing patterns of voter alignments if these occurred 
at all. Chapter 4 attempts to unravel the nature of the yoch' on yado phenomenon
- 5-
4 The first set of data was collected in November 1991 by Prof. James Cotton, and the second set 
of data was collected just after the 1992 presidential election as a follow-up project See, for a 
detailed description of the data, Appendix 1 of this thesis.
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by identifying factors that bring about the observed pattern of voter alignment, 
and through discussion of their political implications. Chapter 5 will examine the 
influence of regional attributes on voting choice, which have prevailed in 
electoral contests since 1987. After identifying the effects of regionalism on 
voting, the chapter specifically tests some of the propositions that may account 
for regional differences in voting. That is, the causes of regional differences in 
partisan support will be explored. In Chapter 6, the meanings of the more 
immediate determinants of individual voting choices such as partisan 
orientations, political attitudes, economic evaluations and candidate perceptions - 
which are introduced in the foregoing chapters - will be fully elaborated, and 
their effects on voting choice in the 1992 presidential election will be weighed in 
a causal sequence model.
In Part 3 (Chapter 7), the future of the democratic transition process in the 
Korean political system will be discussed with reference to the above mentioned 
empirical work. From the point of view of institutional measures, the Korean 
political system is now considered democratic as there are regularly held 
elections which are free and competitive. It is now probable that alternation of 
government in power between competing parties might occur by means of 
election. However, the success of democratic transition may largely depend on 
how the pattem of electoral competition is configured. That is, the political party 
system must effectively link or consolidate conflicting interests among the voters. 
Thus, the political party system and its bases of political support need to be 
closely examined from this perspective. The role played by regionalism may be
particularly interesting: for the political actors it may have been a source of 
reducing uncertainties at first, but soon it may have become a sectoral interest 
that prevailed in political contests.
PART 1.
BACKGROUND: KOREAN ELECTIONS, 
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND VOTERS
- 9-
Chapter 1.
The Development of Korean Party Systems and Elections
1. Introduction
The first general election of South Korea was held on May 10, 1948. The 
election, supervised by a United Nations commission, appointed 198 members of 
the “Constitution-Enacting” National Assembly. Between 1948 and 1992 Korea 
held 8 direct presidential elections, 13 more National Assembly elections, and 11 
various local elections.1 Although it is doubtful that elections before 1987 were 
fairly managed, elections have been held regularly, except for the period of the 
Fourth and the Fifth Republics where direct presidential elections were not held, 
and elections are now firmly recognised as a central feature of the nation’s 
political system.
1 There have been so far four series of local elections: two during the First Republic, one during 
the Second Republic, and one in 1991 restored in 30 years’ of suspension. Even with such a 
short period of experience in local elections, however, the heads of the township-level and the 
provincial-level self-governments have not been popularly elected but appointed by the presidents 
except for the one held during the Second Republic, and only the assembly members in the two 
levels were directly elected, thus seriously limiting the autonomy of the self-governing bodies. 
Popular elections of the heads of the self-governing bodies are scheduled to be implemented in 
1995. It is yet to be seen whether the local self-governing bodies, which have served as a mere 
administrative unit dependent upon the centre, will become an autonomous body of local self- 
government See, for a discussion on the local elections and self-governments during the First 
and the Second Republics, Yun, Hyong-sop, Han guk ChongcK i-ron (Essays on Korean 
Politics), rev. ed., Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1992, pp. 298-300 and pp. 683-726. Also see Park, Dong- 
su, Chibangjach’ i-wa Chibanguiwon Son’go (Local Self-governments and Local Assembly 
Electionsj, Seoul: Shina, 1991.
But have the elections “mattered” in Korea, and in what sense? For a
- 10-
number of years following liberation from the Japanese occupation (1910 - 
1945), elections, filled with fraud or characterised by unscrupulous practices, 
appeared to be a tool for those in power to legitimise and promote their own 
political interests. The Constitution, which prescribes the methods of formation 
of government, for example, has been revised on nine different occasions.2 
Indeed, most of the amendments were prepared for power projection or 
expansion of the power of rulers, and it is not until the ninth amendment in 1987 
that an agreement for amendment was achieved between the ruling and the 
opposition parties. It is only since the presidential election held in 1987 that 
succession to political power seems to have become firmly institutionalised by 
means of fair and competitive elections.
What role, then, have elections played in the past? Have past elections 
simply been a tool for justifying an existing power structure, or have they 
provided an opportunity for changes in political power among the competing 
political parties? What have been the issues or points of contest among the 
political parties, and are the issues at present different from the past ones? What 
have been the main dimensions in political competition among the parties and
2 Each of the six Republics in Korea so far came with a new constitution. In addition to this, the 
First Republic had two more amendments, and the Second and the Third Republics one more, 
respectively. See Kim, Ki-bom, “Revisions of the Korean Constitution (I) & (II).” Korea 
Journal, 14 (7 & 8), 1974, pp. 4-13 & pp. 18-25. Also see Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, 
and Kim, Kwang-woong, Elections in Korea, Seoul Computer Press, 1988, pp. 3-52; and 
Henderson, Gregory, “Constitutional Changes from the First and the Sixth Republics: 1948- 
1987,” in Kim, Ilpyong J., and Kihl, Young-whan (eds.), Political Change in South Korea, New 
Yoik: Korea PWPA, 1988, pp. 22-43.
their supporters? To address these questions, the historical development of the 
party system and patterns of party competition will be reviewed in this chapter. 
This chapter will explore the historical development of political cleavage 
structures in Korean society, and is aimed at providing a background for 
empirical analyses which will follow in the following chapters of Part 2.
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2. Electoral Arrangements in Korean Politics (1948-1992)
Electoral arrangements in South Korean political history have undergone 
frequent changes in their substance, although a presidential system of government 
has been the norm for most of its history. Except for a brief period of the Second 
Republic, in which a parliamentary system of government was employed, the 
president who heads the executive branch of the government has largely held 
responsibility for running the country. The legislative body of the National 
Assembly, which was dominated by the ruling parties - namely, the parties of the 
president - for most of its history, may have been a “marginal” institution that 
became subservient to the executive.3 Thus, the changes in the electoral system, 
achieved by amendments of the constitution that usually included a clause for
3 See Yoon, Young O., “Policymaking Activities of the South Korean National Assembly,’’ 
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 5(1), 1986, pp. 29-48. Also see Kim, Chong-lim, “The 
Unwritten Rules of the Game in the National Assembly of the Fifth Republic,” Asian 
Perspective, 12(2), 1988, pp. 5-34; and Han, Jong-il, “Decision-Making Process in the Korean 
Legislature,” Korea Journal, 13(7), 1973, pp. 29-33 & p.43.
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extending previously defined terms of the president, have been centred upon the 
methods of electing the president, and swung from an indirect method to direct 
depending on political situations of the time. Nonetheless, the electoral methods 
of the National Assembly have not been immune to changes as the executive’s 
aspirations for firmer control over the Assembly necessitated them. Each of the 
six Republics, indeed, came with a different electoral method for the National 
Assembly. Table 1-1 provides for a summary of the electoral systems that Korea 
has experienced so far for the president and the National Assembly.
The electoral arrangements for the early years of the First Republic were a 
hurriedly prepared, convenient mixture of presidential and parliamentary systems 
of government, reflecting the parliamentary bids of the Korean Democratic Party 
(KDP) as well as Rhee Syngman’s version of the American-style presidential 
system.4 For example, the president was elected by a two-thirds majority of the 
National Assembly, but had power to appoint executive ministers, except for the 
Prime Minister which required consent from the Assembly. The unicameral 
National Assembly, consisting of popularly elected members in a single member 
district, was to serve the prescribed terms without dissolution initiated by the 
president. The path taken by the first president, Rhee, soon after his inauguration 
was to build executive dominance over the Assembly: by the first amendment in 
1952, a direct election of the president, which had ensured re-election of Rhee 
given his popularity among the public, was adopted; and by the second
4 See Oh, John Kie-chiang, Democracy on Trial, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, pp. 14- 
22.
- 13-
amendment in 1954, he successfully circumvented constitutional restrictions on 
the number of presidential terms, in addition to adopting new measures that 
strengthened presidential power against the Assembly.5
A parliamentary system of government characterised the electoral 
arrangements of the Second Republic, created as a result of “the April 19th 
Student Revolution” which ousted the Rhee government in I960.6 The two- 
house Assembly - namely, the House of Representatives (Lower) consisting of 
members who were elected in a single member constituency, and the House of 
Councilors (Upper) consisting of members who were elected in a provincial-level 
multi-member district - was empowered to form the cabinet and to elect the 
ceremonial president by a two-third majority in a joint session. The Second 
Republic under the Chang Myon government, however, lasted less than a year, as 
did the electoral arrangements that were considered to be the most democratic so 
far.
5 For example, constitutional amendments were now dependent on national referendum; the Prime 
Ministership was abolished; and the Assembly’s no-confidence vote against the presidential 
cabinet en bloc was abolished. See ibid., pp. 23-50. Also see Pak, Chi-young, Political 
Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980, pp. 88-131; and 
Reeve, W.D., The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963, pp. 39-51.
6 See, for a discussion focused on the rise and fall of the Second Republic, Han, Sung-joo, The 
Failure of Democracy in South Korea, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Also see 
Choi, Yearn H., Decision-making in Korean Government: Between Student Uprising and 
Military Coup D’Etat, Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975.
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Table 1-1. Electoral System in Korea (1948-1992): For the President and National Assembly
Republics
President National Assembly
Election
Year
Method
(Electorate)
Terms Election
Year
Method Terms
The 1 st
Republic1
(1948-60)
1948 Indirect (National 
Assembly)
4 yrs, 2- 
term fixed
1948 Unicameral: FPTP 2 yrs
1952 Direct (Public 
Age over 21)
As above 1950 As above 4 yrs
1956 As above 4 yrs, no 
term limit2
1954 As above As above
1958 As above As above
The 2nd
Republic
(1960-61)
1960 Indirect ( The 
Lower & Upper 
House)
5 yrs, 2- 
term fixed
1960 Bicameral: FPTP(L); 
& Multi-member 
Limited-ballot (U)
4 yrs (L) 
6 yrs (U)
Military Junta Government (1961-63)
The 3rd
Republic
(1963-72)
1963 Direct (Public 
Age over 20)
4 yrs, 2- 
term fixed
1963 Unicameral: Mixed 
[FPTP & PR (1/4 of 
the total, National- 
list)f
4 yrs
1967 As above As above 1967 As above 4 yrs
1971 As above 4 yrs, 3- 
term fixed
1971 As above 4 yrs
The 4th
Republic
(1972-80)
1972 Indirect 
(National 
Council for 
Unification)
6 yrs, 
term not 
fixed
1973 Unicameral: Two- 
member Single-ballot; 
& 1/3 of the president 
appointee3
6 yrs; 3 
yrs for the
appointee
1978 As above As above 1978 As above As above
1979 As above As above
1980 As above As above
The 5th
Republic
(1981-87)
1981 Indirect 
(Electoral 
College for the 
President)
7 yrs, 1- 
term fixed
1981 Unicameral: Mixed 
[Two-member Single - 
ballot & PR (1/3 of the 
total, National-list)]
4 yrs
1985 As above As above
The 6th 
Republic 
(1988- ?)
1987 Direct (Public 
Age over 20)
5 yrs, 1- 
term fixed
1988 Unicameral: Mixed 
[FPTP & PR (1/4 of 
the total, National- 
list)1
4 yrs
1992 As above As above 1992 As above As above
Note: 1 - The vice-presidents were also elected, using the same method as the presidents but 
only during the First Republic. The upper house (House of Councilors) was to be formed by the 
first amendment of the constitution in 1952 but deferred during the First Republic.
2 - Only the incumbent (Rhee Syngman) was exempted from the term limit.
3 - The presidential appointees, called Yushin-chongu-hoe, were technically formed by 
the recommendation of the president and with verification by the National Council for 
Unification.
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The military junta, which came into power by “the May 16th Coup” in 1961 
under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee, interrupted the electoral process 
by enforcing “the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction” to exercise 
legislative, executive and judicial power.7 A presidential system of government 
was revived in the new constitution prepared by the military junta government, 
and the military junta formulated a new ruling party for its power succession in 
the Third Republic.8 The direct, popular election of the president, who had 
restrictions on re-election over two consecutive terms, was adopted, and the 
president would enjoy a similar level of power Rhee had in his later years of rule. 
The upper House was discarded in the National Assembly, and a new element 
designed to enhance the ruling party’s dominant position in the Assembly was 
added. That is, by rendering one-fourth of the quota in the Assembly into the 
national-list seats - in which a half of the seats would be allocated to a party that 
yielded the biggest share of the votes in the elections for the contested seats if the 
party’s vote is less than 50 per cent,9 a party coming second would gain two- 
thirds of the remaining half, and the other parties would gain one-third of the 
remaining half in proportion to their votes - the evidently dominant position of 
the ruling party was shielded. A minor party who could not win either three 
contested seats nor 5 per cent of the vote was excluded from the allocation of the
7 See Kim, Se-jin, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1971, pp. 102-124.
8 See, for a discussion on political system of the Third Republic, Chung, Kyong-cho, Korea: The 
Third Republic, New York: Macmillan, 1971, pp. 41-111.
9 If a party won more than 50 per cent of the vote, then the national-list seats would be allocated 
in proportion to the vote shares, but up to the maximum of two-thirds of the national-list seats for 
the party.
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national-list seats.10 Moreover, party discipline was also emphasised by banning 
the Independents from running for a seat on the one hand, and by prescribing the 
nomination of candidates by the centralised party leadership on the other. During 
the Third Republic under Park, there was one more instance of constitutional 
amendment to permit his re-election for three consecutive terms.
By the adoption of the Yushin (revitalisation) constitution in October 1972, 
the meaning of elections in the political process became nearly void.* 11 The 
presidents of the Fourth Republic, who would enjoy ever stronger power with the 
adoption of presidential emergency measures that could overrule the constitution, 
were elected by a rubber-stamp electoral college named “the National Council for 
Unification” consisting of non-partisan members who were popularly elected but 
had no obligations to the voting public. The electoral system for the National 
Assembly was designed to yield a two-thirds majority of the ruling party in the 
Assembly: that is, one-third of the quota was appointed by the president, and the 
ruling party was likely to secure a half of the remaining two-thirds in the contests 
of a two-member constituency. During the Fourth Republic, the Independents 
were permitted to run for a seat.
10 A similar threshold was maintained during the Fifth Republic: that is, 5 per cent of the vote and 
five contested seats. In 1988, the threshold was a party’s winning five contested seats; and in 
1992, it was 3 per cent of the vote.
11 See, for a comprehensive review of the Yushin political system, Nam, Koon-woo, South 
Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability, Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1989. Also see Sohn, Hak-kyu, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea, 
London: Routledge, 1989.
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The electoral arrangements of the Fifth Republic, which shortly followed 
the Yus hin system by the General Chun Doo-hwan led new military junta, were a 
mere duplication of the former with a few exceptions: that is, the president was 
elected by “the (new) Electoral College for the President” but he was to serve 
only a single seven-year term, and the two-member constituency system was 
maintained for the Assembly but the presidential appointee was abolished. 
Instead, one-third of the quota in the Assembly was allocated for the national-list 
seats, in which two-thirds of the seats would be allocated to a party that yielded 
the biggest share of the contested seats, not by the votes as had been in the Third 
Republic, and the remaining one-third was to be allocated to the other parties, in 
proportion to their seats won in the contests, thus still virtually guaranteeing the 
ruling party’s majority status in the Assembly. 12 The electoral arrangements 
under Chun were a bit more relaxed than those of the Yushin system, the most 
distorted form of electoral representation, but were far from being representative.
A more representative form of electoral arrangement appeared in the Sixth 
Republic. Direct presidential elections were restored after sixteen years’ 
suspension, and a two-member constituency system, designed so that the ruling 
party would gain half of the contested seats, was discarded, returning to the first- 
past-the-post system. The allocation method of the national-list seats was also
12 See, for a detailed discussion on the allocation system of the national-list seats, Yun, Hyong- 
sop, “Son’gojedo 40 Nyon-ui Pyonch’on-gwa Kyolgwa (Changes of Electoral System for 40 
Years-on and their Results),” Chonggyong Munhwa, Feb. 1985, pp. 334-351. Also see Kim, 
Yong-ho, “Kukhoeuiwon Son’gojedo-ui Pyonhwa-wa Chongch’ijok Hyokwa Punsok (Changes in 
the National Assembly Electoral System and an Analysis of their Political Impacts),” in Lee, 
Nam-young (ed), Han guk-ui Son’go (Elections in Korea), /, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 285-310.
changed: that is, in 1988, the method was the same as that of the Third Republic - 
which guaranteed at least half of the seats for the biggest (ruling) party - except 
that the share of the contested seats was used for the allocation rather than the 
share of the vote. But in 1992, the seats would be simply distributed to the 
parties in proportion to their seats won in the elections.13 The presidential term 
was further restricted to a single five-year term.
In short, the history of electoral arrangements in Korea is nothing short of a 
patch-work that served immediate needs of political leaders whose main concerns 
lay in perpetuation of political power. Debate over how to better represent the 
electorate has yet to come. Apart from the brief period of liberal democracy 
during the Second Republic, representativeness had been increasingly reduced 
during the Fourth Republic of Yushin, and only recovered in the Sixth Republic, 
which followed “the June Popular Uprising’’ in 1987. However, the distortions 
of representativeness in the electoral system were achieved at the cost to regimes 
of the very legitimacy that might have been otherwise provided by electoral 
means. In the following sections, the history of party politics, which inevitably 
centred upon electoral politics, although their importance had been curtailed by 
the distortions, will be reviewed.
13 Later in March 1994, the election law was revised so that the national-list seats, once 
considered for total abolition, would be allocated to the parties in proportion to their votes won in 
the elections. The electoral reform included strict regulations on the use of campaign funds, and 
revival of local elections suspended since 1961, especially for the heads of the local self- 
governing bodies. See Huh, Young, “Chongch’i-gaehyok, Pob-i Mannung Anida (Political 
Reform, Law Is Not Everything),” Sindonga, April 1994, pp. 150-158.
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3. Development of the Party System: An Historical Overview
From the time Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945 to the establishment 
of separate governments in the South and the North, hundreds of political parties 
came into existence in the American zone of the South.14 Many more political 
parties have emerged and disappeared since then, but there is not a single party 
which has survived to the present, and most parties existed for only a short time. 
Alignment or realignment of politicians was common, and parties were generally 
formed in the wake of an election and dissolved shortly after the election. Even 
the ruling parties - namely, the Liberal Party in the First Republic, the 
Democratic Party in the Second Republic, the Democratic Republic Party in the 
Third and Fourth Republic, and the Democratic Justice Party in the Fifth 
Republic - rose and fell with their leaders’ fate, and the major opposition parties 
also came and went accordingly - the Democratic Party in the First Republic, the 
old faction of the Democratic Party in the Second Republic, the New Democratic 
Party in the Third and Fourth Republic, and the New Korea Democratic Party in 
the Fifth Republic, for example. This was due to the fact that governments were 
not bom out of open competition among the political parties. That is, an already 
organised political power usually created and nurtured a ruling party as its
14 See Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Kihl, Young-whan, “Development of Party Politics (1945-1961): 
An OverView,’’ in Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Kihl, Young-whan (eds.), Party Politics and Elections 
in Korea, Silver Spring: The Research Institute of Korean Affairs, 1976, pp. 7-18, at p.9.
support base, and this was followed by the creation of an opposition party by 
those who were excluded, by force or by choice, from the ruling power structure.
Nonetheless, the ruling parties and major opposition parties have usually 
engaged in heated competition against each other for the popular vote. Although 
since 1952 there have been no fundamental differences in ideology among the 
ruling and opposition parties, the division between the ruling and opposition 
camps has been clearly drawn over the issue of the legitimacy of the existing 
regimes since the mid-1950s. Attempts at constitutional revision, which were 
mostly motivated by a desire to prolong the political power of the existing 
regimes, have generally made the question of legitimacy the focal point of 
political debates, and this intensified the conflict between ruling and opposition 
camps.
The nature of political competition during the period of the First Republic 
and the Fifth Republic is well illustrated by Ahn Byong-man. He describes the 
process by which a competitive two-party system in Korea developed to the point 
of institutionalisation but eventually failed to be institutionalised.15 The process 
of amending the constitution, which was usually accompanied by irregularities, 
may have served as the major issue which eventually polarised the political
- 20-
15 See Ahn, Byong-man, “Korean Political Parties and Political Development: Crucial Elections 
and the Process of Institutionalisation of the Political Party System,’’ Korea Journal, 18(1), 
1978, pp. 30-41; “The Process of Political Changes in Korea: An Analysis of Crucial Elections 
and Party Politics,’’ Korea & World Affairs, 9(4), 1985, pp. 625-646; and Han guk Chongbu- 
ron (Essays on Korean Government), 2nd ed., Seoul: Tasan, 1989, pp. 153-183.
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parties and the voters as well. According to Ahn, the Korean party system in the 
period 1948 to 1987 developed through four distinct phases in its 
institutionalisation process.16 Each phase included a “crucial” election, which 
eventually resulted in the failure of institutionalisation of a competitive party 
system attained by the election.17 The main thrust of his reasoning is that 
unconstitutional changes of political system may be expected as a result of 
“crucial” elections, unless ruling parties are prepared to accept the possibility of 
transferring political power through free competition, and, most likely, to their 
opponents.
The first phase consisted of Rhee Syngman’s regime (the First Republic of 
1948 to 1960), which collapsed as a consequence of the April 19th Student 
Revolution in 1960, along with the party system which resulted from the 
“crucial” election of 1958. After the “normal” 1954 election, where the ruling 
Liberal Party (LP) - newly formed by President Rhee in 1951 - garnered a 
landslide victory over the main opposition Democratic National Party (DNP), 
came the 1954 amendment that excepted President Rhee from the constitutional
16 See ibid., 1989.
17 In order to illustrate changes in the Korean party system, Ahn developed the concepts of 
“crucial” and “normal” elections by classifying the National Assembly elections from 1948 to 
1985 into these categories. Normal elections refer to those elections which failed in creating 
single opposition parties to challenge the power of governments or ruling parties, which have 
been common in Korean politics, whereas the crucial elections are those which posed serious 
threats to the maintenance of the political power of governments or ruling parties. The latter 
generally resulted from the sudden seizure by opposition parties of a considerable proportion of 
parliamentary seats: that is, by gaining more than one-third of parliamentary seats opposition 
parties not only would be able to prevent an amendment of the constitution, which usually 
restricted presidential terms, but also to present themselves as a meaningful challenger for the 
following presidential elections. He identified the 1958,1971,1978 and 1985 elections as crucial 
elections, which resulted in unconstitutional changes in the political system.
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limitation of two consecutive presidential terms. In the “crucial” 1958 election, 
the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) - the former DNP allied with other 
minor parties in 1955 to counter the ruling LP - appeared as a viable challenger 
for power succession. The LP at last resorted to a massive election fraud to win 
in the March 15th Rigged Presidential Election of 1960, and this eventuated in 
the Student Revolution that toppled the First Republic.
The Second Republic (1960 - 1961), which adopted a parliamentary system 
of government, was dominated by the DP, but lasted insufficiently long to 
institutionalise its party system because of the May 16th Military Coup in 1961. 
This begins the second phase of the institutionalisation process of the Korean 
party system in Ahn’s classification: that is, the period of the Third Republic 
(1963 - 1972) under President Park Chung-hee, terminating in Park’s 
authoritarian Yus hin regime. In the 1963 National Assembly election, and in the 
subsequent 1967 election, the newly set-up ruling Democratic Republican Party 
(DRP) secured a two-thirds majority in the Assembly over the New Democratic 
Party (NDP) - which became a main opposition party through until the end of the 
Fourth Republic. The constitution was again amended in 1969, allowing 
President Park to run for a third term, but the “crucial” 1971 National Assembly 
election, where the NDP fared well enough to pose a meaningful threat to the 
maintenance of prolonged one-man rule, resulted in a two-party system that was, 
however, suddenly abolished by the adoption of the Yushin constitution.
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Thus began the third phase of the development of the Korean party system 
in Ahn’s classification - the Fourth Republic (1972 -1979) under President Park’s 
Yushin regime. This phase includes the “crucial” 1978 National Assembly 
election, in which the popular votes won by the main opposition New Democratic 
Party exceeded the riding Democratic Republic Party’s votes. Although the 
opposition share of the seats was far less than that of the ruling party mainly 
because of the presidential appointees in the Assembly, this electoral victory may 
certainly have encouraged the opposition in demanding the democratisation of 
the authoritarian Yushin regime. This phase ended with the assassination of 
President Park which was followed by the military takeover of the government.
The fourth phase in Ahn’s classification consists of the Fifth Republic 
(1981 - 1987) under President Chun Doo-hwan, which adopted a simdar political 
system to the Yushin regime, although somewhat more relaxed. This phase also 
witnessed a “normal” election in 1981, where the ruling Democratic Justice Party 
(DJP) won a comfortable victory over the small opposition, Democratic Korea 
Party (DKP), albeit under circumstances which included the banning of the 
political activities of key opposition figures, who later in 1985 formed the New 
Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). In the “crucial” 1985 National Assembly 
election, the NKDP, formed about one month before the election, emerged as a 
main opposition and later absorbed most of the Assembly members of the DKP in 
its membership. Thus, the NKDP, commanding far more than one-third of the 
Assembly seats, could effectively prevent the passage of any proposal for
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constitutional revision in favour of the ruling party. Followed by the mass 
demonstration demanding democratic reforms in June 1987, the political order of 
the Fifth Republic was abandoned and a new constitution, which restored a direct 
presidential election, was adopted along with other democratic measures.
This ended, according to Ahn, “a vicious cycle-like process” of 
institutionalisation of the Korean party system, and began a period of 
institutionalised competitive party system. Ahn argues that the vicious cycle-like 
institutionalisation process of the party system was repeated at a quickened pace 
with each passing election, and finally reached the point where a competitive 
party system seemed to be institutionalised as democratisation proceeds.18 Given 
events since 1987, the competitive party system may persist so that a transfer of 
political power can be achieved by electoral procedures, not by external forces. 
Further, it may be no longer “normal” that the ruling party wins a clear majority 
in parliament with marginal: challenges from the opposition parties, thus 
diminishing the relevance of “crucial” elections for an analysis of elections 
beyond 1987.
Ahn, however, seemed to over-emphasise the discontinuous characteristics 
of changes in the Korean party system by relying mostly on the concept of 
“crucial” elections, in essence an ad hoc reasoning of political events. For 
example, within his framework it is hard to incorporate the development of
18 See Ahn, op cit., 1989, p. 181.
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opposition parties, which have grown through the struggle for democracy since 
the mid-1950s. In spite of the frequent alignments or realignments of party 
politicians and changes in name, it can be argued that the opposition parties 
maintained a single heritage from the beginnings of the Korea Democratic Party 
through the Democratic Nationalist, the Democratic, and the Civil Rule Party to 
the New Korea Democratic Party. Perhaps, the Korean party system has shown 
an enduring tendency since the 1950s, not only for its configuration of a two- 
party format but also its structuring of the vote. As Han Sung-joo pointed out, 
the presidential system of government that Korea has had for most of its history 
may have been one of the main factors encouraging politicians to be brought 
together around two major parties - “one for and the other against the 
government.”19 The division between the political parties, which had been highly 
politicised because of the violation of democratic game rules by the ruling power 
as reviewed above, may have also provided voters with a clear cue when they 
made a voting choice. Opposition parties, which usually formed a united front in 
the face of oncoming elections, may have attracted some segments of the voters 
who may have resented prolonged one-man rule, whereas the ruling parties 
mobilised other segments of the voters who have weighed stability or security of 
society as being of most importance.
19 See Han, Sung-joo, “South Korea: Politics in Transition,” in Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J., 
and Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Boulder. Lynne 
Rienner, 1989, pp. 266-303, at p.296. Also see Han, Ki-shik, “Development of Parties and 
Politics in Korea (I) & (II),” Korea Journal, 14 (9 & 10), 1974, pp. 37-50 & pp. 41-57.
Undoubtedly, there may also have been other issues, other than the question 
of legitimacy that was emphasised by Ahn as well as the others,20 that have 
shaped the votes in the long-run. Some issues like anti-Communism, which had 
been excessively used and abused by the Rhee government and by the military 
dominant regimes, for example, shaped the pattern of political competition itself: 
virtually, no parties on the left have existed since the Korean War. As a result, 
electoral choices in substance have been limited to choices among parties of the 
right and component factions. Other issues, like modernisation through 
industrialisation, which was initiated by President Park with a general acceptance 
of the public in 1960s, however, eventually resulted in controversy over problems 
of inequality between the elite and the masses, the urban and the rural dwellers, 
the rich and the poor, and between regions, in spite of the remarkable 
achievements of industrial efforts in enhancing the nation’s overall economic 
output.
In general, government parties have tended to stress the importance of anti- 
Communism along with the prime value of national security and political 
stability, and economic growth, whereas opposition parties have tended to 
emphasise the realisation of liberal democracy, respect for human rights and mass 
welfare. As past election outcomes indicate, government parties have dominated 
in elections by utilising those resources which they can deploy against the attack
- 26-
20 For example, Yang, Sung-chul reviewed the politics of Korea relying solely on the question of 
legitimacy. See his “Where Does South Korean Political Development Stand Now?: From 
Legitimacy Crisis to Democratisation Trial,” Korea & World Affairs, 23(1), 1994, pp. 5-22.
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of opposition parties concerning alleged authoritarian ascendancy. However, 
those contending issues may have varied from occasion to occasion in terms of 
issue priority, and the degree of their intensity in the competition may have also 
varied, depending on the political process. A detailed discussion on the patterns 
of party competition in the elections is given in the following section, focusing on 
the continuity and change of these contending issues.
4. Patterns of Party Competition and Voters’ Responses
From Liberation to the Korean War (1945 -1953).
In this period, following the process of separate nation-building in the South 
and North, and the war between the two Koreas, the ideology of anti­
communism became the dominant rhetoric of the Rhee government. The 
ideological clash between right-wing nationalists and communists became 
irreconcilable as the country’s temporary partition turned into a permanent 
division between two hostile political systems, and eventuated in the three years 
of civil war, which solved nothing but brought ruin to both halves of the country. 
Thereafter, party politics in South Korea have been largely limited to power 
struggles among parties of the right, devoid of conflicting ideological contention.
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Table 1-2. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1948-1952)
National Assembly Presidential
1948 1950 1952
Party Votes j  Seats Votes I Seats Candidate Votes
Major Rhee’s Group Rhee Syngman 74.6 %
NSRRKI 26.1 % j  55 6.8 % ! 14
KNP — i 9.7 % i  24
KDP (DNP in 1950) 13.5% \ 29 9.8 % ! 24 Lee Shi-young 10.9%
Minor Parties 20.1 % 31 10.8% 22 Cho Bong-am 11.4%
Independents 40.3 % 85 62.9 % 126 Others 3.1 %
Total 100% 200 100% 210 Total 100%
Note: NSRRKI - The National Society for Rapid Realisation of Korean Independence (the 
National Association in 1950); KNP - The Korean National Party; KDP - The Korean 
Democratic Party; and DNP - The Democratic National Party.
Source: Chungang-son’go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), 
Taehanmin’guk Son'go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea), Vol.1, Seoul: Central 
Election Management Committee, 1973.
The momentum for rightist parties in gaining a political hegemony over 
other political groups - especially over leftist groups - came with a disagreement 
on the issue concerning the Moscow accords, which arranged a four-power 
trusteeship of Korea for up to five years and assigned the US and the USSR to 
establish a unified provisional Korean government. The left-wing groups’ 
sudden reversal from the anti-trusteeship stance, which had originally been 
advocated by all political groups as one might have expected in a country that 
had just been liberated from almost four decades of foreign rule, became a 
rallying point for the right in their denunciation of the left. With the 
progressively deteriorating relationship between the US and the USSR, both the 
Soviet and the American occupation forces had moved in the direction of 
establishing two Korean states by sponsoring separate Korean advisory and
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administrative bodies in Seoul and Pyongyang. The worsening relationship 
between the two super powers undoubtedly prompted the American shift to 
support the nationalist right-wing groups in South Korea.
Although the trusteeship project soon collapsed following Korean 
opposition, by late 1947 no other effective step had been taken to produce any 
working arrangement between the American forces south of the thirty-eighth 
parallel and the Soviet army north of the line. “The Korean question” was 
handed over to the newly formed United Nations, and the General Assembly 
adopted the American proposal for the establishment of a United Nations 
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise general elections 
leading to the formation of an independent Korean government.21 The Soviet- 
occupied North, however, disputed the UN’s authority to undertake such a 
mission and refused UNTCOK entry to the northern zone, mainly because of the 
fear that the larger population and American influence in the South would dilute 
Soviet strength in the North. The general election of the Constitutional Assembly 
was held on May 10, 1948 only in the southern part of the country, while 
nationalists like Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, who did not accept the idea of 
founding a separate government in the south, withdrew from the election, and the 
communists and nationalists of the left orientation were eliminated from the 
contest. Two months later a constitution with a modified presidential system was 
adopted by the Assembly, and the Assembly elected Rhee Syngman as first
21 See Gordenker, Leon, “The United Nations, the United States Occupation and the 1948 
Election in Korea,” Political Science Quarterly, 73(3), 1958, pp. 426-450.
president of the Republic of Korea established on August 15, 1948. With the 
subsequent emergence of the Democratic People’s Republic in the north, anti­
communism became an indisputable political ideology in the south.22
The ideology of anti-Communism was further intensified as a corollary of 
the Korean War (1950-53). In practice, the governments in power - especially 
the Rhee government and the military dominated regimes - often utilised anti­
communist ideology as a major device for political manipulation against their 
opponents. Anti-communism, which is in nature closely related to the national 
security issue, not only served as a device of governments for mass manipulation 
and mobilisation, but also limited the pattern of political competition itself. 
Indeed, as anti-Communism became an irrefutable national policy, the 
ideological dimension in political competition became a monolithic rather than a 
polarising one.23 Even if an acute ideological cleavage could be found among the 
well-mobilised sectors of society, that is, among the politicians or intellectuals, 
there may have been an overall ideological consensus or “ideological apathy” 
among the mass public as a result of coercion, or acquiescence to the prevailing 
ideological climate.24 Having been manipulated by the Rhee government, the 
national security issue relating to the ever-present threat from the north became
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22 See Yang, Sung-chul, “Political Ideology in Korean Politics: Its Elements and Roles,” in Kim, 
Se-jin and Cho, Chang-hyun (eds.), Government and Politics of Korea, Silver Spring: The 
Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972, pp. 25-42.
23 See ibid., 1972, p.32.
24 See Han, Sung-joo, “Political Dissent in South Korea, 1948-1961,” in Kim and Cho, op.cit., 
1972, pp. 43-69, at pp. 65-66. Also see Park, Sang-seek, “Legacy of the Korean War Its Impact 
on South Korea’s Domestic Politics, Economic Development, and Foreign Policy,” Korea & 
World Affairs, 15(2), 1991, pp. 302-316.
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one of the most important assets for the government parties - especially of the 
military dominated regimes - in mobilising the general public for their own 
purposes during politically significant occasions.
Eventually, however, the various right-wing forces that had stood behind 
Rhee to establish an anti-Communist regime in the south came to be divided into 
two opposing groups, as a result of a power struggle between Rhee and the 
Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which had emerged in September 1945 as a 
centre of those extreme right wing forces which were arranged against the rapidly 
rising “progressive” movement.25 The conflict became sharp when the 
Democratic National Party (the former KDP) submitted a constitutional 
amendment bill calling for a parliamentary system of government in place of the 
existing presidential system of government.26 The bill was voted down and the 
conflict then subsided because the Korean War broke out. In November 1951, 
one year before the termination of Rhee’s presidency, Rhee’s administration 
submitted a constitutional amendment bill calling for direct, popular election of 
the president because Rhee had little or no chance of re-election by the 
Assembly, following the National Assembly election of May 1950, in which 
Rhee’s supporters won only one-fourth of the seats (see Table 1-2). The bill was 
also rejected, in spite of Rhee’s effort in organising the Liberal Party (LP) in 
1951 for parliamentary maneuvering. Political confrontation centring around the
25 See Oh, Byung-hun, “Trial of Liberal Democracy in Korea,” Koreana Quarterly, 9(1), 1967, 
pp. 21-40.
26 See Pak, Chi-young, op.cit., 1980, pp. 88-93.
issue of a constitutional amendment became intense, but the bill prescribing 
popular election of the president was finally adopted only by resorting to 
irregularities in the wartime provisional capital of Pusan.27 In the 1952 
Presidential election, Rhee won another presidential term receiving 74.6 per cent 
of the popular vote without major opponents.
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Rhee Syngman s One-Man Rule to the Military Government (1954  - 1963).
Rhee enjoyed considerable popularity as an independence hero and 
statesman who led the right-wing forces against the leftist groups, and as a key 
contributor to the establishment of the Republic of Korea during the chaotic post- 
Liberation period. Without viable political rivals Rhee had won his presidencies 
by substantial margins, sometimes resorting to election riggings and government 
interference.28 Political figures like Yo Un-hyong and Kim Ku had been 
assassinated during the nation-building period, major opposition candidates like 
Shin Ik-hui and Cho Byong-ok died during the election campaigns of 1956 and 
1960, respectively, and Cho Bong-am, leader of the Progressive Party, who had 
received almost 30 per cent of the popular vote for the presidency in 1956 (see 
Table 1-3), was subsequently convicted of treason and executed. However, Rhee
27 See ibid., pp. 93-111.
28 See, for a detailed analysis on the electoral irregularities of the Rhee regime, Yu, Suk-ran, 
“Son’go-ui Kwonwijuui-jok Unyong-gwa Yokkinung (Authoritarian Use of the Elections and its 
Functional Reversal),” in Han, Bae-ho (ed.), Han’guk Hyondae Chongch’i-ron (Essays on the 
Contemporary Korean Politics), I, Seoul: Nanam, 1990, pp. 373-394. Also see Han’guk- 
chongch’i-yon’guhoe (Research Association of Korean Politics), Han’guk Chongch’i-Sa (Korean 
Political History), Seoul: Paeksan Sodang, 1990, pp. 285-306.
and his Liberal Party (LP), who again managed to amend the constitution, with 
irregularity, to permit his third term as president, encountered fierce opposition 
from those demanding the realisation of liberal democracy. Rhee’s charisma and 
his appeal for “the people’s unity” (around him) faded away. Triggered off by 
the election frauds evident in the fourth presidential (and vice-presidential) 
election of 1960, students revolted against the Rhee government in April, and 
finally brought to an end his one-man rule.
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Table 1-3. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1954-1960)
National Assembly Presidential
1954 1958 I960* 1956
Party Votes i  Seats Votes i  Seats Votes j  Seats Candidate Votes
LP 36.8% ! 114 42.1% ! 126 2.7% 1 2 Rhee Syngman 70.0%
DP (DNP) 7.9% [ 15 34.2% j  79 41.7% | 175 Shin lk-hui —
M in o r P a rtie s 7.4% j 7 2.2% j 1 8.8% j 7 Cho Bong-am 30.0%
In d e p e n d e n ts 47.9% !  67 21.5% ! 27 46.8% j 49
Total 100% !  203 100% !  233 100% !  233 Total 100%
Note: LP - The Liberal Party: and DP - The Democratic Party (the Democratic National Party in 
1954).
* - In the Upper House election, the DP won 31 seats out of the total 58; the LP 4 seats; the 
minor parties 3 seats; and the remaining 20 seats were won by the Independents.
Source: Chungang-son’go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), 
Taehanmin’guk Son’go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea), Vol.1, Seoul: Central 
Election Management Committee, 1973.
In this period, party politics became centred around the issue of 
constitutional amendment, and, further, realisation of democratic rules. The LP, 
which had been inaugurated by Rhee to fulfill the need to form his own force in 
parliament in 1951, was reorganised by Lee Ki-bung toward the end of 1953 for
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the third National Assembly election of the following year. Since no president 
was allowed to serve more than two terms under the existing constitution, Rhee 
and his LP were determined to win a majority of more than two-thirds in the 
election for the passage of a constitutional amendment which would lift the 
limitation on the presidential term. In the 1954 election, the LP won 114 out of 
203 seats against the disunited Democratic National Party (DNP) who won only 
15 seats, a result mainly due to the administration’s illegal interference in the 
elections. By recruiting some of the Independents, who had taken a considerable 
portion of the membership in parliament since the first Assembly, the LP 
introduced a bill amending the constitution, but the affirmative votes (135 out of 
203) were one vote short of the two-thirds requirement. Originally the bill was 
declared defeated, but the LP dominated parliament reversed the earlier ruling on 
the next day, and declared the passage of the bill, mathematically rounding off 
the number of the votes.
This sa-sa-o-ip (rounding-off) constitutional amendment crisis not only had 
a demoralising effect on the LP as the voters were already disillusioned with its 
leadership, but also it led to the formation of a broad, unified opposition 
Democratic Party (DP) among the anti-Rhee legislators (except for Cho Bong- 
am’s group) in 1955. Disenchantment with Rhee’s administration became visible 
during the presidential election campaign of 1956: for example, the Democratic 
Party presidential candidate, “Shin Ik-hui’s May 3 campaign speech on the shore 
of Han River .... attracted about 30,000 citizens, the largest audience ever
assembled in Korea for such a purpose.”29 Further, in spite of various election 
irregularities committed by the administration, the opposition DP strengthened its 
position in the National Assembly election of 1958: indeed, it was the first 
election in which a single opposition party won more than one-third of the seats. 
More significantly, the DP won over 80 per cent of the seats in the major cities of 
Seoul and Pusan, and gained almost 64 per cent of the seats in the other urban 
areas, while the LP showed strength only in the rural areas.30 The breaches of the 
democratic rules of the game brought forward the issue of political democracy in 
political competition during this period: indeed, the issue of political democracy 
became a rallying point for opposition forces through to the end of the Fifth 
Republic.
In the face of the visible rise in popular support for the DP, the LP resorted 
to massive electoral fraud in the 1960 presidential election. Under the growing 
pressure of the opposition and the student uprising, and denunciation of the 
March 15 election as illegal, and null and void, Rhee was forced to announce his 
resignation, and a provisional caretaker government was formed. As Han pointed 
out, “the April uprising could be considered a revolutionary attempt by those 
with liberal-democratic orientations to destroy the ‘power-dependent’ pro- 
government forces allied with Syngman Rhee.”31 Under a new constitution
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29 See Pak, Chi-young, op.cit, 1980, p.190.
30 See Lee, Kap-yun, “Electoral Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of 
Korea (1948-85),” in Political Leadership in a Changing Society, Proceedings of the Second 
Asian-Pacific Political Science Association, Seoul, 1986, pp. 151-163, atp.155, Table 2.
31 See Han, Sung-joo, op.cit., 1974, p. 138.
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prescribing a parliamentary system of government, the fifth National Assembly 
election was held in July 1960, resulting in the overwhelming victory of the DP, 
which won 175 out of 233 seats in the lower House and gained 31 seats out of 58 
in the upper House without major opponents (see Table 1-3).
With its indecisiveness and inconsistency regarding the punishment of 
former leaders of the Rhee regime, the Chang Myon government of the Second 
Republic, which was unable to form a stable and reliable parliamentary majority 
to back his post-revolutionary programs, not only alienated itself from many of 
its coalition partners who expected a revolutionary punishment of former pro- 
Rhee officials, but also failed to attract the loyalty of the former administrative 
and law enforcement apparatus such as the police to the new government because 
of its eventual punitive legislation against these agencies.32 As a result, the 
Chang government not only lost its electoral and intellectual support, but also 
nullified the effectiveness of its administrative and law enforcement network. 
For its survival, perhaps at least one of these was needed. The short trial period 
of liberal democracy in Korea ended with the military coup on May 16, 1961. 
The military junta, under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee, formed a 
military council known as the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 
which had virtually all governmental power, and suspended most political 
activities such as the operation of the political parties, pressure groups, and many 
newspapers.33
32 See ibid., pp. 145-165.
33 See Kim, Se-jin, op.ciL, 1971, pp. 107-109.
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Developmental Authoritarianism under Park Chung-hee (1963 -  1979).
After one and half years of direct rule, the military government drafted a 
revised constitution, and a national referendum ratified it on December 27, 1962. 
A presidential form of government was revived under the new constitution, in 
which the president was given greater power than that of the First Republic.34 In 
the presidential election of October 1963, Park Chung-hee, head of the military 
junta since the coup in May 1961 and the nominee of the newly created 
Democratic Republic Party (DRP), won the presidency in competition against 
Yun Po-sun, the nominee of the major opposition party and former president of 
the Second Republic, by a narrow margin, gaining 46.6 per cent of the votes 
against the 45.1 per cent votes polled by Yun (see Table 1-4). In the following 
National Assembly election, Park’s DRP easily gained a clear plurality with 33.5 
per cent of the vote against fragmented opposition: the main opposition Civil 
Rule Party (CRP) won a mere 20.1 per cent of the vote. There may have been, 
however, strong sentiment against the military government’s extra-constitutional 
take-over, especially among the urban voters.35 Nonetheless, Park and the 
military revolutionaries were able to successfully constitute themselves within a 
civilian political framework by adding a new dimension of economic 
modernisation to politics on top of the national security issue.
34 See Kim, Se-jin, “National Government and Politics in South Korea,” in Kim and Cho, op.cit., 
1972, pp. 70-90, atpp. 74-84.
35 See Kim, C.I. Eugene, “Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections,” Asian Survey, 4(3), 1964, 
pp. 765-773.
Table 1-4. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1963-1978) 
A: The National Assembly Elections
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1963 1967 1971 1973 1978
Party Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
DRP 3 3 .5 % 88(22) 50.6% 102(27) 48.8% 86(27) 38.8% 73 31 .7% 68
NDP
(CRP)
2 0 .1 % 27(14) 32 .7% 28(17) 44 .4% 65(24) 32 .5% 52 32 .8% 61
M inor
Parties
4 6 .4 % 1 6(8 ) 16.7% 1 6.8% 2 10 .2% 2 7.4% 3
Independ­
ents
— - — -- -- -- 18.6% 19 28.1% 22
Total 1 0 0 % 131(44) 1 0 0 % 131(44) 1 0 0 % 153(51) 1 0 0 % 146 1 0 0 % 154
Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket; and the appointees are excluded. 
DRP - The Democratic Republican Party; and NDP - The New Democratic Party (the Civil Rule 
Party in 1963).
B: The Presidential Elections
1963 1967 1971
Candidate Votes Candidate Votes Candidate Votes
Park Chung-hee 46.6 % Park Chung-hee 51.4 % Park Chung-hee 53.2 %
Yun Po-son 45.1 % Yun Po-son 40.9 % Kim Dae-iung 45.3 %
Others 8.3 % Others 7.7 % Others 1.5%
Source: Chungang-son'go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), 
Taehanmin’guk Son’go Sa (Election History of the Republic of Korea), Vol.1-3, Seoul: Central 
Election Management Committee, 1973,1973, and 1980.
In the 1967 presidential election, Park won a resounding victory over Yun, 
polling 51.4 per cent of the votes against 40.9 per cent. In the following National 
Assembly election, Park’s DRP secured more than a two-thirds majority, polling 
50.6 per cent of the votes, while Yun’s New Democratic Party (NDP) - a new  
united opposition party formed to contest the 1967 elections - polled 32.7 per 
cent o f the votes but gained a mere 45 (including 17 of the national-list seats) 
seats out o f a total 175 (including 44 of the national-list seats). One of the
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obvious contributing factors for the landslide victory of the incumbent Park 
administration and the ruling DRP was that they had successfully completed the 
first five-year economic development plan (1962 - 1966) and promised more for 
the future.36 The organisational and financial superiority of the ruling party may 
have been another factor in its victory.37
By 1971, however, a new issue had emerged: the DRP amended the 
constitution to allow Park to stay in power for a third consecutive term, and, thus, 
the continuation of one-man rule (and official abuses and corruption associated 
with it) became a significant campaign issue for the opposition. Park’s re- 
election in 1971 was confidently expected, given the remarkable economic 
achievements of the Park regime and the overwhelming approval recorded in the 
national referendum for the constitutional amendment in 1969. In the event, Park 
won, but with a slight margin of less than one million votes over the NDP 
candidate, Kim Dae-jung. Kim raised many contentious issues - Park’s violation 
of democratic principle regarding his pursuit of the third term, corruption in 
administration, and the negative aspects of Park’s economic development 
programs - and seems to have had a formula for solving problems by advocating 
his own programs of Daejung Minjujuui (mass democracy), Daejung Kyongje 
(mass economy), and Daejung Pokchi (mass welfare).38 As a result, urban-rural
36 See Kim, C l. Eugene, “Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections,” Pacific Affairs, 41(1), 1968, 
pp. 60-70.
37 See ibid., pp. 69-70. Also see Han, Y.C., “Political Parties and Political Development in South 
Korea,” Pacific Affairs, 42(4), 1969-70, pp. 446-464.
38 See Lee, Chae-jin, “South Korea: Political Competition and Government Adaptation,” Asian 
Survey, 12(1), 1972, pp. 38-45. Also see Kim, C.I. Eugene, “The Meaning of the 1971 Korean 
Elections: A Pattem of Political Development,” Asian Survey, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224.
differences in political support became more salient than previously, amidst 
political mobilisation of the geographical bases of the candidates that was also 
sharpened.39
In the following National Assembly election, the ruling Democratic 
Republic Party experienced a major loss compared to previous ones, even though 
it was able to retain majority status, winning a total of 113 (including 27 of the 
national-list seats) seats out of the total 204 (including the 51 national-list seats). 
The opposition New Democratic Party won 44.4 per cent of the votes with 89 
seats (including 24 of the national-list seats), while the ruling party gained 48.8 
per cent of the votes. The main campaigning thrust of the opposition candidates 
was to convince voters of the need for a strong opposition in the Assembly to 
prevent another constitutional amendment to make Park a life-time president, a 
precedent remembered by the voters in the case of Rhee Syngman. The voters, 
who had not rejected Park’s third term as president, showed a strong mood of 
protest against the Park regime.
Faced with declining electoral support, Park opted for a fundamental change 
in the rules of electoral contest. The initiation of a dialogue with North Korea for 
the first time in 20 years, which envisioned peaceful unification of the country, 
was a prelude to the change to the so-called Yus hin system of government. In
40 -
39 See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., “Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: 
An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections,” The Journal of Politics, 34(3), 1972, pp. 
825-859.
October 1972, Park imposed martial law, dissolved the Assembly, banned all 
political activities, and prepared for a new constitution, invoking the need to 
strengthen the domestic system in light of the changing situation both at home 
and abroad - that is, dialogue with North Korea and the changing mood of the 
Cold War. Under the new constitutional order, which was approved by a 
national referendum held under martial law, the president was to be indirectly 
elected by a rubber-stamp electoral college, which assured Park of indefinite 
power, and the Assembly would be under the control of the governing party. The 
party would most likely command a two-thirds majority since the constitution 
also gave the president the power to hand-pick one-third of the Assembly 
membership, and also adopted a single-ballot plurality formula in two-member 
districts for the remaining two-thirds of the contested Assembly seats, which 
would guarantee the governing party at least one seat in every district.
The 1972 Yus hin system all but ensured the perpetuation of Park’s rule and 
curtailed civil rights, and elections under it, therefore, lost their conventional 
meaning. In the 1973 National Assembly election, the ruling Democratic 
Republic Party won exactly one half of the contested seats with 38.8 per cent of 
the votes, but was in a position to control exactly two-thirds of the Assembly 
members because of the one-third appointed members. In the 1978 Assembly 
election, the ruling party won only 31.7 per cent of the votes but controlled 
nearly two-thirds of the seats - however, the main opposition NDP, which polled 
32.8 per cent of the votes, outperforming the ruling party by 1.1 per cent, claimed
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a victory. In spite of some factors which tended to buttress Park’s position - that 
is, the increasing economic prosperity, and the periodic incidents provoked by 
North Korea (and skillfully manipulated by the government to generate a genuine 
fear among the public) - the Yushin system eventually resulted in the alienation of 
many segments of society because of its coercive characteristics, and wa&Äööy 
ended by the sudden and violent death of Park.
Quasi-Authoritarianism under Chun Doo-hwan (1980 -1987).
A new junta of army officers led by Major General Chun Doo-hwan came 
to power in the course of a ten-month period following Park’s assassination. The 
junta demonstrated its willingness to use military force against its own citizens, 
as witnessed in the suppression of the popular uprising in Kwangju. Chun 
adopted a similar system of government to the Yushin regime: the president was 
to be indirectly elected by an electoral college of some five thousand delegates 
although serving for only one term of seven years; and the ruling party would 
secure a majority in the Assembly with only about one-third of the popular votes, 
by allocating two-thirds of the proportional seats, which consisted of one-third of 
the total Assembly seats, to the party gaining the most votes - most likely the 
ruling party. The single-ballot plurality formula in a two-member district was 
also maintained, which meant that one party could hope to capture at best one of
the two seats.
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Chiin’s Fifth Republic, however, lacked the legitimacy it needed from the 
beginning: not only did Chun come to power by military coup (and was then 
confirmed in his presidency by an easily m anipulate electoral college), but he 
presided during the Kwangju Incident, which cost several hundred lives and 
which continued to obstruct the legitimacy he sought throughout the Fifth 
Republic. Although Chun’s new Democratic Justice Party (DJP) gained about 
54.7 per cent of the seats in the 1981 Assembly elections (see Table 1-5), slightly 
less than the 55.5 per cent maximum possible for one party,40 the legitimacy of 
Chun’s regime seemed not to be established because former politicians who 
could challenge his regime, including the three Kims (Kim Dae-jung, Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil), had been banned from political activity. Apart 
from coercive measures, perhaps the only thing that sustained Chun’s regime was 
his repeated pledge to turn the office over to an elected successor in February 
1988. As Eckert and others have pointed out, “the apparent assumption of Chun 
and his group was that continued economic growth, coupled with a few, largely 
cosmetic, political changes to distinguish the Fifth Republic from the Yusin (sic) 
system, would in time allow the new regime to gain public acceptance, just as 
Park’s pre-Yusin regime had come to be more widely accepted in the late 
1960’s.”41
40 If a party elects one o f its members in every two-member district, it yields one-third o f the total 
Assembly seats. With allocation o f the national-list seats (two-ninths o f the total - i.e., two-thirds 
of the one-third national-list seats), the party would be able to produce a five-ninths majority in 
the Assembly.
41 See Eckert, Carter J., Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, Young-ick, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward 
W., Korea Old and New: A History, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990, p.377.
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Table 1-5. The National Assembly Election Results (1981-1985)
1981 1985
Party Votes Seats Votes Seats
DJP 35.6 % 90 (61) 35.3 % 87 (61)
DKP 21.6 % 57 (24) 19.7% 26 (9)
KNP 13.3% 18 (7) 9.2 % 15 (5)
NKDP — — 29.3 % 50 (17)
Minor Parties 18.8% 8 3.3 % 2
Independents 10.7% 11 3.2 % 4
Total 100% 184 (92) 100% 184 (92)
Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket.
DJP - The Democratic Justice Party; DKP - The Democratic Korean Party; KNP - The Korean 
National Party; and NKDP - The New Korean Democratic Party.
Source: Chungang-son’go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), Che 11 
Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son’go Sanghwang (The 11th National Assembly Election Proceedings), 
1981; and Che 12 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son’go Ch’ongram (The 12th National Assembly Election 
Proceedings), Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1985.
The outcome of the 1985 National Assembly election disproved this 
assumption. Chun’s DJP retained its predominant position by polling the largest 
share of votes (35.3 per cent), but the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), 
formed barely one month before the election by politicians newly liberated from 
the ban on campaigning, outperformed both of the established opposition parties, 
and polled only 6 per cent less than that of the ruling party. More significantly, 
the NKDP outperformed the DJP in urban areas by a wide margin, as in the 
previous “crucial” elections in which the legitimacy of the existing regime had 
been put into question.42 The strong showing of the NKDP - which campaigned 
for democratisation, including the demand for constitutional revision to permit
42 See Koh, B.C., “The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,’’ Asian Survey, 25(9), 
1985, pp. 883-897.
direct presidential elections - was viewed as an indirect referendum that 
underscored the illegitimacy of the Chun regime.
Toward the end of Chun’s presidency, constitutional amendment seemed to 
be inevitable, but the DJP and the NKDP were poles apart regarding the form of 
government it would have. While the ruling party pressed for a parliamentary 
form of government, which might perhaps have allowed the perpetuation of its 
rule, the opposition party preferred a presidential system, as it was confident of 
its capacity to defeat the ruling party in a direct presidential election.43 Amidst 
the dispute over the issue, on April 13, 1987, Chun suspended any further public 
debate on amending the constitution to permit direct presidential elections in 
1987. An indirect election of the president by an electoral college would 
certainly have guaranteed Chun transferring power to Roh Tae-woo, who was, on 
June 10, nominated as the DJP’s presidential candidate. From the day of Roh’s 
nomination large-scale mass demonstrations were mobilised throughout the 
country’s major cities, until Roh came up with an eight-point program of 
democratic reform including an endorsement of direct presidential elections on 
June 29.
45 -
43 See Lee, Man-woo, The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987-1990, New  
York: Praeger, 1990, pp. 19-43.
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Democratisation and Onwards (1987 - 1992).
In December 1987, the practice of direct presidential election was restored 
after an interval of 16 years, and this led to the first peaceful transfer of power 
achieved by means of election. Heading toward the election and in spite of 
repeated public pledges to work together and numerous negotiations, the main 
opposition party was divided into the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), led 
by Kim Young-sam, and the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), headed by 
Kim Dae-jung. Kim Jong-pil, a former Prime Minister under the Park regime, 
also ran for election as a candidate of the New Democratic Republic Party 
(NDRP). In this election, Roh Tae-woo, a former general and a leader of the 
ruling DJP hand-picked by President Chun, won his one-term five-year 
presidency by gaining 36.6 per cent of the votes, ahead of the two opposition 
leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who together polled 55.1 per cent of 
the votes (see Table 1-6). Had the opposition camp agreed to a single candidacy, 
Roh’s victory would have been unlikely without resorting to massive election 
fraud.44 Although there had been instances of vote-buying, intimidation, and 
fraud, the election results were generally accepted by the public - the 
opposition’s defeat was attributed to the failure of a single candidacy between the 
two Kims.
44 Lee Man-woo, however, articulated a different view: “The victory of the opposition depended 
upon which Kim was to emerge as the single opposition candidate,” and “only Kim Young-sam, 
broadly supported except in the Cholla provinces, had any chance of winning.” See ibid., p.46.
Table 1-6. The National Assembly and Presidential Election Results (1987-1992) 
A: 1987-1988
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1987 Presidential 1988 National Assembly
Candidate Votes Party Votes Seats
Roh Tae-woo 36.6 % DJP 34.0 % 87 (38)
Kim Young-sam 28.0 % RDP 23.8% 46 (13)
Kim Dae-iung 27.1 % PPD 19.3% 54 (16)
Kim Jong-pil 8.1 % NDRP 15.6% 27 (8)
Others 0.2 % Minor Parties 2.5 % 1
Independents 4.8 % 9
Total 100% Total 100% 224 (75)
Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket.
DJP - The Democratic Justice Party; RDP - Reunification Democratic Party; PPD - Party for 
Peace and Democracy; and NDRP - The New Democratic Republican Party.
B: 1992
1992 National Assembly 1992 Presidential
Party Votes Seats Candidate Votes
DLP 38.5 % 116 (33) Kim Young-sam 42.0 %
DP 29.2 % 75 (22) Kim Dae-iung 33.8 %
UNP 17.4% 24 (7) Chung Ju-young 16.3%
Minor Parties 3.4 % I 1 Others 7.9 %
Independents 11.5% ! 21 (Park Chan-jong) (6.4%)
Total 100% 237 (62) Total 100%
Note: The distribution of the national-list seats is in bracket.
DLP - The Democratic Liberal Party; DP - The Democratic Party; and UNP - The Unification 
National Party.
Source: Chungang-son’go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), Che 13 
Dae Taet’ongryong Son'go Ch’ongram (The 13th Presidential Election Proceedings), 1987; Che 
13 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son’go Ch’ongram (The 13th National Assembly Election Proceedings), 
1988; Che 14 Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son’go Ch’ongram (The 14th National Assembly Election 
Proceedings), 1992; and Che 14 Dae Taet’ongryong Son’go Ch’ongram (The 14th Presidential 
Election Proceedings), Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1992.
M ost striking was that the pattern of vote distribution showed an extreme 
regional bias: each of the candidates performed well exclusively in the regions
with which they had a tie. The main dimension in the contest shifted from that of 
the oppositions’ demand for the realisation of democratic rules versus the
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govemment’s pledge for stability, to the highly controversial and essentially 
emotional regional one. Several reasons can be cited for this extreme regional 
distribution of votes. However, one of the most obvious was that the potential 
rivalry among regions became highly visible during the campaign due to the fact 
that the candidates had distinctive and different regional ties (see Chapter 5 for a 
detailed analysis). This pattem of regional differences in electoral competition 
persisted in the following National Assembly election.
In the 1988 National Assembly election, however, the ruling DJP failed to 
secure a simple majority in parliament, winning only 125 seats of the total 299, 
with 34.0 per cent of the vote. Kim Dae-jung’s PPD came second, winning 70 
seats with 19.3 per cent of the vote, and Kim Young-sam’s RDP won 59 seats, 
gaining 23.8 per cent of the vote. Kim Jong-pil’s NDRP also won 35 seats with 
15.6 per cent of the vote. This so-called yoso yadae (small governing party, big 
opposition) shattered the past pattem of executive dominance over the 
parliament, which had usually been achieved by governments controlling a 
comfortable majority in parliament. However, this yoso yadae did not last for 
long. At the end of 1989, two opposition parties, Kim Young-sam’s RDP and 
Kim Jong-pil’s NDRP, merged with the governing party, forming the Democratic 
Liberal Party (DLP). After this merger, some changes in the political system 
were expected, such as the adoption of a parliamentary based executive which 
could be a method of maintaining the political power of the majority ruling
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coalition, but these changes were not realised, even though the ruling party 
commanded almost two-thirds of the parliamentary members.
In the March 1992 National Assembly elections, the ruling DLP again failed 
to secure a simple majority, this time by one seat, winning 149 out of total 299 
seats with 38.5 per cent of the vote. Only by recruiting some of the 21 
Independent parliamentary members, who together polled about 12 per cent of 
the vote, did the ruling party come up with a simple majority in the 14th National 
Assembly. In this election, the Democratic Party (DP), a coalition of the former 
PPD and the former RDP members who rejected joining the ruling coalition, 
emerged as a main opposition, winning 97 seats with 29.3 per cent of the vote. 
The newly-formed Unification National Party (UNP), led by a big businessman 
Chung Ju-young, also faired unexpectedly well gaining 31 seats with 17.4 per 
cent of the vote. This election revealed that any ruling party would experience 
difficulty winning a clear majority in parliament once the institutional distortion 
of allocating assembly seats had been removed. In this election, Korean voters 
may have delivered a protest vote against the DLP for its arbitrary decision to 
form a majority ruling coalition.
The December 1992 presidential election was set to choose the first civilian 
president in 31 years. Kim Young-sam as the ruling Democratic Liberal Party 
candidate promised “reforms in stability,” while Kim Dae-jung called for “grand 
reconciliation” so as to moderate his radical image as a former dissident and to
overcome his concentrated but limited support from the Cholla region and its 
environs. Chung Ju-young, as a successful businessman and the founder of the 
Hyundai Group, tried to portray himself as an “economic president.” With no 
difference on policies, for all agreed on the need for democratisation, revitalising 
the economy, and reunification with North Korea, Kim Young-sam won the 
presidency with 42 per cent of the votes over Kim Dae-jung, who polled 33.8 per 
cent, and Chung, who polled 16.3 per cent. The victory by Kim Young-sam 
indicates that a majority of the Korean voters preferred ‘stability’ to ‘change.’ 
Underneath the surface, however, regional sentiment, or regional antagonism to 
be specific, may have played a decisive role as indicated by the pattern of 
regional distribution in electoral support. Kim Dae-jung outperformed Kim 
Young-sam only in his stronghold Cholla region, and ran closely with Kim 
Young-sam in the neutral regions of Seoul and Kyonggi; further, Kim Dae-jung 
even came behind Chung Ju-young in the rival Kyongsang region, and ran 
closely with Chung in the neutral Chungchong region (see Table 5-1 in Chapter 
5).
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In short, party competition in Korea since its establishment in 1948 could 
be summarised as a contest between a dominant government party and an anti- 
government party. The government party has been successful in maintaining its 
power through electoral or other means, even though the opposition parties’ 
challenge has been more than a marginal one, especially when the legitimacy 
issue was at stake. However, the voters’ response has not been, by and large,
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uniform: after all, the ruling party under the authoritarian governments may have 
been most successful in winning support from the less sophisticated voters, and 
the degree of their support has also fluctuated depending on political situations of 
the time, as reviewed above. In the next chapter, the propositions which have 
been developed to explain the patterns of voter alignment in the elections prior to 
1987 will be reviewed. Presumably, the voters’ response in the elections held 
after the democratisation of the political system in 1987 may be different from 
the previous ones, given the changes in the rules of party competition. Leaving 
this question to be tested with empirical data in the following chapters, the 
propositions developed for the explanation of the observed patterns of voter 
alignment - most notably, the yoch’on yado (government rural, opposition urban) 
phenomenon and regional voting - will be reviewed.
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Chapter 2. Political Cleavages and Propositions: A Review
1. Introduction
In any political entity, it may not be natural to assume a complete 
homogeneity of its constituents. If there k  the rich, then there is the poor; if 
there are whites, then there are coloureds; if there k  the religious, then there is 
the non-religious; if there are the urbanities, then there are the rural dwellers; and 
so forth. There may be many kinds of “haves” and “have-nots,” or various ranges 
in between. 1 However, it may be an error to assume that all cleavages or 
differences in a society have political significance. Whether a cleavage in a 
society comes to hold political relevance may be largely dependent upon its 
structure as well as the process by which it is politicised.
In their classical study on the development of European party systems and 
voter alignments, for example, Lipset and Rokkan identified four main cleavages 
that were produced by the two waves of “National” and “Industrial” revolutions 
accompanied by extension of the suffrage: that is, the two cleavages of “Subject 
vs Dominant Culture” and “Church vs Government” were a corollary of the
1 For example, Rae and Taylor broadly define a cleavage as “a family of sets of individuals,” 
including cleavages of opinion and behaviour as well as societal cleavages. See Rae, Douglas 
W., and Taylor, Michael, The Analysis of Political Cleavages, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970, pp. 23-24.
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conflicts over the mobilisation by the “nation-builders” during the nation­
building period. 2 The Industrial Revolution also produced two more cleavages, 
“Primary vs Secondary Economy” and “Workers vs Employers, Owners,” that 
were formulated by conflicting economic interests within the nation. The 
established party alternatives, which nonetheless varied across nations in terms of 
which set or sets they have developed for their national party systems, according 
to Lipset and Rokkan, “have remained roughly the same through decades of 
subsequent changes in the structural conditions of partisan choice. ” 3 Since then, 
two more waves of social change - that is, the emergence of the welfare state and 
post-industrialism - have been identified. This resulted in the new “sectoral” and 
“value” cleavages, respectively, but only adding the new cleavages to the old 
cleavages, rather than replacing the old ones, for their political significance. 4
The formation of political cleavages in Korea, however, took a quite 
different path compared to that of European experience. That is, the latent 
cleavages that might be produced by the nation-building process or by the 
industrialisation were not politicised. One of the reasons for lacking the “Subject 
vs Dominant Culture” cleavage in the political sphere may be that nationalist 
sentiments were far too great to materialise any movements against mobilisation 
of the nation-builders, especially during the years of post-liberalisation. One
2 See Lipset, Seymour Martin, Rokkan, Stein, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction,” in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 
New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.
3 See ibid., p.52.
4 See, for a review of the new cleavages, Harrop, Martin, and Miller, William L. Miller,
Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 193-202.
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might expect nationalist sentiments to be higher in a nation just being liberated 
from foreign occupation. Further, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity may have 
posed a limitation for “cultural” resistance against the “dominant” nation- 
builders. If there had been any movement against the dominant nation-builders, 
it was rather a movement toward the unification of the two Koreas which took 
the separate path of nation-building. Nor had the cleavages of a “Church vs 
Government” kind emerged, as there had been no such vested institutions that 
might have claimed a functional role in the state.
The conflicts over economic interests in the “commodity” or “labour” 
markets have also yet to be politicised. Although the rapid process of state- 
sponsored industrialisation since the 1960s, which transformed Korean society 
from a basically agrarian economy into an industrialised one, may have resulted 
in stratification of society into various social groups which share a common 
economic interest, no class-based parties of political significance have emerged 
so far. Above all, the parties based on working-class interest have not been able 
to exist because of society’s ideological rigidity on the left-right continuum, as a 
result of the distinct ideological foundation of the two Koreas.
What, then, are the main cleavages that shape Korean voting patterns? One 
of the most often cited is the “urban vs rural” cleavage that has been reflected in 
differences of partisan support. That is, there has been a long-observed tendency 
for rural residents to give their support more to the government party, while
urban residents have been more likely to support the opposition. This was 
commonly called the yoch’on yado (government-rural, opposition-urban) 
phenomenon. Another cleavage that has attracted particular attention, especially 
since the presidential election of 1987, is a regional one. The voters’ inclination 
to support a party which shares the same regional traits has become an irrefutable 
pattern in party competitions since 1987. These are, however, in essence a 
description of the patterns of vote distribution, observed most often at the 
aggregate level, thus posing limitations on the understandings of the nature of 
these cleavages. Several studies since the 1960s, nonetheless, have developed 
propositions for the explanation of the observed phenomena. A review of the 
propositions is given in the following sections.
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2. The Yoch’on Yado Phenomenon
Although there were variations in defining urban and rural areas and/or in 
the calculations of govemment/opposition party votes among the researchers, 
most of the studies agreed that the yoch’on yado phenomenon or the urban/rural 
difference in electoral support had been evident in most of the elections - 
regardless of whether an election had been presidential or parliamentary - from 
the mid-1950s to the present. For example, with a five-scale typology of the 
urban-rural continuum for the major opposition party votes based on two party
calculation, Kim and Koh confirmed the yoch’on yado phenomenon, that “the 
government party relied heavily on rural votes while the opposition thrived in the 
cities,” in the presidential elections from 1963 to 1971 ;5 Kim and Choe also 
observed “statistically significant differences” in the two major party votes 
among the voters in the four-scale types of the urban and rural districts in the 
National Assembly elections held between 1963 and 1978;6 and Lee Kap-yun 
came up with three types of electoral districts, “government dominant rural 
districts, neutral urban districts, and opposition dominant metropolitan (Seoul and 
Pusan, and the two largest cities) districts,” by looking at the votes for the ruling 
and the main opposition party distributed by a three-scale typology of the urban- 
rural continuum in the National Assembly elections from 1954 to 1985.7
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This pattern was also evident in the recent elections: for example, Kim 
Hong-nack observed that “the level of support for the government party was 
inversely related to the degree of urbanisation,” while “the opposition parties as a 
whole” performed better in the more urbanised districts in the 1988 National 
Assembly election.8 In the 1992 National Assembly election, Park Chan-wook 
found that “the more rural the electoral district is, the more support for the
5 See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., “Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: 
An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections,” The Journal of Politics, 34(3), 1972, pp. 
825-859, at p.845.
6 See Kim, Hong-nack, and Choe, Sun-ki, “Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns in South 
Korean Parliamentary Elections,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 6(3), 1987, pp. 31-50, at 
p.40.
7 See Lee, Kap-yun, “Electoral Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of 
Korea (1948-85),” in Political Leadership in a Changing Society, Proceedings of the Second 
Asian-Pacific Political Science Association, Seoul, 1986, pp. 151-163, at p.154.
8 See Kim, Hong-nack, “The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey, 29(5), 
1989, pp. 480-495, at p.488.
[ruling] DLP in the district; the more urban the electoral district is, the more 
support for the [main opposition] DP in the district.”9 A disruption of this pattern 
was also noted, however: in the 1992 presidential election, for example, Lee 
Nam-young found a “reverse relationship” between the degree of urbanisation 
and the opposition vote, which could have resulted from the regional voting 
patterns that became one of the most important factors since 1987.10 That is, 
because the candidates’ regional strongholds contained one or more metropolitan 
areas, the bivariate-level cross-tabulations may have no longer provided as neat a 
picture of the yoch’on yado phenomenon as before. With regionalism controlled, 
as Park Chan-wook found in the 1988 National Assembly election, urbanisation 
may have maintained “a degree of influence on the party vote.”* 11 If compared to 
the past - for example, Kim and Koh found a similar level of influence exerted by 
regionalism and urbanisation in the 1971 presidential election 12 - the influence of 
urbanisation may have been relatively smaller.
In order to explain the long-observed differences of electoral support 
between urban and rural areas, several different hypotheses, which can be 
categorised into three broad lines of thought, are developed. The first, in general, 
pays more attention to differences in the socio-political “composition” of voters
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9 See Park, Chan-wook, “The Fourteenth National Assembly Election in Korea: A Test for the 
Ruling Democratic Liberal Party,” Korea Journal, 33(1), 1993, pp. 5-16, p.7
10 See Lee, Nam-young, “The Voter’s Choice: The 14th Presidential Election of Korea,” Korea 
Journal, 33(1), 1993, pp. 17-26, at p.20.
11 See Park, Chan-wook, “The 1988 National Assembly Election in South Korea: The Ruling 
Party’s Loss of Legislative Majority,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 7(3), 1988, pp. 59- 
76, at pp. 70-71.
12 See Kim and Koh, op.cit., 1972, pp. 847-851.
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living in urban and rural areas; the second to the differences in party or other 
means of “organisational infrastructure” that gamers the votes; and the third 
specifically depicts problems involved in the process of “urbanisation or 
modernisation” as a source of such differences in electoral support. One point on 
which the three all agree is the dependent variable, namely, the government- 
opposition cleavage.
The first two groups of hypotheses stem from the earlier studies by Yoon 
Chun-joo, in which he argues that the urban-rural difference in electoral support 
results from the gap in the degree of political development between the urban and 
the rural areas. 13 That is, in modernised urban areas “comprehensive voting” - 
that is, voting with a high degree of political interest and based on one’s own 
opinions and judgment - is practised, whereas in rural areas “conformity voting,” 
in obedience to the various kinds of extensive government interference, is more 
common. 14 This parallels the to jo ch’ on go (urban-low, rural-high) phenomenon 
in voting rates, which describes the tendency of a higher voting rate in the less 
modernised - thus, easily “mobilisable” by the government - rural areas. 15 In
13 See Yoon, Chun-joo, “Up-min-ui T’up’yohaengt’ae (Voting Behaviour of Up [Semi-rural] 
Inhabitants),” Asea Yon’gu (Asiatic Study), 4(1), 1961, pp. 1-54; Urinara-ui Son go Shilt’ae 
(The Electoral Realities of Korea), Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1981; Han guk 
Chongch’i Ch’egye (Korean Political System), rev. ed., Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 
1987; and T  upyoch’ amyo-wa Chongch’ i-baljon (Electoral Participation and Political 
Development), enlgd. ed., Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989.
14 See ibid., 1989, p.44.
15 See Yoon, Chun-joo, op.cit., 1981, pp. 337-446. Also see, for empirical studies supporting the 
mobilised voting hypothesis, Mo, Chong-ryn, Brady, David, and Ro, Jae-hun, “Urbanisation and 
Voter turnout in Korea: An Update,” Political Behaviour, 13(1), 1991, pp. 21-32; and Kim, 
Chong-lim, “Political Participation and Mobilised Voting,” in Kim, Chong-lim (ed.), Political 
Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilisation and Stability, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 
1980, pp. 119-141.
short, he views the yocK on yado phenomenon as a corollary of different 
characteristics of urban and rural voters that, in turn, result in different reactions 
against mobilisation by the government which used to employ its administrative 
networks to gamer political support.
The point regarding conformity or mobilised voting, which can successfully 
explain the government party’s relative strength in rural areas, is further 
developed by Kim Chong-lim . 16 With his sample survey data, Kim observed that 
“there is a greater tendency toward mobilised voting in small cities, towns, and 
villages scattered throughout the provinces than in the most urbanised 
metropolitan centers. ” 17 He then argued that the level of individual modernity - 
which was likely to be lower in rural areas - was the key variable resulting in the 
phenomenon of mobilised voting . 18 As for the political orientations of the 
mobilised voters, he concluded that the usual beneficiaries of mobilised votes are 
the government party and its candidates, “because mobilised voting grows in part 
out of the submissive attitudes toward the sources of power, social and political,
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16 See Kim, Chong-lim, op.cit., 1980.
17 See ibid., p. 128.
18 See ibid, pp. 130-132. Also see, for the empirical studies linking political attitudes to socio­
economic attributes, Lee, Young-ho, “The Korean People’s Political Orientations: A Multivariate 
Analysis (I) & (II),” Koreana Quarterly, 13(1-2 & 3), 1971, pp. 11-30 & pp. 19-42; Choe, 
Hong-gi, “Urban-Rural Difference in Attitudes and Behaviour,” Korea Journal, 12(2), 1972, pp. 
4-13; Kim, Se-jin, “Attitudinal Orientations of Korean Workers,” Korea Journal, 12(9), 1972, 
pp. 18-30; Lee, Hong-koo, “Political Culture and Political Development in Korea: An Aspect of 
the Political Behaviour of Low-Income Groups in Seoul,” Korea Journal, 18(1), 1978, pp. 16- 
29; Lee, Nam-young, “The Democratic Belief System: A Study of the Political Culture in South 
Korea,” Korean Social Science Journal, 7,1985, pp. 46-89; Bark, Dong-suh, and Kim, Kwang- 
woong, Han gugin-ui Minju-chongch’ i-uishik (Democratic Political Awareness of Korean), 
Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987, pp. 81-114; and Han, Bae-ho, and Uh, Soo-young, 
Han guk-chongcK i-munhwa (Korean Political Culture), Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1987, pp. 71-144.
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and furthermore, there is hardly any other institution more powerful than the 
government itself.”19 This contention was further demonstrated by Choi and 
Lee’s analysis, which showed a strongly positive relationship between Park 
Chung-hee’s electoral support and voter turnout in 1971 - a relationship which 
was even stronger in rural areas.20 The implications of these propositions for 
political development in Korea are rather optimistic - as society became more 
modem, the social basis of mobilised voting would become eroded, thus 
“depriving the regime in power of its once-secure electoral advantage.”21
Kim Chong-lim also pointed out the government party’s illegal use of 
government apparatus as an “organisational” advantage in gamering votes: “In an 
authoritarian political system such as Korea’s, the huge and powerful government 
machinery is often placed at the service of the government party during the 
election period.”22 While the government party may have been more effective in 
“mobilising” voters in the rural areas - where the level of political awareness is 
lower - by manipulating powerful government machinery and personnel during 
the election campaign, as Han Y.C. argued, the opposition party showed a poor 
showing in rural areas because of its weak organisational infrastructure in the 
rural areas, limiting its scope mainly to urban centres.23
19 See ibid., p. 133.
20 See Choi, Sung-il, and Lee, Chae-jin, “Environment, Policy, and Electoral Participation: A  
Comparison of Urban and Rural Areas,” in Kim, Chong-lim (ed.), Political Participation in 
Korea: Democracy, Mobilisation and Stability, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 165-180, 
atp.178
21 See Kim, Chong-lim, op.cit., 1980, p. 138. Also see Yoon, Chun-joo, op.cit., 1989, p.50.
22 See ibid., p. 133.
23 See Han, Y.C., “Political Parties and Elections in South Korea,” in Kim, Se-jin and Cho, 
Chang-hyun (eds.), Government and Politics of Korea, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on
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For the explanation of the opposition’s relative strength in urban areas, Kim 
and Koh hypothesised that the major source of urban-opposition alignment is the 
stronger democratic commitment of the urban residents. 24 Urban residents, who 
have better access to mass media and formal education, are less tolerant of 
violations or breaches of democratic norms, and thus become more anti- 
government in their political propensity. An indirect test of this hypothesis was 
provided by a study by Ahn, Kil and Kim, which pointed out that persons who 
are younger, have higher education, have more income, and who live in urban 
areas, are more likely to have democratic consciousness, but are less likely to be 
satisfied with the existing political system. 25 According to Kim, Kihl and Chung, 
“it is this feeling of alienation then that has been keeping them away from voting 
and their sense of political efficacy is shown not through the regular, 
institutionalised political channels, but often through the irregular, non- 
institutionalised political channels. ” 26 These citizens may have provided a social 
basis of political support - that is, either through regular or irregular channels - 
for the opposition parties which have stood for the liberalisation and 
democratisation of the political system.
Korean Affairs, 1972, pp. 127-147, at pp. 137-138. Also see his “Political Parties and Political 
Development in South Korea,” Pacific Affairs, 42(4), 1969-70, pp. 446-464.
24 See Kim and Koh, op.cit., 1972, p.847.
25 See Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, Elections in Korea, Seoul 
Computer Press, 1988, pp. 231-268.
26 See Kim, C.I. Eugene, Kihl, Young-whan, and Chung, Doock-kyou, “Voter Turnout and the 
Meaning of Elections in South Korea,” Asian Survey, 13(11), 1973, pp. 1062-1074, at p.1074.
-62-
Within the framework of “compositional” approach, another explanation for 
the yoch’on yado phenomenon was proposed by Lee Kap-yun. 27 For the 
explanation of this pattern, he identified satisfied and dissatisfied social groups 
and their distribution in districts. The main thrust of his reasoning was that an 
authoritarian government would be supported by those voters whose demands 
were easier to meet with its policies and programs, while opposition parties 
would be supported by those whose demands were more difficult. 28 Among 
social groups, the farmers and the upper and middle class were those most likely 
to be satisfied, as the authoritarian governments in Korea had been able to meet 
the social and economic demands of these groups, while the educated and the 
working poor were those most likely to be dissatisfied, as the demand for 
democracy by the educated were difficult to meet because of the nature of the 
successive authoritarian regimes, and the demands for income redistribution by 
the working class were difficult to meet because of the growth-oriented economic 
policy. Thus, he explained the dominant position of opposition parties in the 
metropolitan areas by “the fact that the metropolitan residents are highly 
educated, and the fact that economic inequality in the cities has been high,” and 
that rural voters have opted for the government party because most of them are 
farmers and the local economy is relatively equal. 29 However, the empirical 
evidence of the political orientations of social groups ran counter to his 
proposition regarding the working class, as they tended to support the governing
27 See Lee, Kap-yun, op.cit, 1986, pp. 156-162.
28 See ibid., pp. 156-160. Also see Paik, Chong-min, “Authoritarian Rule in South Korea: 
Political Support and Governmental Performance,” Asian Survey, 31(8), 1991, pp. 743-761.
29 See ibid., p. 161.
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party.30 Perhaps, their relatively low level of education made the working class 
prone to mobilisation by the government, apart from the fact that there have been 
virtually no parties of significance putting their demands for a more equitable 
economy and for the rights of the working class, which could be easily taken as 
being left-oriented, the officially banned ideology.
For some others, the yoch’on yado phenomenon is more of a direct 
consequence of urbanisation, which has been accompanied by rapid 
industrialisation since the 1960s. For example, the more congested, anonymous 
and competitive socio-political settings of urban communities, according to Lee 
Chae-jin, “are likely to render the urban dwellers less susceptible to 
governmental and communal pressures for their electoral participation,” and “the 
densely populated urban communities tend to produce more social and economic 
problems, including housing, transportation, water supply, and sanitation, which 
can in turn engender a sense of alienation and dissatisfaction among the 
urbanites;” thus “they may refrain from participating in voting procedures or 
from voting for the governing elites.”31 An empirical study by Choi and Lee 
using aggregate-level data for the 1971 presidential and National Assembly 
elections confirmed that the urban environmental settings exert, at least, a partial 
impact on voting choice, in addition to social compositional variables such as
30 See, for a recent study that found political propensities of the working class toward the 
government party, Sung, Kyong-ryung, “Han’guk-ui Sahoe-gyegup-kwa Chongdang-gujo (Social 
Class and Party System in Korea),” in Lee, Un-jin, and Kim, Sok-jun, et al., Han’guk-ui 
Chongch’ i-wa Son gomunhwa (Politics and Electoral Culture in Korea), Seoul: Sahoe-munhwa 
Yon’guso, 1992, pp. 13-69.
31 See Lee, Chae-jin, “Urban Electoral Participation in Korea,” Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 16(2), 1972, pp. 303-312, at p.308.
education and age, which depict the level of modernisation. 32 Similar results 
were found in a study by Kim and Choe: the level of urbanisation as well as 
modernisation in districts showed inverse correlations with government party 
support in the Assembly elections during the Park regime. 33
Although a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from this review regarding the 
relative merits of these propositions, which needs an empirical test, it becomes 
clear that the urban-rural cleavage of electoral support has not been formulated 
by the conflicts over economic interests in the “commodity” market despite its 
phenomenal similarities with European experiences. Instead, the yocK on yado 
phenomenon may result from the difference in political attitudes among the 
voters between urban and rural areas - the unit conveniently regarded as a 
measurement for various aspects of their socio-political life. What is needed 
most is, therefore, to explicitly explore linkages that may lead urban voters as 
opposed to rural residents to prefer parties in the opposition. For example, it may 
result from the difference in their democratic values, which may be largely 
attributable to education attainment or difference in political socialisation, as in 
much of Korean electoral history the democratisation of the political system has 
been the main dimension in electoral competition; or it may result from their 
difference in other value orientations that are attributable to other sources 
specifically associated with urbanisation or modernisation. In addition, there are
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32 See Choi and Lee, op.cit., 1980, pp. 174-177. Also see, for a study pointing the relevance of 
urbanness in electoral turnout, Mo, Brady and Ro, op.cit., 1991, pp. 21-32.
33 See Kim and Choe, op.cit., 1987, pp. 45-46 (Table 6 at p.43).
a few more number of further questions which need to be answered. For 
example, to what extent does this pattem of voter alignment exert its effect on the 
voter’s choice? To put the issue differently, how strong is this relationship? Has 
this relationship fluctuated from time to time, especially in the period after the 
issue of political democratisation no longer holds its political significance? How 
strong is this relationship if compared to other relationships that may exist?
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3. Regional Voting Patterns
Regional voting - namely, voters’ tendency to favour the candidates from 
their region - has been a significant factor, especially in presidential elections. 
This pattem of regional voter alignment was first observed in the 1963 
presidential election - Park Chung-hee fared better in his native Kyongsang 
regions, and in the adjacent Cholla regions, while Yun Po-sun was favoured by 
the provinces around Seoul. This was called as the Nam-Puk (South-North) 
phenomenon of votes, as Park performed better in the southern regions, compared 
to Yun’s better performance in the northern regions (see Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 
in Chapter 5). In the 1967 presidential election, Park increased his command of 
electoral support in his Kyongsang region, while at the same time polling more 
electoral support across all the regions than 1963, except for declined support in 
Cholla. This pattern of regional voting was called as the Tong-So (East-West)
-66-
phenomenon of vote distribution - that is, the opposition candidate Yun fared 
better than Park in the western provinces including Seoul, Kyonggi, South 
Ch’ungch’ong, and Cholla (North and South), while Park fared better in the 
remaining eastern provinces of Kangwon, North Ch’ungch’ong, and Kyongsang 
(North and South), including Cheju. With the opposition candidate Kim Dae- 
jung, whose origin was Cholla, the pattem of regional voter alignment - namely, 
the Tong-So phenomenon - became more prominent in the 1971 presidential 
election: Kim Dae-jung won about two-thirds of the votes in the Cholla region, 
whereas Park won about three-fourths of the votes in the Kyongsang region (see 
Table 5-1).
Regional voting - which had not been visible but might have been latent as a 
result of the suspension of direct presidential elections - appeared again on an 
expanded scale in the 1987 presidential election and onwards. Each of the four 
major candidates running for the presidential office in 1987 happened to have a 
regional tie in the three major regions of Kyongsang (North, Roh Tae-woo, and 
South, Kim Young-sam), Cholla (Kim Dae-jung), Ch’ungch’ong (Kim Jong-pil, 
especially in South). Thus, the electoral contest in 1987 became a regional one, 
each candidate outperforming the others in his respective region. Moreover, the 
regional pattem of vote distribution was again reproduced in the 1988 National 
Assembly election. That is, the four major parties led by the four major 
candidates in 1987 won almost every seat in their respective regions. In the 
National Assembly elections of the past, however, no such regional patterns of
electoral support were apparent. For example, neither in the 1971 National 
Assembly election, held shortly after the regionalism driven presidential 
election,34 nor in the recent 1985 National Assembly election,35 had such patterns 
of regional voting emerged. In spite of the party mergers carried out first by the 
ruling and then by the opposition party in 1990, both of which may have aimed at 
widening their bases of support across regions, the pattern of regional voter 
alignment was a significant factor, if not a dominant one, in the subsequent 
National Assembly and presidential elections in 1992.
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One plausible reason regarding the source of regional differences in 
electoral support, stems from studies that emphasise “cultural” aspects of Korean 
society. According to several socio-psychological studies, for example, Korean 
voters have maintained a strong sense of collective regional identity as a facet of 
political culture that values personal connections or ties in societal life.36 The 
sense of regional attachment, which is susceptible to inter-generation transference
34 See, for a regional distribution of the votes, Kim, C.I. Eugene, “The Meaning of the 1971 
Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development,” Asian Survey, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224, 
at p.220 (Table 4). Also see his, “Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections,” Pacific Affairs, 41(1), 
1968, pp. 60-70; and “Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections,” Asian Survey, 4(3), 1964, pp. 
765-773.
35 See, for a distribution of the votes in the major cities of the regional hinterlands, Koh, B.C., 
“The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey, 25(9), 1985, pp. 883-897, at 
p.891 (Table 2).
36 See Cho, Kyong-kun, “Chongch’i-sahoehwa-ui Shigag-eso-bon Yong-Honam-gan-ui 
Chiyokkamjong Shiljae-wa Akhwa-mit Ku-Haeso (Existence, Aggravation, and Dissolution of 
the Regionalism Between Kyongsang and Cholla: From the Perspective of Political Socialisation), 
Haptong-Haksuldaehoe-Palp’yo-Nonmunjip (Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the 
Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in 
North America), 7, 1987, pp. 107-126; and Kim, Chin-kuk, “Chiyokkamjong-ui Shilsang-gwa 
Ku-Haesobangan (The Reality of Regional Sentiment and Some Suggestions for Its 
Dissolution),” in Han’guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), ed., Shimrihag- 
eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiment from the Psychological Perspective), Seoul: 
Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 221-254.
as it is acquired during the early stage of socialisation, often results in in-group 
favouritism or out-group resentments. 37 Thus, it is their basic assumption that 
prejudice or stereotype against peoples in other regions, which became a 
symptom of regional collectivism in social life , 38 may have been a source of 
political mobilisation by politicians, turning it into inter-regional resentment or 
regional favouritism in the political sphere. 39 For example, Kim Chin-kuk argued 
that regional voting is an incremental manifestation of the regional antagonism. 
That is, voters’ regional antagonism, stemming from in-group cohesion and out­
group hostility, forms a basis of perceptions on regional interests - which could 
have been identified with the success of their regional candidate in electoral 
contests; and the perceptions, which produced the vicarious personalism based on 
regional traits and manifested in the electoral contests, in turn reproduce the 
regional antagonism on an expanded scale.40
37 See, for the empirical studies on regional prejudice and stereotypes, Lee, Chin-suk, “P ’aldoin- 
ui Songgyok T ’uksong-e-daehan Sonipkwannyom (Prejudice on the Characteristics of Localities 
in the Eight Regions),” Sasanggye, Dec. 1959, pp. 74-87; Kim, Chin-kuk, “Yong-Honam 
Taehaksaeng-ui Sanghogan Ch’aijigak Yon’gu (Kyongsang and Cholla University Students’ 
Perceptions of the Differences between Kyongsang and Cholla People),” Sahoe-shimrihak 
Yon’gu (Studies in Social Psychology), 1987, 3(2), pp. 113-147; and Kim, Hye-suk, “Chiyokkan 
Kojong-gwannyom-gwa P ’yon’gyon-ui Shilsang (The Reality of Stereotypes and Prejudice 
among the Regions),” in Han’guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), e&, 
Shimrihag-eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiments Viewed from the Psychological 
Perspective), Seoul; Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 123-169.
38 See, for a study hypothesising a reactionary process of social contacts as a source of regional 
conflict, Song, Pok, “Chiyokkaldung-ui Kujojok Yoin: Chiyog-idong-ui T’uksong-ul Chung shim - 
uro (Structural Factors in Regional Conflict: Centred on the Nature of Regional Migration),” in 
Han’guk Chongch’i Hakhoe (Korean Political Science Association), ed., Han’guk Chongch’i-ui 
Minjuhwa (Democratisation of Korean Politics), Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1988, pp. 269-289.
39 See Moon, Sok-nam, “Chiyokkyokch’a-waKaldung-e-gwanhanHan-Yon’gu: Yong-Honam, 
Tu Chiyog-ul Chungshim-uro (A Study of Regional Disparities and Conflicts: Focusing on the 
Two Regions of Kyongsang and Cholla),” Han’guk Sahoehak (Korean Sociology), 18, 1984, pp. 
184-209; Kim, Chin-kuk, op.cit., 1988, pp. 238-241; andPae, Kyu-han, “Son’gogwajong-gwa 
Chiyokkamjong (Regionalism and Electoral Process),” in Han’guk Sahoehakhoe (The Korean 
Sociological Association), ed., Han’guk-ui Chiyokchuui-wa Chiyokkaldung (Regionalism and 
Regional Conflict in Korea), Seoul: Songwonsa, 1989, pp. 307-330.
40 See Kim, Chin-kuk., op.cit., 1988, p. 240.
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Some others seek more direct sources of regionalism or regional voting. 
For example, Kim Kwang-soo argued that the Cholla voters’ political propensity 
toward the opposition results from their perceptions of regional disadvantages, as 
the Cholla region, indeed, suffered most in the geographically skewed patterns of 
economic development and recruitment of the ruling elite since the 1960s, which 
favoured the Kyongsang region.41 Regarding regional disparities in the economy 
and in the political recruitment of ruling elites, various evidence has been put 
forward. For example, Kim Man-heum analysed the regional pattern of 
recruitment of high-rank government officials, in which he found that the 
Kyongsang region had been over-represented in the administration, the 
legislature, and the military, especially since the government under Park Chung- 
hee.42 Ahn Young-sik, and Kim Hyun-il, had drawn the same conclusion from 
their respective analyses of the regional pattern of recruitment in government 
controlled enterprises and the military elite.43 Recent evidence also points to the 
same conclusion: among those who made public their personal assets - namely,
41 See Kim, Kwang-soo, “Han’guk-chongch’i-e-itsoso-ui Cholla-do (The Cholla Region in 
Korean Politics),” Hariguk Chongch’i Hakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 20(1), 
1986, pp. 85-107. Also see Kim, Man-heum, “Han’guk-ui Chongch’i-gyunyol-e-gwanhan 
Yon’gu: Chiyokkyunyol-ui Chongch’igwajong-e-daehan Kujojok Chopkun (A Study on Political 
Cleavage in Korea: Structural Approach to the Political Process of the Regional Cleavages),” 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul National University, 1991.
42 See ibid., pp. 80-95. Also see Kim, Yong-hak, “Elite Ch’ungwon-T’allag-ui Chiyokkyokch’a 
(Regional Disparities in the Recruitment or Exclusion of the Elite),” in Kim, Jong-chul and Choe 
Chang-jip, et al., Chiyokkamjong Yon'gu (Studies of Regionalism), Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 
258-288.
43 See Ahn, Yong-sik, “Kugyong-giopch’e Imwon Kun-Yongnam Ch’ulshin-i Manta (Those 
from Kyongsang and the Military Are Outnumbered in the Government Controlled Enterprises),” 
Sindonga, Jan. 1988, pp. 364-371; and Kim, Hyun-il, “Changgundul-ui Kohyang (Native 
Regions of the Generals),” Wolgan Chungang, Nov. 1988, pp. 144-158.
the high-rank public officials under the new Kim Young-sam government - those 
from Kyongsang doubled in number to those from Cholla, 36.9 per cent and 16.0 
per cent, respectively.44 Regional disparities in industry, income and 
infrastructure also became evident as a result of uneven economic development 
under the Park regime, which tended to follow a Seoul-Pusan axis, favouring the 
capital area and the Kyongsang region in the southeast, and neglecting the Cholla 
provinces of the southwest.45 An empirical study on the voters’ perceptions of 
economic disparities found that most Korean voters considered the government 
economic policies as a main reason for regional economic disparities, and this 
was even more acute among Cholla voters, while Kyongsang voters were more 
prone to seek other kinds of reasons.46 According to this line of “functional” 
approach, the evident regional disparities became a major source in the 
sharpening of regionalism, which already existed in the form of regional identity 
based on the variance of regional attributes, thus resulting in regional voting. 
Above all, regional antagonism, resulting from regional disparities, may have 
been most acute between Kyongsang and Cholla, as Kyongsang can be easily 
equated with the most benefited region and the region of the government while
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44 See Donga Ilbo (Donga Daily Newspaper), 8 Sept. 1993)
45 See Choe, Won-kyu, “Kyongjegaebal-ui Kyokch’a-wa Chiyokkamjong (Disparities in 
Economic Development and Regionalism),” in Kim Jong-chul and Choi Chang-jip, et aL, 
Chiyokkamjong Yon’ gu (Studies of Regionalism), Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 310-333; and 
Kim, Man-hem, op.cit., 1991, pp. 52-68. Also see, for a review of the socio-economic indices 
distributed by regions, Koh, Hung-hwa, Charyo-ro Yokun Han’gugin-ui Chiyokkamjong 
(Regional Sentiments of Korean: Fabricated with Reference Materials), Seoul: Songwonsa, 
1989, pp. 129-137.
46 See Park, Yong-nam, ‘‘Onul-ui Chiyokkamjong Shilt’ae (Realities of Today’s Regionalism),” 
in Kim Jong-chul and Choi Chang-jip, et al., Chiyokkamjong Yon’ gu (Studies of Regionalism), 
Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 40-80, at pp. 68-69. Also see Kim, Man-heum, Han'guksahoe 
Chiyokkaldung Yon’ gu (A Study of Regional Conflict in Korean Society), Seoul: Hyondaesahoe 
Yon’guso, 1987, pp. 63 & 107.
Cholla is the region to have suffered most and the region of the opposition.47 
Indeed, four out of the five presidents (Park, Chun, Roh and Kim Young-sam) 
Korea has had so far were from the Kyongsang region, while Cholla has 
produced Kim Dae-jung, a main opposition figure who has fought with Park, Roh 
and Kim Young-sam, successively, but without success. The Kwangju incident 
in 1980, where many civilians were killed in the course of the new military 
junta’s quelling of the popular uprising, may have contributed to the sense of 
collective discontent in the Cholla region.48
Regarding the question of to what extent regional attributes exert an impact 
on voting choice, several studies agreed that the effects of regional attributes are 
the single most important, if not dominant, variable in relation to other socio­
economic attributes. In his aggregate-level analysis of voting choice in the 1988 
National Assembly election, for example, Park Chan-wook found that “in 
determining the vote for each of the four parties, regionalism shows a much 
stronger influence on the party vote than does urbanisation.”49 A study by Shin 
Kwang-young also found the dominant effects of the variable of regional origin 
on voting in 1987 and in 1988, compared to the variables of class, age, gender, 
occupation and education.50 In multivariate analysis of voting choice in the 1992
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47 See Kim, Man-hem, op.cit., 1991, p . l l l .
48 See Park, Yong-nam, op.cit., 1991, pp. 75-79.
49 See Park, Chan-wook, op.cit, 1988, p. 70.
50 See Shin, Kwang-young, “T ’up’yohaengwui-wa Chiyokchuui (Voting Behaviour and 
Regionalism),” in Han’guk Sahoehakhoe (The Korean Sociological Association), ed., Han’guk-ui 
Chiyokchuui-wa Chiyokkaldung (Regionalism and Regional Conflict in Korea), Seoul: 
Songwonsa, 1989, pp. 335-352.
presidential election, Park Chan-wook again found that native region, in addition 
to age, was one of the most important social background variables.51
Although there is little dispute about the substantial impact of regionalism 
on voting and the existence of regionalism, however, what is generally missing 
among the studies reviewed above is the linkage between them. That is, what are 
the most considered intervening variables when voters make the choice according 
to their regional ties? Is it perceived disadvantages or advantages, or is this 
choice an emotional one? If both factors operate, which one is dominant? What 
are the implications of this regional pattem of voter alignment for political 
development in Korea? These are questions which need to be explored to draw a 
firm conclusion about the nature of regional voting. The emergence of 
regionalism as a political factor, in addition to the political cleavage of urban- 
rural, is perhaps a lagged but clear sign in the development of new political 
cleavages in Korean society, as Yang Sung-chul put it two decades ago: “by 
institutionalising the north-south political issues of the 40’s and 50’s (anti­
communism and the unification formula), attention was diverted to differences 
within the south rather than the problems between the south and the north.”52
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51 See Park, Chan-wook, “Korean Voters’ Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election: A 
Survey Data Analysis,” Korea & World Affairs, 17(3), 1993, pp. 432-458, at pp. 446-447 
(Table 1). Also see, for a similar finding for the voting choice in 1988, Lee, Kap-yun, 
“T’up’yohaengt’ae-wa Minjuhwa (Voting Behaviour and Democratisafion),” in Kim, Kwang- 
woong (ed.), Han’guk-ui Son go-jongch’ihak (Studies on Korean Electoral Politics), Seoul: 
Pobmunsa, 1988, pp. 167-181, at p.177 (Table 5).
52 See Yang, Sung-chul, “Political Ideology in Korean Politics: Its Elements and Roles,” in Kim, 
Se-jin and Cho, Chang-hyun (eds.), Government and Politics of Korea, Silver Spring: The 
Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972, pp. 25-42, at p.37.
PART 2. THE KOREAN VOTERS, 1985-1992:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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Chapter 3.
Party Manoeuvrings and Changing Voters, 1985 -1992
1. Introduction
For the past several years of democratisation, Korean political parties have 
gone through several series of party formation, mergers and splits. Political 
parties were newly formed and merged for upcoming elections or as a result of 
elections. There have been three major changes in the configuration of parties 
since 1985: the first is the emergence of the New Korea Democratic Party 
(NKDP) as the main opposition party and its virtual absorption of the Democratic 
Korea Party (DKP) immediately after the 1985 National Assembly election; the 
second is the party split in the opposition camp into the Reunification Democratic 
Party (RDP) led by Kim Young-sam and the Party for Peace and Democracy 
(PPD) led by Kim Dae-jung shortly before the 1987 presidential election; and the 
third is the creation of the governing Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) coalesced 
in 1990 from the three parties - the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), Kim 
Young-sam’s RDP and the New Democratic Republic Party (NDRP) led by Kim 
Jong-pil.
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The first series of changes in party configuration signified the changing 
mode of Korean party politics, which followed the NKDP’s strong showing in 
the 1985 National Assembly election. The existing power configuration of the 
Fifth Republic (1981-1987) was to be undermined as a result of the impressive 
emergence of the new opposition party led by Lee Min-woo, who was closely 
allied with two leading figures of the opposition, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young- 
sam. During the early years of the Fifth Republic, the ruling DJP under the all- 
powerful president, who was elected indirectly by an electoral college of some 
five thousand members, maintained a dominant position in parliament with only a 
marginal challenge from the moderate opposition DKP (and from the minor 
Korea National Party). However, the political system of the Fifth Republic was 
fundamentally challenged by the NKDP, which had successfully campaigned for 
democratic change in the 1985 election. By the virtual absorption of the DKP 
immediately after the election, the NKDP commanded 103 out of the 276 
National Assembly seats, arithmetically representing 48.9 per cent of the 1985 
votes. Of the series of demands the NKDP put forward, a constitutional revision 
to hold the direct election of the president had become an all-important issue 
which dominated Korean politics until Roh Tae-woo, the DJP’s presidential 
nominee for the scheduled indirect presidential election, came up with the June 
29 declaration in 1987. In the declaration, Roh urged President Chun Doo-hwan 
to hold a direct presidential election along with other democratic measures, 
including restoration of civil rights of Kim Dae-jung.1 A new constitution was
1 See, for a detailed description of political process during this period, Lee, Man-woo, The 
Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987-1990, New York: Praeger, 1990, Ch. 2,
drafted by consensus between the DJP and the Reunification Democratic Party 
(RDP) - a Kim Young-sam led splinter party of the NKDP, which made the 
NKDP defunct - and a direct presidential election was to be held on December 
16, 1987.
As the presidential election was imminent, the opposition camp divided into 
Kim Young-sam’s RDP and Kim Dae-jung’s PPD to compete for the presidency 
with the ruling DJP’s Roh Tae-woo and the NDRP’s Kim Jong-pil (who had also 
been banned from political activities under the Fifth Republic because of his 
alleged corruption during Park Chung-hee’s regime). The ruling DJP succeeded 
in electing its candidate as the president of the Sixth Republic (1988-1992), albeit 
narrowly. In the subsequent National Assembly election of 1988, however, the 
DJP failed to secure half of the seats, although it still commanded the biggest 
share of seats. One of the success stories of the opposition-controlled assembly - 
perhaps with tacit approval of the Roh controlled DJP - may have been the 
summoning of the National Assembly hearings on the irregularities conducted 
during Chun’s seven-year rule, known as “liquidation of the Fifth Republic.” 
Notwithstanding the electoral failure and success of the opposition camp in those 
elections, the second series of changes in party configuration - more specifically, 
the split of the opposition parties - resulted in the four party system, in which 
each party became strongly associated with its leader’s home province. Electoral 
competition between the parties shifted subsequently from a focus on the
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pp. 19-44; also see, for the text of the June 29 Declaration, Appendix 1 of his book, pp. 145-148.
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democratic-authoritarian axis, which had characterised Korean party politics 
since the mid-1950s, to a regional one.
The creation of the ruling DLP in 1990 through the merger of President 
Roh’s DJP, the opposition RDP and Kim Jong-pil’s NDRP again upset the 
existing party system. Further, the party merger between the ruling and 
opposition parties, which had traditionally engaged in hostile confrontation, was 
unprecedented. As a result of the formation of the DLP, Kim Dae-jung’s PPD 
was left alone in opposition. A few assembly members of the former RDP who 
had not joined the ruling coalition also remained in opposition, forming the 
(small) Democratic Party. Subsequently in 1991, the PPD and the “small” 
Democratic Party led by Lee Ki-taek formed a new united opposition Democratic 
Party (DP) for the upcoming National Assembly and presidential elections of 
1992. In the third series of changes in party configuration, the emergence of the 
Unification National Party (UNP) as a viable third party is noteworthy. This 
party was newly formed by a big businessman Chung Ju-young about a month 
before the National Assembly election on March 24, 1992. It may have been the 
UNP that attracted those floating voters who had possibly become disenchanted 
both with the arbitrary merger of the DLP and with its change of leadership to 
Kim Young-sam, but who were unlikely to support the opposition DP mainly 
because of its strong affiliation with the Cholla region.
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As briefly reviewed above, the Korean parties had gone through extensive 
processes of party manoeuvrings since 1985, from the emergence of an outspoken 
opposition party of the NKDP, to its split into parties based on personal 
leadership, to a merger between the governing and the opposition parties. 
Although all of the three series of changes in party configuration share a common 
historical pattem of Korean party politics - that of instability in the party system - 
each of them differs in the context in which the changes occurred and in the 
extent to which the changes exerted impact on the existing party system as well 
as the power configuration (let alone impact on the pattem of voter alignment). 
For example, the first two took place within the opposition as a result of election 
reverses, and leadership splits, respectively, whereas the third series pervaded the 
whole party system, resulting from “the common reckoning that the ‘one-Roh, 
three-Kim’ stalemate ... would not guarantee a confident power succession by 
any of the three [merged] parties.”2 Moreover, the first series of changes led to a 
collapse of the existing power configuration eventually, whereas the last two 
contributed to the maintenance of this either implicitly or explicitly.
How, then, have the voters responded to these changes in the party system? 
In other words, to what extent were the voters influenced by these changes in the 
party configuration when they made their voting choice? Were there significant 
changes in the pattern of voter alignments if these existed at all? More
2 See Park, Jin, “Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance,” 
Asian Survey, 30(12), 1990, pp. 1154-1168, atp.1158. Also see, for an analysis of the DLP 
merger, Kim, Hak-joon, “New Political Development with a Vision for the 1990s and Beyond,” 
Korea & World Affairs, 14(1), 1990, pp. 34-53.
specifically, were there changes in the main dimensions of voter alignments, 
resulting from the party splits/mergers? These are questions to be considered in 
the following sections. The electoral impact of the first series of changes in the 
party configuration, in spite of its importance in the democratisation process, 
however, cannot be explicitly assessed because the NKDP had gone through a 
party split before the 1987 election. Thus, the following sections will deal with 
the electoral impact of the last two series of party splits/mergers by utilising 
sample survey data.3
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2. Changing Voter Preferences Resulting from the Opposition Split, 1985-88
In the direct presidential election of 1987, which was restored after 16 years 
of suspension, four main candidates contested the presidency of the Sixth 
Republic: Roh Tae-woo of the ruling DJP; Kim Young-sam of the RDP and Kim 
Dae-jung of the PPD in the opposition; and Kim Jong-pil of the NDRP, a revived 
party of Park Chung-hee’s Democratic Republic Party. The four main parties 
also contested the subsequent 1988 National Assembly election. In both of the
3 See, for a detailed description o f the data, Appendix 1 of this thesis. For the purpose o f this 
chapter, a few characteristics o f the data are noteworthy. First, with regard to the timing o f the 
surveys, the first survey was carried out in November 1991, that is, after the DLP and the DP 
merger and before the creation o f the UNP for the March 1992 National Assembly election. The 
second survey was carried out immediately after the December 1992 Presidential electioa  
Second, the survey data employed for the analysis in this thesis were weighted so that the data 
correspond to the official returns o f the 1987 Presidential election, for the first survey data, and 
those o f the 1992 Presidential election for the second survey data.
elections, the DJP proved its ability to prolong its ruling status by securing the 
biggest share of the votes, while the opposition, which once claimed to represent 
the public’s democratic will as signified by the strong showing of the NKDP in 
the 1985 election and in the democratisation process onwards, suffered a defeat 
mainly because of the leadership split.
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Table 3-1. Flow of the Votes, 1985 -1988: Column Percentages (Frequencies) 
A. Between 1985 and 1987
1987
1985
Total (N)DJP NKDP DKP Others N o n V o te r NewVoter
Roh Tae-woo 71.6% 12.5% 9.3% 37.9% 18.6% 13.7% 32.2 % (369)
Kim Younq-sam 11.5% 33.1% 43.5% 17.4% 24.4% 31.3% 24.7 % (283)
Kim Dae-iung 5.0% 43.9% 28.9% 13.2% 16.9% 34.8% 23.8 % (273)
Kim Jong-pil 7.9% 5.4% 8.7% 22.0% 8.1% 1.8% 7.1 % (82)
Non-Voter 4.0% 5.1% 9.5% 9.5% 32.0% 19.4% 12.2% (140)
Total (N) 30.1%
(345)
32.6%
(374)
5.4%
(62)
2.5%
(28)
23.1%
(265)
6.4%
(73)
100% (1147)
Note: The respondents who were not eligible to vote in 1987 are excluded.
B. Between 1985 and 1988
1988
1985
Total (N)DJP NKDP DKP Others NonVoter NewVoter
DJP 69.4% 6.2% 8.3% 15.8% 17.8% 16.1% 28.6 % (334)
RDP 11.4% 38.0% 51.4% 4.7% 19.5% 28.0% 25.0 % (292)
PPD 5.2% 44.6% 20.0% 10.6% 14.8% 29.0% 22.9 % (267)
NDRP 8.7% 7.1% 14.6% 55.6% 9.3% 3.2% 9.3 % (109)
NonVoter 5.3% 4.1% 5.8% 13.2% 38.7% 23.7% 14.1 % (165)
Total (N) 29.5%
(345)
32.0%
(374)
5.3%
(62)
2.4%
(28)
22.8%
(266)
8.0%
(93)
100% (1168)
Note: The respondents who were not eligible to vote in 1988 are excluded.
DJP - The Democratic Justice Party; NKDP - The New Korean Democratic Party; DKP - The 
Democratic Korean Party; RDP - The Reunification Democratic Party; PPD - The Party for 
Peace and Democracy; and NDRP - The New Democratic Republican Party.
Source: The 1991 Survey
Table 3-1 reports the movement of votes, resulting from the second series of 
party realignment, that is, the opposition party split. Panel A shows the flow of 
the votes between the 1985 election and the 1987 Presidential election, and Panel 
B between the 1985 and 1988 National Assembly elections/ These two tables 
are almost identical, except for negligible differences in the detailed figures, 
reflecting that the 1987 and the 1988 elections were fought in similar political 
settings. By reading down each column in the table, we can see how each group 
of voters in 1985 was distributed in 1987 and 1988.
It is apparent from the table that the DJP votes were, first of all, the least 
affected by the second series of party realignments: about 70 per cent of the 1985 
DJP votes stayed with it in the 1987 and 1988 elections. Of the 1985 DJP votes, 
there also emerged no significant pattern of defection to the other parties. The 
DJP in 1987 and 1988 also had fewer influx votes from the other parties: the only 
exception may be the minor party votes. Perhaps most of these were KNP voters, 
whose defection to Roh in 1987 was the largest (about 38 per cent), but later in 
1988 a majority of the 1985 minor party votes (about 56 per cent) flew to Kim 
Jong-pil’s NDRP. The relative stability of the DJP votes is not unexpected, as it 
maintained its party organisation and leadership relatively intact. However, the 
stability of the DJP votes is remarkable if viewed in the context of the changing 
political atmosphere. That is, considering the fact that the elections of 1987 and
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4 Since the data for Table 3-1 were collected in 1991, the 1985 figures, which have a six year gap 
of recall, may inevitably contain some measurement errors. Of these, the votes for the NKDP 
were over-estimated at cost of the votes for the DKP (and the other minor parties).
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1988 were fought in a more free and competitive manner than those in the past, 
the stable DJP vote suggests that the ruling party may have had a solid basis of 
electoral support beyond its ability to mobilise the unsophisticated and ill- 
informed voters. Further, given the pattem of electoral competition of the four 
parties, in which each party commanded its respective regional stronghold thus 
leaving less room for electoral manoeuvring of the ruling DJP, the stable DJP 
vote was even more remarkable.
A greater volatility in the movement of the opposition parties’ votes could 
be expected, and Table 3-1 shows this was the case. The 1985 NKDP votes were 
distributed to Kim Dae-jung and his PPD, and to Kim Young-sam and his RDP 
(to a lesser degree), without much defection to the others. The same pattem was 
noticeable in case of the 1985 DKP votes, but this time the larger portion went to 
Kim Young-sam and his RDP. The main beneficiary of the movement of the 
1985 minor party votes was Kim Jong-pil, particularly his NDRP. Of the non- 
voters in 1985, the largest portion again abstained, and the rest were rather evenly 
distributed to the main parties. Nearly two-thirds of the new voters, namely, 
those who were not eligible to vote in 1985, supported either Kim Young-sam or 
Kim Dae-jung (and their parties). A significant portion of the new voters also 
abstained.
In looking at the vote movement of the opposition parties, however, it is 
also remarkable that most of the 1985 NKDP and the DKP votes stayed with the
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main opposition, that is, either Kim Young-sam (and his party) or Kim Dae-jung 
(and his party). Indeed, their defection to the other parties, that is, to the DJP or 
the NDRP, were less than that of the ruling DJP. This clearly indicates that there 
exists a solid opposition tendency in the Korean electorate, which suggests that 
both the ruling party and the opposition mobilise quite different sources of 
electoral support. This supports the contention made by Lee Kap-yun that the 
Korean electorate is polarised into supporters and opponents of the government.5 
The observed volatility of the opposition party votes could be, then, attributed to 
the fragile nature of the opposition parties.
The pattem of voter movement between 1985 and 1987/ 1988 which 
emerged from this analysis is that of continuity. Not to mention the stability of 
the DJP votes, it was also very rare that the supporters of the main opposition 
parties in 1985 moved to the ruling party in 1987 and 1988. No comparable 
attempts were made for earlier elections using sample survey data. However, 
Darcy et al. estimated voter mobility between 1981 and 1985 using the official 
election data, in which a model of pro-government partisan stability and anti- 
government instability was proposed.6 They found that support for the new 
NKDP, which “came not as much from the disintegrating opposition parties as
5 See Lee, Kap-yun, “C/ie 5 Konghwaguk Kukhoeuiwon Son’go-ui Punsok-kwa Chonmang (An 
Analysis of the National Assembly Elections in the Fifth Republic and its Implications),”
Han guk Chongch’i Hakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 19(1), 1985, pp. 47-58, at 
p.52.
6 See Darcy, R., Hyun, Chong-min, Huston, James, and Kim, Hyun-woo, “Political Party 
Support in the Korean Fifth Republic: An Ecological Analysis 1981-1985,” Australian Journal 
of Political Science, 26(2), 1991, pp. 295-306. Also see Kim, Hyun-woo, “1980 Nyondae 
Han’gugin-ui Son’gohaengt’ae (Korean Electoral Behaviour in the 1980s),” in Lee, Nam-young, 
ed., Han’guk-ui Son’go (Elections in Korea), /, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 185-219.
from those not participating in the previous election,”7 was a main source of 
party instability, especially in the opposition, across the two elections. 
Nonetheless, it was also observable that the defection to the ruling DJP (12 to 14 
per cent8) of the main opposition party votes, that is, the votes of the DKP and 
the KNP in 1981, was limited as much as in this analysis. This also suggests that 
there existed a coherent opposition tendency in the electorate, which may have 
led to the first series of changes in the party system - that is, the NKDP merger 
with the DKP, which did not last for long, however.
Despite the fact that the opposition parties enjoyed deep-rooted electoral 
support and had, indeed, together polled a majority of the votes since 1985, it 
was not likely the main opposition parties would reunite. The two Kims, who 
commanded the evenly divided basis of opposition support and who once failed 
to agree on a single candidate in 1987, were unlikely to come up with a reunified 
opposition party because of their serious political rivalry. For the ruling party, 
however, which had been faced with decreasing electoral support since the late 
seventies, the stability in partisan support may mean that it had a limited ability 
to expand its basis of electoral support above and beyond its former supporters, 
who consisted of more or less than one-third of the electorate. This may have 
been a decisive factor that made the ruling party seek a coalition with some of the 
opposition parties later in 1990, in the wake of its loss of a majority in the 1988 
National Assembly elections.
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7 See ibid., p.303.
8 See ibid., Table 5, p. 302.
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3. Changing Voter Preferences as a Result of the DLP Merger, 1987-1992
The merger of the ruling and opposition parties was an unprecedented one 
in Korean political history if viewed in terms of its scale and nature. Although 
party mergers/splits were rather common among the opposition parties whose 
intention was to strengthen their electoral fortunes for upcoming elections, cross­
changes of politician’s party affiliations between the ruling and opposition parties 
were rather exceptional and personal. Mergers/splits were less evident in the 
ruling parties, although these were reshaped by those who came to power as a 
result of changes in the political system (see Chapter 1 for a review). The 
division between the government and the opposition parties, which once looked 
impossible to overcome as they traditionally engaged in hostile confrontation, 
became blurred, at least at the leadership level, by the merger of the parties to 
form the new ruling DLP.
In retrospect, the ruling DLP accomplished what it wanted by the merger, 
that is, to keep itself in power. It secured a majority of the National Assembly 
seats albeit narrowly, and elected its presidential candidate, Kim Young-sam, in 
the elections of 1992. However, its electoral success was a limited one. That is, 
the DLP’s overall share of the votes was greatly reduced in the 1992 elections, 
compared with that before the merger. For example, the constituents of the DLP 
together polled about 73 per cent of the votes both in the 1987 and 1988
elections, but in the 1992 elections, the DLP’s share of the votes was reduced to 
less than three-fifths of the former share of its constituents’ votes (see Table 1-6 
in Chapter 1). The main opposition, DP, regained its strength by securing about 
one-third of the seats, more than its prior share of one-fourth. Kim Dae-jung, the 
leader of the main opposition, finished second in the presidential election by 
polling about one-third of the votes. The emergence of the UNP as a viable third 
party was also remarkable: the UNP polled 17.4 per cent of the votes in the 
National Assembly election, and its presidential candidate, Chung Ju-young, 
polled 16.3 per cent.
The impact of the third series of changes in the party configuration on the 
voters may have been more far-reaching, but at least two main sources of voter 
mobility can be identified. The first source is in the opposition, especially among 
the former supporters of the RDP: that is, by joining with the ruling DJP, Kim 
Young-sam may have lost a significant degree of the political support 
commanded as an opposition leader. It is also expected that there would be some 
degree of voter mobility in the case of the ruling coalition, where some voters 
were former supporters of the DJP and the NDRP. That is, there appear^ to have 
been those who were dissatisfied with the leadership change to Kim Young-sam 
in the DLP. This is exemplified by the various splinter groups who deserted the 
DLP - their shared interest may have been in opposing Kim’s leadership.9 Table 
3-2 shows how voting choices in 1987 were distributed in the elections of 1992:
-86-
9 See Lee, Hong-yung, “South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratisation,” Asian 
Survey. 33(1), 1993, pp. 32-42.
Panel A reports the voter movement between the 1987 and the 1992 presidential
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elections, and Panel B between the 1987 presidential election and the 1992 
National Assembly election.
Table 3-2. Flow of the Votes, 1987-1992: Column Percentages (Frequencies) 
A. Between 1987 and the 1992 Presidential Elections
1992
1987
Total (N)Roh YS DJ JP NonVoter NewVoter
Kim Young-sam 59.2% 51.3% 2.4% 38.9% 23.2% 22.2% 3 6 .2  % (543)
Kim Dae-iung 7.7% 11.3% 82.2% 10.7% 14.3% 29.6% 29.1 % (437)
Chung Ju-young 18.3% 18.5% 5.1% 25.4% 6.7% 14.4% 14.1 % (211)
Others 5.1% 9.1% 2.0% 14.5% 7.8% 14.7% 6 .8 %  (101)
NonVoter 9.6% 9.9% 8.4% 10.5% 48.1% 19.1% 13.8 % (208)
Total (N) 35.3 % 
(530)
16.7%
(251)
23.5  % 
(353)
3 .8  % 
(57)
8 .6  % 
(128)
12.0%
(181)
1 0 0 %  (1500)
Note: Roh - Roh Tae-woo; YS - Kim Young-sam; DJ - Kim Dae-jung; and JP - Kim Jong-pil.
B. Between 1987 and the 1992 National Assembly Elections
1992
1987
Total (N)Roh YS DJ JP NonVoter NewVoter
DLP 59.5% 42.2% 5.9% 39.8% 16.6% 22.6% 35.2 % (525)
DP 9.2% 24.2% 81.1% 9.3% 17.6% 29.6% 31.9%  (475)
UNP 12.2% 17.2% 3.7% 18.2% 6.1% 7.4% 10.2% (152)
Others 7.1% 6.8% 1.3% 10.3% 4.8% 7.8% 5.7 % (85)
Non-Voter 11.9% 9.7% 8.0% 22.4% 54.9% 32.5% 17.1 % (255)
Total (N) 35.5%
(530)
16.8%
(251)
23.7 % 
(353)
3.8%
(57)
8.6 % 
(128)
11.5%
(172)
100% (1491)
Note: The respondents who were not eligible to vote in the 1992 NA election are excluded. 
DLP - The Democratic Liberal Party; DP - The Democratic Party; and UNP - The Unification 
National Party.
Source: The 1992 Post-Election Survey
In looking at the tables, there emerge several points to be noted. First, the 
support for Kim Dae-jung, and his party, was quite consistent. O f those who had
supported him in 1987, more than four-fifths stayed with him and his DP in 1992. 
Out-flow votes in other directions were minimal, among which abstention was 
the biggest but not higher than for his counterparts. This could be expected, as 
he and his DP were the least disturbed by the third series of party realignment. 
In-flow votes from the other directions, which were slightly higher than the out­
flow votes, indicate that Kim Dae-jung and his DP had net gains, albeit limited. 
It is noteworthy that his DP had the biggest in-flow votes from the 1987 votes of 
Kim Young-sam among the DLP components, but the in-flows were substantially 
reduced in the presidential election. This clearly indicates that the DP (former 
PPD) attracted some former Kim Young-sam supporters through the merger with 
the (small) Democratic Party composed of former RDP members who split with 
Kim Young-sam over his decision to merge with the DJP. The DP, which 
contained some former RDP members whose constituencies largely coincided 
with Kim Young-sam’s regional strongholds, may have been more successful in 
gaining the in-flow votes of former Kim Young-sam supporters in the National 
Assembly election than in the presidential election. In practice, however, the DP 
won none of the seats in the single member district contests for the National 
Assembly in Pusan and Kyongnam.
Second, there is also remarkable stability in the movement of the 1987 Roh 
Tae-woo vote. Nearly 60 per cent of his supporters stayed with the ruling DLP 
and its presidential candidate. Although the movement from 1987 to 1992 was a 
little more volatile than that in Table 3-1 covering 1985-1987/88 (the comparable
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figures were about 70 per cent), his 1987 support yielded the least defections 
among the DLP components. The biggest share of the out-flow votes, including 
those to nonvoting, went to a new comer, Chung Ju-young and his UNP. The 
defections to Kim Dae-jung and his DP were minimal. Despite the fact that Roh 
had withdrawn his party membership of the DLP before the presidential election, 
Kim Young-sam was successful in retaining the 1987 Roh supporters - indeed, 
far more so than in retaining his own supporters.
a  trot*
Third, Kim Young-sam, indeed, suffered. significant loss ef his former 
support«». More than half of his 1987 voters deserted him in the 1992 National 
Assembly election, and nearly half of them did so in the presidential election. 
Nearly one-fifth of the former Kim Young-sam supporters deserted to Chung Ju- 
young and his UNP, who also accommodated a substantial portion of the 
defectors of the DLP components. Nonetheless, Kim Young-sam won more 
support among his former supporters in the presidential election than his DLP did 
in the Assembly election, by largely regaining those who had switched to the DP 
in the Assembly election. That is, the out-flow votes to Kim Dae-jung were 
halved if compared with those to the DP, and there were similar levels of 
defections in other directions. The in-flow votes to Kim Young-sam show that 
he won more support from the 1987 Roh voters than his own. That is, among 
those who voted for Kim Young-sam in 1992, there were more of the 1987 Roh 
voters (59.2 %) - who were also far bigger than the 1987 Kim Young-sam voters 
in absolute figures - than his former supporters (51.3 %). However, it may not
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have been possible for the DLP to stay in power without support from the former 
Kim Young-sam voters (and from the former Kim Jong-pil voters to a lesser 
degree).
The fourth point of note is that about 40 per cent of the 1987 Kim Jong-pil 
voters stayed with Kim Young-sam and the DLP. Among the components of the 
DLP, the former Kim Jong-pil voters were the most volatile. Among those who 
deserted him in 1992, a majority chose not to vote in the National Assembly 
election, but went to Chung Ju-young in the presidential election. It is 
noteworthy that the flow to the UNP in the Assembly election was the biggest of 
all if the flow to non-voting is excluded. It is also apparent that many of the 
switchers went to minor parties. The out-flows to Kim Dae-jung and his DP 
were the least of all. In addition, a majority of the non-voters in 1987 again 
abstained in 1992: Kim Young-sam won a fair share of support from the 1987 
non-voters in the presidential election, and both the DP and the DLP won a 
similar degree of support from the 1987 non-voters. The most favoured direction 
of support among the new voters, namely, those who were too young to vote in 
1987, was to Kim Dae-jung and his DP - excluding non-voting in the Assembly 
election. The flows to Kim Young-sam and the DLP were, though, not much less 
than those to Kim Dae-jung and the DP.
Finally, the new comer, Chung Ju-young and his UNP, attracted a 
significant portion of the defectors of the DLP components, many more than did
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Kim Dae-jung and his DP. In terms of absolute size, the in-flow from the former 
Roh voters was the biggest - for example, 97 out of 211 in Panel A. These 
observations clearly support the general expectation that Chung Ju-young and his 
UNP would naturally erode the electoral basis of the governing party, as Chung 
and his party not only gained a majority of defectors from the DLP components, 
but also the in-flow from Roh comprised nearly half of Chung’s votes. From 
another point of view, however, it should also be noted that Chung and his party 
eroded the basis of the opposition party by accommodating a majority of the 
defectors of the DLP components. That is, being a popular direction of the 
defectors of the DLP components - especially those of Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Jong-pil who might have flown to Kim Dae-jung and his party in the absence of 
the UNP - Chung and his UNP also eroded the basis of the opposition support as 
much as it did that of the governing party. Indeed, in terms of relative defection, 
defined by the percentages of out-flow as shown in Table 3-2, Chung and his 
UNP attracted more switchers from the former Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil 
voters than from Roh. The direct in-flow from the former Kim Dae-jung votes 
was minimal, however.
In short, there was continuity as much as change in the vote movement 
across the two elections. The support of Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil 
underwent the most significant changes by the DLP merger, as expected. 
Another potential source of vote movement in the ruling party side, namely, the 
1987 Roh supporters, saw no substantial impact from the merger. Kim Dae-jung
and his DP had shown a limited ability to expand their basis of electoral support 
beyond the already solid, but limited, basis of support. The main opposition’s 
inability to accommodate the defections, especially those from the former Kim 
Young-sam voters (and the Kim Jong-pil voters), may have been one of the 
decisive factors that resulted in its electoral defeat. Accommodation of the 
defections, which resulted from the DLP merger, was undertaken by a third party 
in 1992, and, further, it performed its role surprisingly well by attracting 
defections from all of the DLP components.
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4. Changing Patterns of Electoral Support: 1985,1987, and 1992
In most of the past Korean elections, the yoch’on yado phenomenon - that 
the ruling party gets greater support in less urbanised areas, while the opposition 
receives much more support in more urbanised areas - was the most frequently 
observed pattern of voter alignment.10 Studies of recent elections also observed 
this pattern of urban-rural differences in voting. For example, in his district level 
study of the 1988 National Assembly election, Park Chan-wook demonstrated 
that there remained “a reasonably strong and negative relationship between
10 See Chapter 2 for a detailed assessment See, for studies that identified the pattem of urban- 
rural voter alignments in the elections before 1987, for example, Lee, Kap-yun, “Electoral 
Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of Korea (1948-85),’’ Proceedings of 
the Second Asian-Pacific Political Science Association Conference, 1986, pp.151-163; and Kim, 
Hong-nack and Choe, Sun-ki, “Urbanisation and Changing Voting Patterns in South Korean 
Parliamentary Elections,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 6(3), 1987, pp.31-50.
urbanisation and the DJP vote,” and the RDP and the PPD won “appreciable 
support in metropolitan and urban districts.” 11 This was so after controlling for 
regional differences, which exerted a far stronger influence in determining the 
vote for each of the parties.
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Regional differences in party support had also been a frequently observed 
pattem of voter alignment, especially in presidential elections.12 This pattem was 
first observed in the 1963 presidential election, in which Park Chung-hee drew 
his support heavily from the Kyongsang provinces.13 Regional voting became 
intensified in 1971, as Kim Dae-jung, who had strong electoral support from the 
rival Cholla provinces, became the opposition candidate.14 In the 1987 
presidential election, there re-emerged profound regional differences in electoral 
support. The four main candidates performed best in each of their home 
provinces: Roh Tae-woo in North Kyongsang (Kyongbuk), Kim Young-sam in 
South Kyongsang (Kyongnam), Kim Dae-jung in Cholla, and Kim Jong-pil in 
Ch’ungch’ong. In the following National Assembly election of 1988, this pattem 
of regional voting was repeated virtually intact. All of the four main parties, led 
by the same leadership as in 1987, became regional parties. The elections of
11 See Park, Chan-wook, “The 1988 National Assembly Election in South Korea: The Ruling 
Party’s Loss of Legislative Majority,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 7(3), 1988, pp.59-76, 
atp.71.
12 See Chapter 2 for a review.
13 See Kim, C.I. Eugene, “Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections”, Asian Survey, 4(3), 1964, 
pp. 765-773; and his “Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections,” Pacific Affairs, 41(1), 1968, pp. 
60-70.
14 See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., “Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: 
An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections,” The Journal of Politics, 34(3), 1972, pp. 
825-859.
1992 also confirmed that the regional nature of voting, namely, voting for the 
candidates or the parties of the same regional attachment, continued to play a 
significant role in shaping the voter’s choice.15 What differentiates the recent 
pattern of regional voting from that of the past is that the region-party alliance, 
which hardly appeared as a significant factor in the past National Assembly 
elections, and which may have been merely a tendency toward voters favouring 
their region’s political leaders in the presidential elections, became increasingly a 
party-oriented one.
- 94-
In the following section, the impact of the party splits/mergers on voting 
choices will be discussed with reference to these two main dimensions of voter 
alignment. That is, by exploring changes in the patterns of voter alignment, how 
the voters responded to the party splits/mergers can be closely examined. To 
measure changes in the patterns of voter alignment over time, multiple regression 
analyses were performed with dependent variables of voting choice in 1985, 
1987, and 1992, and with independent variables of urban-rural location and 
residential region, which were selected as indicators of the two dimensions of 
voter alignment.16 By comparing the regression coefficients of the independent
15 See Park, Chan-wook, “The Fourteenth National Assembly Election in Korea: A Test for the 
Ruling Democratic Liberal Party,” Korea Journal, 33(1), 1993, pp. 5-16; and Lee, Nam-young, 
“The Voter’s Choice: The 14th Presidential Election of Korea,” Korea Journal, 33(1), 1993, pp. 
17-26.
16 For the purpose of this chapter, the variables of urban-rural location and residential region are 
employed to examine changes in the patterns of urban-rural and regional voting, as these are most 
frequently observed patterns. The nature of the urban-rural differences in party support still 
needs to be tested with socio-economic and altitudinal indicators. Alternative ways of coding the 
variable of region may be either using regional identification variable, which can be obtained by 
directly asking a respondent’s regional identification, or obtaining data on a respondent’s region 
of origin. The surveys employed here collected the latter kind of data, and the data will be used
variables, which are reported in Table 3-3 for the governing party votes and in 
Table 3-4 for the opposition party votes, the impact of the party splits/mergers on 
the voters can be identified.17
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Changing Patterns of Governing Party Support.
Table 3-3 reports the effects of urban-rural location and residential region 
on governing party choices in 1985, 1987 and 1992. For example, in 1985, those 
who lived in rural areas were about 11 per cent more likely to vote for the ruling 
DJP than those who lived in metropolitan areas, after the effect of residential 
region on voting was accounted for (see b ’s in the table). Similarly, the former 
were about 14 per cent more likely to vote Roh Tae-woo than the latter in 1987. 
Those who lived in Kyongbuk were about 16 per cent more likely to vote for the
in the later Chapters, in relation to the residential region variable. See Chapter 4 for a detailed 
analysis on the urban-rural dimension of voter alignment, and Chapter 5 for regional voting.
17 For the purpose of comparison between the models, ‘b ’ - the unstandardised partial regression 
coefficient of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression - is particularly useful, as it estimates the 
effect of an independent variable, statistically holding constant the other variables listed. The b ’s, 
which are comparable across models, can be interpreted as a percentage probability, where the 
lowest possible value of an independent variable is 0 and the highest 1. The ‘beta’ is a 
standardised coefficient, which indicates the relative strength of the variables in a model. The 
standardised coefficients are particularly useful when the unit of measurement of the variables 
varies. Logit estimates, which are commonly used for binary dependent variables, are also 
reported in the Tables, but as a diagnostic means only since OLS regression does not give serious 
misleading results unless the distribution across the two categories is highly skewed. The logit 
estimate is the change in the log of the odds ratio associated with a unit change in the dependent 
variable. See Hanushek, Eric A., and Jackson, John E„ Statistical Methods for Social Science, 
New York: Academic Press, 1977, pp. 187-210; and Achen, Christopher H., Interpreting and 
Using Regression, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982. Also see Aldrich, John H., and Nelson, Forrest D., 
Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984.
DJP than those in Seoul in 1985, after the effect of urban-rural location on voting 
was accounted for, and about 28 per cent more likely to vote for Roh Tae-woo in 
1987. In 1987, those in Kyongbuk were about 62 per cent (subtracting -.343 
from .275) more likely to vote Roh than those in Cholla.
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Table 3-3. Effects of Location and Region of Residence on the Governing Party Votes: 
In 1985,1987, and 1992 (A Multivariate Assessment)
1985 (DJP) 1987 (Roh Tae-woo) 1992 (Kim Young-sam)
Variables b beta logit b beta logit b beta logit
Location
( M e t r o p o l i t a n )
City .043 .037 .250 -.008 -.007 .038 .023 .021 .130
Rural
Region
.110* .097 .666** .135** .122 .801** .138** .121 .849**
(Seoul)
Kyonggi .058 .043 .131 .053 .041 .117 -.025 -.020 -.237
Kangwon .149 .059 .451 .166A .067 .482 .068 .027 .071
C h ’u n g c h ’o n g .085 .052 .109 -.031 -.019 -.332 .095A .056 .212
Cholla -.394** -.254 -2.19** -.343** -.227 -2.33** -.400** -.269 -3.29**
Kyongbuk .160* .106 .553* .275** .188 1.07** .205** .134 .760**
Kyongnam -.002 -.001 -.140 -.036 -.029 -.277 .366** .278 1.48**
Intercept .390 -.406 .334 -.654 .337 -.644
R2 (pseudo-R2) .098 .082 .115 .099 .196 .168
C (% ) 62.9 % 67.2 % 69.5 %
Note: (1) pseudo- R2 = [1 - (lnLn / lnL0)], where L0 denotes the likelihood value for the null model 
(i.e., with an intercept only) and Li denotes the likelihood value for the full model (see Dhrymes, 
Phoebus J., “Limited Dependent Variable,” in Griliches, Zvi, and Intriligator, Michael D., eds., 
Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. Ill, 1986, pp. 1567-1631, at p.1585); c - The overall 
percentage correctly predicted by the model in the classification table with the observed 
frequencies.
(2) Coding of the dependent variables: 1985, DJP vote=1, others=0; 1987, Roh Tae-woo 
vote=1, others=0; 1992, Kim Young-sam vote=1, others=0. Non-voters were excluded.
(3) ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.
Source: The 1991 Survey for 1985 and 1987, and the 1992 Post-election Survey for 1992.
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A comparison of b ’s between the first two columns at Table 3-3 indicates 
changes in the patterns of the governing party support, resulting from the second 
series of changes in the party configuration. One of the differences is that Roh 
Tae-woo improved his support from those living in Kyongbuk, compared with 
that of the DJP in 1985. The Cholla voters’ disenchantment with the ruling DJP 
was largely maintained in 1987.18 The Ch’ungch’ong voters, who had been more 
likely to support the DJP in 1985 than those in Seoul, show a far reduced level of 
support for Roh in 1987. The level of the DJP support among the Kangwon and 
Kyonggi (and Kyongnam) voters is similar to that of Roh Tae-woo support. The 
urban-rural difference in the governing party support also became steeper in 1987 
than was so in 1985. The logit estimates are similar to those of the OLS in 
substantive details.
These comparisons clearly indicate that the pattern of the governing party 
support also underwent a change as a result of the establishment of the four party 
system, although the governing party support remained the most stable of all as 
shown in the above section. The changes in the pattern of regional voting are 
remarkable: Roh pulled more support from his Kyongbuk than did the DJP, less 
support in the other candidates’ regional strongholds, and maintained a similar 
level of support in the “neutral” regions of Kyonggi and Kangwon. The stable 
governing party support between 1985 and 1987 may, then, have stemmed from
18 There were obviously measurement errors for the Cholla voters, especially for the recalled vote 
of 1985. According to the election statistics, the Cholla voters were about the national average in 
supporting the ruling DJP. Thus, the difference of the Cholla voters’ support for the governing 
party between 1985 and 1987 may have been far greater than here.
the urban-rural dimension of party support, which also shows a similar pattem in 
1992.
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From this analysis, two tentative conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
impact of both of the two main dimensions in voter alignment was sharpened in 
the 1987 presidential elections: this was indicated by the increased b’s of the two 
categories of the variables in 1987 overall, and also by the R-squared and the c 
statistics. Of these, the b figures of Kyongbuk and Ch’ungch’ong showed the 
most distinct change. Second, as regards the relative importance of the two 
dimensions in determining the governing party support, indicated by the 
standardised regression coefficients (beta’s), the regional one was far stronger 
than the urban-rural influence both in 1985 and 1987. The latter conclusion, 
however, may be quite misleading as there was evidence that those in Cholla 
showed highly skewed responses in the data toward the opposition NKDP. If we 
take account of the measurement errors, the effects of the two main dimensions in 
1985 may be even, or the regional one may be weaker, in terms of their relative 
importance. Nonetheless, it becomes clear that the regional variables exerted a 
stronger, if not dominant, influence in the governing party choices among the two 
dimensions of party support. This was particularly so in the electoral contests in 
1987, where the four major candidates actively sought regional appeals in their 
respective regional strongholds. It is, however, noteworthy that the variables of 
urban-rural location also had some significant impact on the governing party
choices.
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A comparison of b ’s between the last two columns of Table 3-3 indicates 
changes in the patterns of the governing party support, resulting from the DLP 
merger. First of all, there is little difference in the patterns of the b ’s of the 
urban-rural location variables across the two elections of 1987 and 1992. In 
other words, there has been continuity rather than change in the urban-rural 
dimension of electoral support for the governing party. This similarity is a quite 
striking one, given that Roh Tae-woo (who shared a common background with 
his predecessors, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan) and Kim Young-sam 
(who had long been an opponent of dictatorial rule$) had nothing much in 
common, except for the fact that both of them had run for presidency as a ruling 
party candidate. Through the party merger, the DLP may have expected that it 
could shift its social basis of party support, or at least minimise the urban-rural 
pattem of voter alignment, which had characterised the past electoral contests 
between “dictatorship and democracy.” In 1992, however, the DLP candidate 
was again more successful in winning votes from those who were traditionally 
supportive of the government, that is, in the rural areas, perhaps the older and the 
less educated.
Two main changes are notable in the regional patterns of governing party 
support between 1987 and 1992: first, the increased propensity of the Kyongnam 
voters supporting the DLP candidate in 1992, and, second, the relative setback of 
the Kyongbuk voters supporting Kim Young-sam. As a result of the change in its
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leadership, the DLP further mobilised support from those in Kyongnam - indeed, 
much more than Kim Young-sam did in 1987 as an opposition candidate (see 
Table 3-4) - but lessened the support from those in Kyongbuk, who had shown a 
stronger leaning toward Roh in 1987. To be sure, the Kyongbuk voters still 
showed a significant leaning toward the DLP candidate in 1992. Kim Young- 
sam was also somewhat successful in retaining the support of Ch’ungch’ong 
voters, who had been away from Roh in 1987. Cholla voters maintained, or 
rather intensified, their political propensity against the governing party. The 
changes in the degree of Kim Young-sam support among the Kangwon and 
Kyonggi voters are notable, compared with that of Roh and the DJP. The level of 
Kim Young-sam support in Kangwon was far reduced, although there was still a 
leaning toward the DLP candidate, and Kyonggi voters withdrew their electoral 
support for the governing parties in 1992.
In looking at the relative importance of the two categories of variables in 
determining governing party support, the regional nature of voting far is salient 
(see the beta figures). Indeed, the tendency of regional voting for the governing 
party became more acute in 1992 than in 1987. The overall increase of the 
predictability, which was shown in terms of the R-squared and the c statistics in 
the table, may be attributable to the increased tendency of regional voting. In 
short, the DLP may have been successful only in broadening its political support 
geographically by the merger of the parties commanding respective regional
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strongholds, but it failed in altering its basis of social support, which obviously 
had been a purpose of the party merger in 1990.
Changing Patterns of Opposition Party Support.
Table 3-4 reports regression coefficients of the two categories of variables, 
for the main opposition party votes this time. First of all, compared with the 
patterns of the governing party support, the b’s of the urban-rural variables were 
smaller in magnitude across the models, especially in 1987 and 1992, although 
they were all in the opposite direction to those predicting support for the 
governing party. This tells us that the pattern of voter alignment following the 
urban-rural dimension relates more to the governing party than the opposition. It 
therefore supports the contention made by Darcy et al. that “the opposition 
tendency in the electorate, being more negative against the government rather 
than positive toward a particular party, will be more fragmented and unstable 
from election to election.”19 As a result of the party split, the opposition parties 
failed to consolidate the anti-government tendency in the electorate in 1987, 
although there is a clear indication that Kim Young-sam was more successful in 
mobilising the anti-government tendency than Kim Dae-jung. In 1992, the main 
opposition DP again failed in attracting the anti-government tendency, partly
19 See Darcy et al., op.cit., p.132.
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because of its strong regional image, and partly because of the emergence of the 
UNP led by Chung Ju-young which attracted most of the floating voters resulting 
from the DLP merger.
Contrary to this, stronger regional voting characterised the support for the 
main opposition parties.20 This is particularly so for the support of Kim Dae- 
jung, who had been strongly favoured by those in Cholla in 1987 and again in 
1992. The regional pattern of his support in 1987 showed that Kim Dae-jung 
was the most affected by regionalism. That is, Kim Dae-jung was exclusively 
supported by the Cholla voters, who were thus the least supportive of all the 
other candidates; but at the same time, he was also the least favoured in the other 
candidates’ strongholds. In the case of the other candidates, however, this was 
not so. For example, Kim Young-sam, who also mobilised his Kyongnam voters 
most in 1987, did not suffer as much as Kim Dae-jung neither in Kyongbuk 
(Roh’s stronghold) nor in Ch’ungch’ong (Kim Jong-pil’s stronghold). This was 
the case for Roh Tae-woo as well.
By 1992, support for Kim Dae-jung had become increasingly regionalistic. 
In addition to the low support for him in Kyongbuk, Kyongnam and 
Ch’ungch’ong, voters in Kangwon and Kyonggi also showed a significant
20 The significant regional differences in the NKDP support in 1985 may result from the NKDP's 
strong showing in Seoul rather than the regional nature of voting observed in 1987 and onwards. 
That is, since the NKDP performed far better in Seoul than anywhere else, by using the Seoul 
voters as a reference category in the model most of the regional variables seemed to be 
statistically significant
tendency to vote against him. The relatively good performance of the UNP 
candidate in Kangwon and Kyonggi may have been a factor that resulted in Kim 
Dae-jung’s relatively poor performance in these regions. The DP merger, which 
followed the DLP merger to widen its regional basis of electoral support, then 
had failed in widening its appeal in 1992. If there had been a change in the 
parties’ regional strongholds because of the leadership change in the ruling DLP, 
the change may have resulted in the relative success of the UNP and its 
presidential candidate because of the main opposition’s inability to overcome its 
strong regional image.
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5. Conclusion
While the Korean parties have undergone several stages of changes in their 
configuration since 1985, the forgoing analysis revealed that the voters exhibited 
a coherent tendency in their electoral choices. The extent of electoral change by 
1992 was far more modest than might have been expected from such changes in 
the party system. One of the main contributing factors to the partisan stability of 
the voters may be a government-opposition cleavage, which had often produced a 
pattern of voter alignment along the urban-rural dimension. As seen above, the 
governing parties have been far more successful in winning support from the 
rural voters over time, in spite of the parties’ changing characteristics resulting
- 105-
from the changes in the party system. In this vein, the pattern of urban-rural 
voter alignment shown in 1992 deserves more attention. The party mergers 
across the opposition and the government hardly resulted in changes of voting 
pattem along the urban-rural dimension. Thus, it can be argued that the voter 
movement away from Kim Young-sam in 1992 among his 1987 supporters 
resulted from his change of partisan stance. Kim Young-sam’ electoral success 
in 1992 may have, instead, lain in maintaining the support of the traditional 
governing party voters, in addition to the mobilisation of the DLP constituents’ 
regional strongholds. It is even more intriguing that the out-flow votes of Kim 
Young-sam were largely contained by the minor party candidates, especially by 
Chung Ju-young, rather than by the main opposition.
The patterns of regional voting over time showed that there was change as 
much as continuity. With rather strong regional ties to the parties, or the party 
leaderships, among the electorates, the parties maintained stable support from 
where they were strong; but regional voting became a source of change at the 
same time, as the voters, who increasingly viewed the parties as regionalistic, 
were easily cross-pressured by such changes of leadership in the parties. The 
fact that the regional attributes continued to shape voting choice in 1992 is hardly 
surprising as the four major candidates were still active in politics. Indeed, the 
two main candidates, namely, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, again 
performed best in their respective regional strongholds in 1992 as they did in the 
regionalism-driven four party contests in 1987. What is surprising is the
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performance of Chung Ju-young, who mobilised the support of the formerly 
“neutral” regions of Kyonggi and Kangwon (Chung claimed a regional tie in 
Kangwon) at the cost of aggravating the performance of Kim Dae-jung in these 
regions. He also accommodated the defecting voters of the DLP constituents far 
more than Kim Dae-jung, especially those in Kim Jong-pil’s regional stronghold, 
Ch’ungch’ong. Although the nature of regional voting still needs to be pursued, 
it can be argued that if the region-party allegiance looms large it may become a 
source of electoral volatility, as changes in party leaderships - and the changes of 
regional traits of the parties accordingly - would be more frequent with the 
current electoral arrangement of the five-year one-term fixed presidency.
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Chapter 4. The Pro-Government vs Pro-Democratic Cleavage: 
Urban-Rural Difference, Socialisation, or What?
1. Introduction
Since the early 1960s, urbanisation in Korea has occurred rapidly in close 
association with its modernisation process. For example, in 1960 only 28 per 
cent of the population lived in urban areas, but by 1990 about 72 per cent of the 
population was living in the cities (see Table 4-1). This growth has been due 
largely to migration of the rural population, accompanied by the fast growing 
economy, which sustained an increased rate of almost 10 per cent per annum, 
measured in GDP. According to the estimation by Kwon Tai-hwan of net 
population movement between 1960 and 1985, the cities inherited the rural 
population approximately in proportion to their size: Seoul had the biggest share 
of the in-migrants, followed by the cities of Kyonggi, Pusan, and the cities of 
Kyongbuk and Kyongnam in due sequence.1 A rapid increase in the school 
attendance rate was also witnessed: by the 1980s, about 90 per cent of children of 
secondary school age were attending school. The adult illiteracy rate dropped 
from 29.4 per cent in 1960 to under 5 per cent by 1990. The adult population
1 See Kwon, Tai-hwan, “Estimates of Net Migration for Korea,” Bulletin of the Population and 
Development Studies Center, 4 (1975), pp. 54-101; 7 (1978), pp. 43-57; and 17 (1988), pp. 36- 
69.
who had no schooling had also decreased to some 14 per cent of the total by
- 108-
1985, compared to about 57 per cent in 1960.
Table 4-1. Selected Indicators of Socio-economic Development in Korea, 1960-1990
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Total Population in Millions (3) 25.0 29.2b 31.5 34.7 37.4 40.4 43.5
U rb a n  P o p u la tio n  as  P e rc e n ta g e  of T o ta l (3 ) 28.0 33.6b 43.2 48.4 57.3 65.4 74.4
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP:
1 9 6 0 -7 0 , 1 9 7 0 -8 0 , & 1 9 8 0 -9 0  (2 ) — 8.6 — 9.6 — 9.7 —
Distribution of GDP (%) (4)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 38.2 41.3 29.7 27.0 17.8 12.8 9.1
Industry 18.6 23.9 27.2 31.3 37.9 41.8 44.8
Service, etc. 43.2 35.8 43.1 41.7 44.3 45.4 46.1
G N P  p e r c a p ita  (U S  d o lla rs ) (4 ) 82 a 114 223 574 1418 2194 5569
A d ult Illite racy  R a tio  (% , A g e  1 5 + )  (1 ) &  (2 ) 29.4 31 9b 12.4 9 7 N/A 4
G ro s s  E n ro llm e n t R a tio  by A g e -g ro u p  (1 )
P r im a ry  S c h o o l (% ) 96 100 103 107 109 97 108
S e c o n d a ry  S c h o o l (% ) 27 34 42 56 80 90 87
P o s t-s e c o n d a ry  S c h o o l (% ) 4.7 6.2 7.9 9.6 14.1 34.2 39.2
D istribu tio n  of A d u lt P o p u la tio n  b y
E d u c a t io n ( l)
N o  S c h o o lin g  (% , A g e  2 5 + ) 56.9 43.6 34.4 25.3 19.8 14.4 1 1 . 0 C
P rim a ry  S c h o o l (% , A g e  2 5 + ) 29.6 35.2 38.2 39.3 34.6 28.1 21.7C
S e c o n d a ry  S c h o o l (% , A g e  2 5 + ) 10.9 17.5 21.8 28.7 37.0 46.5 51.3C
P o s t-s e c o n d a ry  S c h o o l (% , A g e  2 5 + ) 2.6 3.6 5.6 6.7 8.6 11.0 16.0°
Note: a - 1961; b -1966. c - Calculated from the 1990 Census.
Sources: (1) UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1965,1974,1976,1982,1992; (2) World Bank, 
World Development Report, 1983,1984,1988,1989,1992,1993; (3) Economic Planning 
Board, Population and Housing Census Report, 1960,1966,1970,1975,1980,1985, 1990; (4) 
Korean Statistical Association, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1966,1971,1982,1991.
The urban areas, which became the centre for economic growth led by the 
industrial sector, attracted mainly the younger portion of the population between 
the ages of 15 to 34, with their increasing socio-econom ic opportunities,
especially in job and education. 2 In the political sphere, it was the urban centres 
that provided the opposition with the basis of political protests as well as 
electoral support. Within this context, most of the studies of Korean voting 
behaviour often cited the urban-rural difference in electoral support as a natural 
dimension of voter alignment. Under past authoritarian regimes, in which the 
political forces had been usually polarised into pro-government and anti- 
government on the issue of regime legitimacy, the urban population’s political 
propensity toward the opposition and the rural population’s leaning toward the 
government were often regarded as a manifestation of their differences in value 
orientations attributed by different experiences in socio-economic and political 
life. For example, it was speculated that people in urban areas, who tended to be 
younger, better-educated and higher in socio-economic status, were, with their 
higher level of modernity, more committed to the democratic values, and thus 
less likely to support the government. 3
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However, previous findings that demonstrated a substantial association 
between the level of urbanisation and voter preferences are often incomplete in 
grasping the nature of the urban-rural pattern of voter alignment, as there is no 
specification of the linkages that may have led urban voters to prefer the
2 See Repetto, Robert, Kwon, Tai-hwan, Kim, Son-ung, Kim, Dae-young, Sloboda, John E., and 
Donalson, Peter J., Economic Development, Population Policy, and Demographic Transition in 
the Republic of Korea: Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 75-101.
3 See Lee, Nam-young, “The Democratic Belief System: A Study of the Political Culture in 
South Korea,” Korean Social Science Journal, 7, 1985, pp. 46-89. Also see Kim Chong-lim, 
“Political Participation and Mobilized Voting,” in Kim Chong-lim, ed., Political Participation in 
Korea: Democracy, Mobilization and Stability, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 119-141.
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opposition parties and rural voters to favour the government party. That is, since 
the socio-economic variables - which had differentiated urban and rural voters, 
and which were found to be associated with voting preferences and other 
attitudinal variables - are closely related, arguments based on the bivariate 
relationship between voting preferences and each of the socio-economic variables 
are not only incomplete but may be quite misleading in some cases. For 
example, the older tend to be less-educated, the farmers tend to be older and less- 
educated, the less-educated tend to earn less income, and the rural areas consist 
of more of the voters who are older, less-educated, earn less income and are 
farmers than their metropolitan counterparts (see Table 4-2).
In his bivariate level analysis, for example, Lee Nam-young explained the 
negative relationship between family income and the governing party support 
observed in the 1992 presidential election as a result of the fact that “low-income 
earners seem to be more interested simply in maintaining their jobs than in 
changing the whole economic structure” under the deteriorating economic 
situation, and thus tended not to support the opposition parties which proposed 
somewhat radical economic reforms.4 However, the negative relationship 
between the level of family income and governing party support can be due to 
improper controls: that is, the level of family income is positively correlated with 
the level of education, which is also negatively, and perhaps more strongly, 
correlated with governing party support. Take another example: looking at the
4 See Lee, Nam-young, “The Voter’s Choice: The 14th Presidential Election of Korea,” Korea 
Journal, 33(1), 1993, pp. 17-26, atpp. 22-23.
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bivariate relationship between voting choice and social class, Song Kyong-ryung 
argued that there exists “a discordant (or an inverse) relationship” between the 
class structure and the party system, as the ruled - such as farmers, workers and 
petty bourgeoisie - seemed to be the most supportive of the governing party, and 
those who are most likely to benefit from the ruling party, including the 
bourgeoisie, seemed to be the least supportive of the governing party. 5 As will be 
demonstrated below, however, the seemingly discordant relationship may be 
simply a statistical artifact due to lack of proper controls. Furthermore, it has 
been rare for researchers to specifically link the socio-economic variables with 
attitudinal variables that may determine the voter’s choice.
The following sections will attempt to unravel the nature of the urban-rural 
dimension of voting. By looking initially at urban-rural differences in voting in a 
multivariate model, it will be possible to assess, first, whether urban-rural 
differences in voting are a reflection of the different socio-economic setting 
between urban and rural areas, and second, which aspects of socio-economic life 
are important in leading the voters to make different choices. Second, by 
additionally controlling for the voter’s political attitudes, we will attempt to 
assess by which process the urban-rural dimension of voting - or anti-government 
voting - is exercised. That is, by controlling for the voter’s immediate political
5 See Sung, Kyong-ryung, “Han’guk-ui Sahoe-gyegup-kwa Chongdang-gujo (Social Class and 
Party System in Korea),” in Lee, Un-jin, and Kim, Sok-jun, et al., Han’guk-ui Chongch’ i-wa 
Son’gomunhwa (Politics and Electoral Culture in Korea), Seoul: Sahoe-munhwa Yon’guso, 
1992, pp. 13-69, at p.48.
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tendencies, it may be possible to explore the linkages between socio-economic 
variables and voting choice.
2. Social Composition and Urban-Rural Differences in Voting
Let us begin by examining bivariate relationships between the voter’s socio­
economic characteristics and voting choice. Table 4-3 reports the unstandardised 
regression coefficients of the socio-economic variables with the dependent 
variables of voting choice in the 1987 and the 1992 presidential elections. The 
ordinary least squares regression analysis was performed for each category of the 
socio-economic variables. The estimates of the bivariate model can be seen as 
the baseline of effects of the independent variables before taking into account 
effects of other variables that may be associated with them, thus giving only 
limited information about the voter’s decision.
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 show that all of the socio-economic variables under 
study have some significant relationships with voting at the bivariate level, albeit 
various in their degree of association. In other words, the voters’ socio-economic 
characteristics listed may have exerted some influence on their voting decision. 
For example, among the voters in the 1987 presidential election, a person who 
lived in a rural area was some 10 per cent more likely to vote for Roh Tae-woo
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Table 4-3. Social Structures and Voting Choice in 1987/1988: Bivariate Relationships (b’s)
Variables Roh YS DJ DJP RDP PPD
Urban/Rural
(Metropolitan) (.343) (.327) (.250) (.314) (.336) (.247)
City -.015 -.025 .039 -.013 -.030 .035
Rural .103** -.156** .047 .097** -.147** .041
r2 .010 .021 .002 .009 .018 .002
Gender
(Female) (.411) (.251) (.258) (.385) (.266) (.244)
Male -.090** .060* .026 -.103** .050A .044
r2 .009 .004 .001 .012 .003 .033
Age
(Over 50) (.594) (.122) (.240) (.550) (.106) (.269)
20s -.343** .224** .089* -.318** .282** .027
30s -.315** .196** .036 -.300** .242** -.009
40s -.183** .193** -.045 -.192** .169** -.054
r2 .081 .039 .012 .073 .058 .004
Religion
(None/Others) (.350) (.270) (.310) (.309) (.305) (.277)
Buddhist .147** -.035 -.132** .150** -.023 -.106**
Protestant -.095* .064 .015 -.063 -.041 .081*
Catholic -.066 .087 -.050 -.055 .018 .031
r2 .035 .009 .019 .031 .002 .023
Education
(Primary School) (.539) (.114) (.298) (.477) (.115) (.316)
Middle School -.139** .094* -.066 -.123** .116** -.086A
High School -.202** .195** -.023 -.158** .209** -.055
University -.320** .344** -.032 -.284** .349** -.064
r2 .050 .069 .002 .040 .069 .004
Job, Head of Household
(Self-employed) (.352) (.280) (.268) (.272) (.314) (.301)
Farmer .126** -.145** .017 .183** -.160** -.029
Manual Worker -.005 .013 .034 .063 -.052 .007
Routine Non-manual -.027 .045 -.002 .033 .043 -.059
Manager/Professional -.014 .208** -.114A .006 .097 -.179**
r2 .014 .037 .005 .019 .031 .010
Household's Income
(Under 500,000 won) (.432) (.227) (.260) (.357) (.269) (.273)
500,000 - 990,000 -.071* .049 .027 .014 -.029 -.007
1,000,000-1,490,000 -.151** .139** -.028 -.067 .077A -.010
Over 1,500,000 -.129* .137* .027 -.125* .138** -.017
r2 .011 .012 .002 .010 .016 .0001
Subjective Status
(Low) (.417) (.230) (.267) (.374) (.234) (.278)
Lower-middle -.028 .025 .004 -.027 .372 -.014
Middle -.101* .084* .025 -.079* .098** -.013
Upper-middle/Upper -.109A .207** -.095 -.083 .177** -.040
r2 .008 .014 .004 .005 .012 .0005
Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10 in a two-tailed test. 
Intercepts are in bracket.
Source: The 1991 Survey.
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Table 4-4. Social Structures and Voting Choice in 1992: Bivariate Relationships (b’s)
Variables YS DJ JY DLP DP UNP
Urban/Rural
(Metropolitan) (.405) (.330) (.168) (.385) (.418) (.130)
City -.015 .009 .023 -.001 -.046 .033
Rural .076* .024 -.045 .161** -.087* -.064**
r2 .005 .0004 .005 .020 .006 .012
Gender
(Female) (.467) (.322) (.148) (.468) (.359) (.111)
Male -.096** .031 .031 -.086** .051A .024
r2 .010 .001 .002 .008 .003 .001
Age
(Over 50) (.611) (.289) (.078) (.557) (.324) (.073)
20s -.349** .102** .112** -.222** .120** .060*
30s -.247** .041 .159** -.214** .070A .097**
40s -.088* .037 .038 -.032 .024 .029
r2 .079 .007 .029 .042 .009 .012
Religion
(None/Others) (.349) (.403) (.146) (.373) (.425) (.122)
Buddhist .199** -.193** .049* .160** -.144** -.008
Protestant .074* -.047 .007 .053 -.010 .006
Catholic -.012 .003 .022 -.084 .047 .039
r2 .030 .031 .003 .023 .019 .001
Education
(Primary School) (.567) (.331) (.074) (.546) (.333) (.067)
Middle School -.061 .002 .051 -.081A .024 .070*
High School -.205** -.0003 .147** -.140** .042 .070**
University -.256** .034 .102** -.244** .143** .079**
r2 .040 .001 .025 .028 .011 .008
Job, Head of Household
(Self-employed) (.390) (.344) (-170) (.353) (.437) (.123)
Farmer .120** .010 -.076* .184** -.107* -.058*
Manual Worker .049 -.027 .022 .121** -.099* .003
Routine Non-manual -.035 .021 .011 .004 -.013 .041
Manager/Professional .245** -.265** -.050 .253** -.206* -.086
r2 .019 .011 .009 .027 .012 .013
Household's Income
(Under 500,000 won) (■525) (.363) (-077) (.538) (.370) (.048)
500,000 - 990,000 -.117** -.023 .096** -.107** .003 .065*
1,000,000-1,490,000 -.127** -.040 .115** -.152** .003 .129**
Over 1,500,000 -.143** -.027 .110** -.169** .062 .072*
r2 .010 .001 .012 .013 .002 .017
Type of Housing
(Owner Occupier) (.476) (.309) (.151) (.458) (.360) (-116)
Monthly Rent -.079 .040 -.040 -.009 .013 -.015
Long-term Lease -.158** .083** .046* -.101** .072* .023
r2 .022 .007 .005 .009 .005 .001
Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.
Intercepts are in bracket.
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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(and about 16 per cent less likely to vote for Kim Young-sam) than a comparable 
person who lived in a metropolitan area. Male voters, the younger, and the 
better-educated were less likely to be supportive of the governing party 
candidates in 1987 and in 1992 than female counterparts, the older, and the less- 
educated, respectively. Voters whose religious affiliations were Buddhism, 
whose occupations were farmer, and who were earning less income, showed 
political propensity toward the governing party and its candidates across all the 
models. In addition, those who had managerial and professional jobs favoured 
Kim Young-sam disproportionately both in 1987 and in 1992. People who 
assigned themselves as middle-class or above were less likely to vote Roh Tae- 
woo in 1987 than the others, and those who dwelled in their own house were 
more likely to vote Kim Young-sam in 1992 than those who occupied other types 
of housing.
As mentioned above, it may be premature to conclude that the relationships 
between the socio-economic variables and voting choice observed at the bivariate 
level are genuine. There may be two main sources of misleading results. First, 
there are obviously many more politically relevant variables that may affect 
voting choice. Although it may be impractical to attempt to explain all the forces 
that influence a voter’s decision in an election, an argument based on a bivariate 
relationship is even more problematic. Second, it is possible that the observed 
bivariate relationships may be spurious. Since the socio-economic variables are 
interrelated, the bivariate relationships measure different aspects of the same
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voters without distinguishing their different impacts on voting choice. The latter 
point can be more serious if one attempts to construct a theoretical model, as 
each of the socio-economic variables may have different theoretical implications. 
For example, the negative relationship between the level of a household’s income 
and the governing party support - that is, the more a person earns, the less the 
person supports the governing party (a proposition which is highly doubtful) - 
may mislead a researcher unless other relevant variables, which may be related 
both to a person’s level of income and voting choice, are taken into account.
To test different impacts of the socio-economic variables on the voter’s 
choice, the coefficients are estimated using a series of ordinary least squares 
equations. Basically, three regression models for voting choice were employed 
by introducing additional controls. The first model takes on the effects of 
geographical location on voting choice by employing the variables of residential 
type (urban/rural), and region. The native region variables were also entered into 
the equations as a control variable to insure that any relationship detected is not 
actually due to regional factors. (Detailed discussions of regional effects on 
voting will follow in Chapter 5.) The second model introduces additional control 
variables of socialisation: gender, age, religion and education. The third model 
considers the effects of a person’s location in the social structure by introducing 
additional variables of occupation, income, subjective status or housing type. 
Thus, by looking at changes of the coefficient in due course, it is possible to 
assess: (1) whether or not the geographical differences in voting (in this chapter,
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the focus is on the urban-rural difference) exist if differences of the socio­
economic characteristics of the voters are considered; (2) which aspects of socio­
economic life result in such differences in voting if the differences are due to 
differences in social composition between the geographical units; and (3) to 
determine which aspects of socio-economic life exert most significant impact on 
voting, and to identify their varying degrees of influence. The unstandardised 
regression coefficients of the three models are reported in Table 4-5 and Table 4- 
6 for voting choices in 1987/1988 and 1992, respectively.
First of all, the urban/rural differences in voting, which were significant in 
the first model, became insignificant when the voters’ socio-economic 
characteristics were controlled.6 Indeed, by the second model, in which the 
socialisation variables were entered into the equations, the effect of urban/rural 
residency on voting became negligible. When the regional attributes were 
controlled in the first models, rural voters tended to favour (by some 12 per cent) 
the governing party candidates compared with those in metropolitan areas. This 
is a clear indication that the observed urban/rural difference in voting may be a 
mere reflection of differences in social composition between urban and rural 
areas. That is, the reason for rural voters’ favouring the governing party and its
6 Regarding this observation, however, a reservation needs to be made for the models in the 1992 
National Assembly election, in which those who lived in the cities (other than the metropolises, 
i.e., Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taegu, Kwangju, and Taejon) showed some significant difference in 
their voting for the DLP and the UNP, compared with those in the metropolitan areas (and of 
course compared with those in the rural areas as well). No firm answers can be provided for this, 
but it is likely that the UNP had relative success in the cities rather than the metropolitan areas, 
as the special cities in the regional hinterlands coincided largely with the regional strongholds of 
the DLP - i.e., Pusan and Taegu, including Taejon - and the DP - i.e., Kwangju.
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candidates overall may be nothing more than the fact that, for example, the rural 
areas consisted of more of the older and the less educated voters, who tended to 
favour the governing party candidates. Comparable evidence can be found in the 
analyses by Lee Kap-yun and Park Chan-wook, where the urban-rural differences 
in voting became negligible when other socio-economic characteristics of the 
voters were taken into account.7
A further test is provided in Table 4-7, in which each of the socialisation 
variables is controlled, in addition to those in the first models. The models for 
Kim Dae-jung and his party vote were not estimated as the urban-rural difference 
was not significant for them in the first models. The table shows that the urban- 
rural difference in voting was largely accounted for either by education or by age 
across the models, except for the difference in the 1987 Kim Young-sam vote - 
which was not accounted for by any single variable but by the combination of 
education, age and religion. This analysis indicates that the urban-rural 
difference in voting results from differences in educational attainment or age 
composition between the urban and rural areas that result in differences in voting 
choice. In accounting for urban-rural differences in voting, education seemed to 
be somewhat more important than age. But when age was added as a control as 
shown in the second models at Tables 4-5 and 4-6, education appeared to exert
- 121-
7 See Lee, Kap-yun, “T’up’yohaengt’ae-wa Minjuhwa (Voting Behaviour and Democratisation),” 
in Kim, Kwang-woong (ed.), Han guk-ui Son’ gojongch’ ihak (Studies on Korean Electoral 
Politics), Seoul: Pobmunsa, 1988, pp. 167-181; and Park, Chan-wook, “Korean Voters’ 
Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election: A Survey Data Analysis,” Korea and World 
Affairs, 17(3), 1993, pp. 432-458.
only some residual effect on voting.8 Thus, it can be argued that the urban-rural 
difference in voting ultimately results mainly from differences in age 
composition, and partly from differences in education attainment between urban 
and rural voters. In short, the yocK on yado (government-rural, opposition-urban) 
phenomenon may have been nothing more than urban-rural differences in the 
aggregate tendency of the individual voter’s characteristics, especially those of 
age (and education), that have led them to make different choices.
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Table 4-7. The Urban-Rural Difference, Socialisation Variables, and Voting Choice (b’s of 
Rural): In 1987/1988 and 1992 (Controlling for Regional Attributes)
Controls
1987/1988 1992
Roh YS DJP RDP YS JY DLP UNP
R egional Attributes (1) .118** -.125** .115** -.089* .110** -.063* .103** -.039
(1) + Education .043 -.073A .052 -.034 .005 -.021 .044 -.025
(1) + Age .062 -.096* .063 -.051 .031 -.035 .056 -.026
(1) + Religion .100* i —A o OD * .098** -.079* .110** -.067* .102** -.038
(1) + Gender .117** -.124** .114** -.088* .108** -.063* .102** -.039
All of the above .029 -.062 .038 -.026 .021 -.022 .056 -.026
Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test
Let us now examine the effect of each of the socialisation variables, which 
largely accounted for the urban/rural differences in voting. Of the socialisation 
variables, age seemed to exert the strongest impact on voting choice across the 
models (see the second models at Table 4-5 and 4-6). For example, across all the
8 Given the higher correlation figures between education and the urban-rural variable (.311 in the 
1991 survey data and .406 in the 1992 survey data) than those between age and the urban-rural 
variable (-.192 in 1991 and -.281 in 1992), it may not be so surprising that education was more 
important than age in accounting for the urban-rural difference in voting. However, in making 
voting decisions, age differences appeared far more important than education.
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models those in their twenties, who were similar in other respects on the list, 
were some 30 per cent less likely to vote for the governing party and its 
candidates than those in their fifties and over, except for the DLP in which the 
difference was about 20 per cent. Alternatively, the opposition parties and their 
candidates were favoured most by those in their twenties (but note that Chung Ju- 
young and his UNP in 1992 were most favoured by those in their thirties). 
Compared with the patterns of governing party support, the b ’s of the age 
variables for the models of the opposition party support were smaller in their 
magnitude although their directions were all against the governing party. This 
indicates that the opposition parties shared rather evenly, especially in 1987, the 
support of the younger age cohorts that was reflected in the anti-government vote. 
Kim Young-sam, who once pulled more support from the younger age cohorts in 
1987 as an opposition candidate, lost this support in 1992 as a result of his 
change in partisan stance. If compared with the bivariate relationships shown in 
Tables 4-3 and 4-4, the b’s of age were virtually the same (slightly reduced) 
across the models, except for the b ’s for Kim Dae-jung and his party vote, which 
increased in magnitude. Once effects of the other variables, especially those of 
regional attributes, were taken into account, Kim Dae-jung and his parties pulled 
more support from the younger age cohorts as did the other opposition parties 
and candidates. Independent of other variables on the list, the male voters were 
also less likely to support the governing party and its candidates than female.
Religious affiliations also appeared to exert some significant effect on 
voting, after holding constant other variables on the list, especially in the 
presidential elections. For example, in 1987 Buddhists favoured Roh Tae-woo 
the most and Kim Young-sam the least, and in 1992 Chung Ju-young the most 
and Kim Dae-jung the least; in 1987 Protestants favoured Kim Young-sam the 
most and Roh Tae-woo the least, and in 1992 they favoured Kim Young-sam 
again. Of the models in the National Assembly elections, religious affiliations 
exerted some significant influence only for the governing party choices. That is, 
in 1988 the DJP was favoured by Buddhists but disfavoured by Protestants and 
Catholics, and in 1992 the DLP was favoured by Protestants. The pattern that 
emerged from this analysis is that differences in electoral support among the 
religious groups are not related to the party lines of government vs opposition but 
to a specific candidate. The voters may have taken into account the candidates’ 
religious affiliations when voting - that is, Kim Young-sam is affiliated with the 
Protestant church, Kim Dae-jung the Catholic church, and Roh Tae-woo/Chung 
Ju-young with Buddhism. It seems unlikely that the religious institutions played 
a significant role in politically socialising the mass public along the party lines, 
even though some of the Christian churches often produced some prominent anti- 
government activists during the authoritarian regimes.9
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9 See Sohn, Hak-kyu, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea, London: Routledge, 
1989. Also see Huang, Sung-mo, “Protestant Churches in Korea: Their Impact on Cultural 
Change,” Koreana Quarterly, 9(1), 1967, pp. 41-55.
It is also noteworthy that the bivariate b’s of Buddhists for the governing 
party candidates, that is, for Roh Tae-woo (.147) and for Kim Young-sam (.199) 
shown at Tables 4-3 and 4-4, respectively, were far reduced in the second 
models. This indicates that the bivariate relationships may have contained 
spurious components accounted for by other socialisation variables. Indeed, 
those who practised Buddhism were more likely to be the older, the less-educated 
and female, and those who exhibited political leanings toward the governing 
party ( see the correlation matrix at Table 4-2).
Some residual effects were found for education, especially for those who 
had a university education, in the choice of Roh Tae-woo, and in the choice of 
Kim Young-sam and his RDP in 1987/1988. In 1992, however, virtually no 
effects of education on voting choices remained across the models when the other 
characteristics of the voters were taken into account. Compared with the 
bivariate relationships, the decrease in the effects of education on voting 
behaviour in the multivariate analysis is quite drastic. Thus, it can be speculated 
that the significant leaning toward the opposition in 1987/1988 among those who 
had a university education related to their greater commitment to 
“democratisation.” Concerns over regime characteristics, which might result 
partly from educational attainment,10 still prevailed in the electoral contests.
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10 According to Lee Nam-young’s regression analysis on democratic attitudes, the strongest 
determinant of such attitudes was educational attainment: indeed, about twice as strong as the age 
or political interest variables. See Lee, Nam-young, “The Democratic Belief System: A Study of 
the Political Culture in South Korea,” Korean Social Science Journal, 7, 1985, pp. 46-89, at 
p.68 (Table 5). Also see Dong, Won-mo, “University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns 
ofRadicalisationinthe 1980s,” Journal of International Affairs, 40(2), 1987, pp. 233-255.
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By the third models (see Table 4-5 and 4-6), in which the variables of a 
person’s socio-economic interests were added, the b’s of socialisation variables 
remained virtually unchanged. It was rather the b’s of socio-economic variables, 
which exerted some significant effects on voting at the bivariate level, that 
generally lost their significance. For example, income and self-perceptions of 
social status virtually lost significance across all the models. The farmers’ 
tendency of favouring the governing party and its candidates all but disappeared 
across the models. There was also no substantial improvement in the overall 
explanatory power by the addition of socio-economic interest variables in the 
equations (see the changes of R-squared statistics across the models). These 
results indicate that socialisation variables have priority over socio-economic 
interests in voting choice. The seemingly “discordant (or inverse)” relationship 
between voting choice and income, or social class,11 simply did not exist.
There were rather indications of relationships in a right direction between 
voting choice and social structure, especially in 1992. For example, of the 
occupational categories, the managerial/professional segment maintained its 
preference for Kim Young-sam in 1992, as it did in 1987 (and for his RDP in 
1988). It is also noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung and his DP were less supported 
by the managerial/professional segment in 1992. Its tendency of favouring Kim 
Young-sam deserves special attention in that this was consistent across the two
11 See Sung, Kyong-ryung, op.cit, 1992.
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elections despite his dramatic shifting of political stance, and furthermore support 
increased over time. Perhaps the managerial and professional segment - which 
consisted of such occupational groups as higher rank public and private sector 
employees, lawyers, university lecturers, doctors, artists, etc. - may have 
supported Kim Young-sam, an opposition candidate, in 1987 because it may have 
preferred democratic change, but in 1992, where what mattered was pace of 
democratisation rather than democratisation itself, it again chose to support him, 
as the governing party candidate. In 1992, the farmers favoured Kim Dae-jung 
somewhat (by about 8 per cent more than the self-employed), but in 1988 they 
were disenchanted with his PPD by about 10 per cent, independent of other 
variables on the list. In 1992, those who were not dwelling in their own house, 
especially those who lived in long-term leased housing, but were similar in other 
respects, showed their significant electoral leaning (some 10 per cent) against 
Kim Young-sam.12 However, it may be too early to argue that the electoral 
impact of the socio-economic interests of voters has some significant ongoing 
political implications. This may be highly dependent on how political parties 
articulate voters’ socio-economic interests in forthcoming electoral competitions. 
After all, the influence of a person’s location in the social structure was 
negligible overall when other characteristics of the voter were taken into account.
12 The data on type of housing are only available in the 1992 survey. The variations exposed by 
the housing type indicate a possible hypothesis of interest-oriented voting that differences in 
property ownership result in such differences of voting choice. However, it may have been a 
phenomenon specific to the elections of 1992 as the issue of housing price - especially the price of 
apartments - was raised by Chong Ju-young and his UNP during the 1992 National Assembly 
and presidential election campaigns. Nonetheless, the fact that the beneficiary of this housing 
price issue was the main opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung rather than Chong himself is an 
affirmative indication of the interest-oriented voting hypothesis, which exhibits a congruent 
relationship on the party lines of government vs oppositioa
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Whatrthen arc-the-reasons-that voters’ socio-economic interests ^gese- given 
so little due regard when -they decided who -to vote for? An obvious answer can 
be sought in the existing party system, in which class-oriented parties are kept 
out. For example, no parties of importance based on working-class interests 
came to exist after the 1960s, as political activities of trade unions - such as 
donations of political funds, formal support of a particular party or candidate, and 
party formation - were strictly barred by the law.13 The few “progressive” 
parties, which claimed to represent the interests of the under-privileged, including 
the working-class, gained less than 2 per cent of the popular vote in the post-1987 
elections. Class-related issues of wealth redistribution of a social group’s other 
specific concerns have not yet proved salient in electoral contests. Rather, it has 
been such issues as those related to regime characteristics that have bound 
political contests of the parties. Up to the elections of 1992, issues of 
“democratisation,” “social stability” or “economic development” were the major 
points of contention where the parties tried to project themselves as more capable 
managers than the others. For these reasons, it is not so surprising to behold that 
a voter’s socio-economic interests have not been reflected much in his/her voting 
decision as yet.
Overall, the influence of the socialisation variables was dominant over the 
socio-economic interest variables when the voters decided how to vote in
13 See Kim, Young-rae, Han'guk Iikchiptan-gwa Minjujongch'ibaljon (Interest Groups and 
Development of Political Democracy in Korea), Seoul: Taewangsa, 1990, pp. 227-242.
1987/1988 and in 1992. Regarding the significant differences in electoral 
support across age cohorts, gender and educational level, it is most likely that the 
voters’ different value orientations resulting from their different experience in 
political socialisation may have resulted in such differences of electoral 
preferences. The differences in the governing party support relating to the age 
cohorts are the most impressive among the socialisation variables. Why, then, 
are the younger voters more likely to support the opposition? There may have 
existed a good deal of age-related attitudinal differences, which in turn affected 
voters’ decisions, but how? For example, is the difference in political preference 
among the age cohorts mainly due to “life-cycle effects” or because of 
“generation effects”?14 Can the differences in the governing party support 
between male and female also be attributed to differences in political attitudes? 
These kinds of questions still need to be pursued further, in order to explore the 
nature of the urban-rural dimension of voter alignment.
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14 See, for a review of theories explaining age-related phenomenon in political socialisation, 
Niemi, Richard G., and Sobieszek, Barbara L, “Political Socialisation,” Annual Review of 
Sociology, 3,1977, pp. 209-233, at pp. 225-228. See, for an argument that weighs the (political) 
generation effects in Korea, Ahn, Chung-si, “Political Culture and Political Socialisation of the 
Post-war Generation in South Korea,” Korea Journal, 28(5), 1988, pp. 4-20; and Chung, Jin- 
min, “Han’guksahoe-ui Sedaemunje-wa Son’go (The Generation Problems and Elections in 
Korean Society),” in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), Han’guk-ui Son’go (Elections in Korea), /, Seoul: 
Nanam, 1993, pp. 115-137.
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3. Political Attitudes, Issue Standing, and Voting
From the analysis above, it has become clear that the urban-rural difference 
in voting is a mere reflection of a dimension of voter alignment that mainly 
results from some voters’ tendency towards anti-government voting. Given that 
only a negligible effect of the urban-rural residence in voting choice remained 
after taking into account the socialisation variables, age (and education) in 
particular, it is hardly compelling to pursue other sources that are specifically 
associated with direct consequences of urbanisation. However, the nature o f the 
urban-rural dimension of voter alignment - the dimension which was often 
regarded the same as the democratic-authoritarian dimension of political 
alignment because of its close correspondence to party systems in the past - still 
needs to be pursued. By introducing additional controls of the voters’ political 
attitudes, this section w ill attempt to unravel the nature of the urban-rural 
dimension of political alignment.
The additional control variables introduced in the following analyses are 
basically those which measure an individual’s immediate political tendency. The 
aim in adding the attitudinal variables - which may vary among social groups, 
and also impact on voting choice - to the regression equations above, is to 
identify the main attitudinal variable that accounts for the urban-rural dimension 
of voter alignment, the dimension in this case largely comprised of the age
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differences in voting. That is, by looking at the changes of the coefficients across 
the models, components of the effects of the socio-economic variables that are 
accounted for by the newly added political attitude variables can be identified.
Table 4-8. Rotated Factor Loadings for the Selected Attitudinal Variables
Anti-gvnl
Group
P ro-gvnt
Group
Regim e
Support
Political
Interest
Aware­
n e s s
Morality
C haeya, Contribution to D em ocracy .849 -.034 .007 .056 .015 -.022
Labour Activists .822 .005 -.053 .014 .045 -.002
University S tu d en ts .821 -.077 -.015 .022 .031 -.032
Religious Institutions .648 .267 -.056 .042 -.009 .008
B ig-business, Contribution to D em ocracy .115 .767 .101 -.046 .008 .054
T he Military -.054 .716 .117 -.124 .114 -.057
Am erica .035 .685 .139 .128 -.118 .003
P a s t E lections, Fair -.049 .064 .672 .028 -.048 .204
D em ocratisa ton , well Advanced -.034 .109 .610 .021 .012 -.223
Intra-party Politics, D em ocratic -.112 .182 .560 -.075 .271 -.175
No n e ed  for Big C h an g es .033 .098 .532 -.151 -.034 .119
B een in C am paign Rally -.004 -.017 -.032 .749 -.038 -.064
In terested  in Politics .131 -.036 -.043 .709 .179 .105
Influence of Vote-buying, Negative .021 -.073 .084 .042 .671 .253
R egionalism , Serious -.041 .139 -.353 -.070 .566 -.046
O pposition Party Unification, Desirable .090 -.031 .141 .100 .503 -.184
Political Corruption, U nacceptable -.055 .034 -.045 .066 -.044 .819
P ersonal Experience of Vote-buying, No .020 -.050 .147 -.378 .098 .414
Eigen Value 2.63 2.17 1.30 1.22 1.15 1.06
Variance Explained (%) 14.6 12.1 7.2 6.8 6.4 5.9
Source: The 1991 Survey.
For the models of 1987/1988, six attitudinal variables are identified using a 
factorial solution, and indexed to run 0 to 1 - simply by adding up, and dividing
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the sums by the numbers of the variables clustered together in each of the six 
categories. The factor loadings, extracted by the principal components method of 
the 18 selected variables and orthogonally rotated, are reported in Table 4-8. 
Then, the six variables were scaled to run 0 to 1, and grouped into two to build 
up two additional equations.
The first category of attitudinal variables consists of “the political interest 
index” (scaled 1 for those who participated in a campaign rally, and were 
interested in politics very much), “the awareness index” (scaled 1 for those who 
saw the influence of vote-buying activities of politicians as negative, regionalism 
as serious, and the recent opposition party unification as positive), “the morality 
index” (scaled 1 for those respondents who had no experience of receiving 
money or other material gains from politicians in the campaign processes, and 
enunciated corruption of politicians unacceptable), and “the regime support 
index” (scaled 1 for those who evaluated past elections fair, the democratisation 
process advanced, the parties managed democratically, and the societal system as 
needing no big changes). The second category measures the voters’ evaluations 
of the various political groups’ contribution to democratisation: that is, “the anti- 
government group evaluation index” was scaled 1 for those respondents who 
evaluated the activities of university students, anti-government forces (Chaeya), 
labour-movement activists, and religious institutions most positively; and “the 
pro-government group evaluation index” was scaled 1 for those respondents who
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evaluated the high ranking military officers, the businesses (Chaebol), and 
America most positively in the democratisation process.
In the case of the 1992 models, three attitudinal variables were employed: 
that is, self-designated socio-political tendency, which runs progressive to 
conservative, political efficacy regarding the input functions of elections to 
political process, and an index of issue standing regarding demonstrations, the 
teacher’s union, withdrawal of the US army, and permission for personal-level 
contact with North Korea. (See Appendix 1 for detailed discussion of variable 
constructions, and wordings for the survey data sets.) The two variables of self- 
designated socio-political tendency and political efficacy are controlled first, and 
“the issue standing index” is followed to build up two additional models.
In building up the models, no causal assumptions are made between the two 
categories of attitudinal variables. Rather, these are the variables that measure 
various aspects of the voters’ political life: with one group representing the 
voters’ general political orientation towards the political system, and the other 
delineating the specific concerns of group evaluations in the case of 1987/1988; 
and in 1992, one represents the voters’ general political tendency, and the other 
depicts the voters’ viewpoints reflected in issue standing. The main objective 
here is to identify a major dimension that accounts for the urban-rural dimension 
in voting, thus providing an insight into the nature of the urban-rural dimension 
of voting. In other words, it is to identify the underlying political forces that
- 134-
were reflected in the differences in voting choice across the social groups. By 
additionally controlling two categories of the attitudinal variables in due 
sequence, it is possible to identify which attitudinal aspects account for mostly, if 
not entirely, the effects of socialisation and socio-economic interest variables on 
voting. Tables 4-9 and 4-10 report the coefficient estimates of the socio­
economic variables in 1987/1988 and in 1992, respectively: the first models are 
without controls - the same as the final models at Table 4-6 and 4-7, the second 
models are with controls of the first category of attitudinal variables, and the 
third models with additional controls of the second category of the variables.
Let us begin by briefly examining the models in 1987/1988. There emerged 
three general patterns in the changes of the b’s of socialisation and socio­
economic interest variables with the additional controls of attitudinal variables: 
(1) variables showing more change in the second models than in the third; (2) 
variables showing more change in the third models than in the second; and (3) 
variables not showing much change. First, the effects of gender and age on 
voting across the models were accounted for more by the first category of 
attitudinal variables that measured the voters’ general political orientation 
towards the political system. Second, the effect of university education on voting 
was accounted for more by the second category of attitudinal variables that 
measured the voters’ evaluations of political groups. To be sure, however, the 
attitudinal variables employed here did not have a substantial impact in reducing 
the effects of gender, age and education. Third, the effects of religious affiliation 
on voting remained virtually the same across all the models, and the
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managerial/professional segment’s tendency to favour Kim Young-sam remained 
also virtually unchanged.
In the case of the models in 1992, there appeared two notable patterns in the 
changes of the b’s of socialisation and socio-economic interest variables. First, 
the issue standing index had some impact in reducing the effects of age, 
university education and managerial/professional occupation on voting across the 
models. There, however, still remained substantial effects of these variables on 
voting to be accounted for. Second, the effects of gender, religious affiliation 
and housing type on voting remained virtually the same across the models. In 
addition, there were virtually no changes in the effects of socialisation and socio­
economic interest variables on voting by the second models, where the voters’ 
self-designated ideology and political efficacy were taken into account.
As regards the effects of political attitudes on voting, the OLS partial 
regression coefficients for each variable, after holding other variables on the list 
constant, are reported at Table 4-11. In 1987, for example, those who perceived 
regionalism as serious, unification of the opposition parties as positive, and 
influence of vote-buying activities as negative, were somewhat more likely to 
have voted for Kim Dae-jung (and less likely for Roh Tae-woo) than those at the 
opposite extreme. Those who evaluated past elections as fair, parties internally 
democratic, the political system democratised, and no need for a big change, 
were far more likely to have voted for Roh Tae-woo (and less likely for Kim
Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam); and those who evaluated the anti-government 
groups’ political activities positive on democratisation were more likely to have 
voted for Kim Dae-jung (and less likely for Roh Tae-woo). Attitudes toward 
political corruption (although most of the respondents were firmly against it), 
political interests, and evaluations of the pro-government groups’ activities were 
not useful in differentiating voters’ choices in 1987.
Table 4-11. Political Attitudes and Voting Choice in 1987 and 1992:
A Multivariate Assessment (Controlling for Social Structures and Regional Attributes)
A: 1987 and 1988 (Continued from Table 4-9)
Roh YS DJ DJP RDP PPD
Political Interest Index .002 -.056 .057 .050 -.065 -.001
(.001) (-.039) (.040) (.033) (-.045) (-.001)
Awareness Index -.144* -.027 .118* -.152* -.014 .157**
(-.061) (-.012) (.055) (-.066) (-.006) (.073)
Morality Index .062 .018 -.011 .074 .002 -.026
(.036) (.011) (-.007) (.044) (.001) (-.016)
Regime Support Index .569** -.274** -.216** .572** -.293** -.285**
(.199) (-.103) (-.082) (-204) (-.108) (-.108)
Anti-government Group Evaluation -.186** .082 .171** -.171** .010 .143**
(-.090) (•043) (.090) (-.085) (.005) ( 076)
Pro-government Group Evaluation .067 -.027 -.015 .107 -.097 .055
(.028) (-.012) (-.007) (.045) (-.043) (.025)
Note: Beta’s are in bracket. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.
B: 1992 (Continued from Table 4-10)
YS DJ JY DLP DP UNP
Subjective Political Tendency 
Political Efficacy 
Issue Standing Index
.003
(.001)
.132*
(.062) 
-.376** 
(-.219)
.073A 
( 037) 
-.032 
(-.016) 
.290** 
(.176)
-.038
(-.025)
-.072
(-.045)
.023
(.018)
-.012
(-.006)
.023
(-011)
-.392**
(-.228)
.051 
(-025) 
-.022 
(-.010) 
.345** 
(.203)
-.028 
(-.020) 
-.042 
(-.030) 
.037 
(.032)
Note: Beta’s are in bracket. ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10 in a two-tailed test.
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In 1992, those who claimed that they were “progressive” in socio-political 
matters were a little more inclined toward Kim Dae-jung than those who claimed 
to be “conservative.” Those who evaluated the input functions of the electoral 
process affirmatively were more likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam. The 
voters’ viewpoints on the political agenda seemed to exert a strong impact on 
voting choice: those who maintained the most “liberal” views on the issues of 
demonstrations, the teachers’ union, withdrawal of the US army, and personal- 
level contact with North Korea, were far less likely to have voted for Kim 
Young-sam and the DLP (and far more likely for Kim Dae-jung and the DP) than 
those who were the most “conservative” on these issues. Overall, the 
contribution of the attitudinal variables to the models was not, however, so 
extensive (the R-squared statistics showed about 4 to 6 per cent increase for the 
models of the governing party and its candidate votes both in 1987/1988 and 
1992). The logit estimates for the final models, reported in Tables 4-12 and 4-13, 
are similar in their substantive detail.
There are a few more points to be noted regarding the effects of age, which 
seems to have been a main component of the urban-rural differences in voting. 
First, for the models of 1987, the components of the age effect on voting were 
largely attributable to the first category of the attitudinal variables, especially to 
“the regime support index,” whereas in the 1992 models “the issue standing 
index” accounted for the effects of age. That is, the accounted effects of age 
cohorts were mostly attributable to the different viewpoints of the voters: 
younger voters may have been more critical about the regime characteristics, and
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Table 4-12. Social Structures, Political Attitudes, Regional Attributes, and Voting Choice in 1987/88 (Logit)
Roh YS DJ DJP RDP PPD
Urban/Rural (Metro)
City -.377 .113 .739 -.506 .443 .107
Rural .545 -.591 .609 .132 .191 .614
Gender (Female)
Male -.591* .418A .010 -.510* .179 .322
Age (50+)
20s -1.12** .536 1.46** -1.59** 1.61** .463
30s -.826* .371 .760 -1.27** 1.33** -.089
40s -.580A .533 .788 -1.01** 1.11** .265
Religion (No/Others)
Buddhist .038 -.277 .067 .380 -,449A .344
Protestant -.768** .733** -.205 -.209 -.243 .798*
Catholic -.681A .444 .160 -.408 -.235 1.14*
Education (Primary)
Middle School -.778* .056 .278 -.169 -.162 .289
High School -.575 .390 .313 .379 -.190 .526
University -.507 .512 .183 .247 .100 .640
Job (Self-employed)
Farmer -.070 -.174 -.289 .621 -.371 -1.01
Manual Worker -.100 .166 .417 .092 -.081 .508
Non-manual .049 .108 -.164 .491 -.013 -.694A
Manager/Prof -.072 .529 .037 .142 .104 -1.55A
Income (< 500,000)
500 - 990,000 -.170 .253 .216 .498A -.403 .078
1,000 - 1,490,000 -.110 -.017 .992* .083 -.080 .752A
Over 1,500,000 -.317 .073 -.299 -.297 -.026 .381
Self-Status (Low)
Lower-middle .076 -.082 .110 -.229 .068 -.211
Middle -.250 .156 .132 -.189 .208 -.321
Upper-middle/Upper .290 .181 -.903 .561 -.294 .200
Political Interest .213 -.862* 1.26* .503 -.564 .178
Awareness -.703 -.071 .774 -.668 .106 .652
Morality .553 .001 .215 .188 .142 .010
Regime Support 3.45** -1.96** -2.25* 3.16** -1.64** -2.94**
Anti-gvnl Group -1.53** .943* 2.39** -1.55** .382 1.72**
Pro-gvnl Group 1.17* -.806 -.923 1.68** -1.23* -.131
Residential Region(Seoul)
Kyonggi .137 -.180 -.356 .300 i ro * .411
Kangwon .230 .403 -.656 1.21A -.015 -1.49
Ch’ungch'ong -1.05* 1.06* -1.03 -.554 -.084 -.818
Cholla -2.25** -1.39A 1.84** -1.79** -2.00* 2.34**
Kyongbuk .757* .178 -2.30* 1.09* -.324 -3.04*
Kyongnam -.823* 1.14** -.644 -.478 1.15** -1.58**
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)
Kangwon -1.26* -.068 1.67* -.560 -.756 1.85*
Ch'ungch’ong -.746A -1.00* 1.33* -1.28** -.843* 1.58*
Cholla -1.87** -2.30** 3.89** -1.86** -2.36** 4.01**
Kyongbuk -.362 -.480 .786 -1.14* -.511 1.24A
Kyongnam -1.04* .829A -1.35 -.879* -.164 .113
Others -.581 -.296 1.21 -.814 -.421 1.34A
Intercept 1.27 -.808 -6.16 -.028 .053 -4.63
Pseudo-R2 (% c) .284(78.6) .272(77.6) .563(90.2) .281(81.1) .268(77.8) .569(89.2)
Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10. % c - Overall percentage correctly predicted.
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Table 4-13. Social Structures, Political Attitudes, Regional Attributes, and Voting Choice in 1992 (Logit)
YS DJ JY DLP DP UNP
Urban/Rural(Metro)
City .120 .026 -.110 -.317 -.019 .479
Rural .361 -.117 .033 .569A -.378 -.340
Socialisation
Gender(Female)
Male -.467** .063 .313 -.356* .185 .245
Age (50+)
20s -1.35** .325 .775* -.718* .469 .629
30s -.723* .213 .846* -.701** .353 .707A
40s -.140 .312 .251 -.120 .245 .463
Religion (No/Others)
Buddhist .019 -.357 .680** .055 .020 .051
Protestant .440A -.099 -.156 .288 -.141 .248
Catholic -.138 .325 -.057 -.571 .256 .274
Education(Primary)
Middle School .145 .129 -.138 -.100 -.035 .453
High School -.362 .140 .455 -.043 .120 -.134
University -.427 .174 .081 -.293 .392 -.185
SE Interests
Job(Self-employed)
Farmer -.227 .958A -.533 -.214 .005 .288
Manual Worker -.097 .340 .246 .334 -.208 .086
Non-manual .425A .169 -.259 .456 -.366 .136
Manager/Prof 1.05* -1.62A -.550 1.19* -1.10A -1.52
lncome(< 500,000)
500 - 990,000 -.225 -.068 .242 -.131 -.345 .451
1,000 - 1,490,000 -.301 .198 .045 -.420 -.291 .999A
Over 1,500,000 -.218 -.079 .207 -.380 -.147 .603
Housing (Owner)
Monthly Rent -.043 .538 -1.35* .395 -.112 -.446
Long-term Lease -.436* .695** -.184 -.028 .249 -.159
Political Attitudes
Self-assigned Ideology .290 .284 -.284 -.258 .469 -.150
Political Efficacy .903* -.305 -.754A -.004 -.104 -.416
Issue Standings -2.76** 2.18** .404 -2.19** 1.74** .553
Regional Attributes
Resident (Seoul)
Kyonggi -.411 -.266 .552A .528A -.308 -.454
Kangwon -.267 -.701 .112 .848A -1.35* .013
Ch’ungch’ong -.178 -.133 .382 .925** -1.28** -.262
Cholla -2.03** 2.31** -6.37 a -.167 .804A -6.66 a
Kyongbuk -.259 .024 -.050 .676A -.675A -.433
Kyongnam 1.29** -.694A -.920* .865** -1.31** .001
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)
Kangwon .249 -1.31* .621 -.701A .400 .001
Ch’ungch’ong .172 -.411 .085 .065 -.267 -.165
Cholla -1.61** 2.27** -1.50** -1.30** 1.64** -.130**
Kyongbuk 1.03** -1.32** -.101 .673* -.849* -.068
Kyongnam .663A -1.17* -.205 .444 -.632A -.355
Others .208 -.436 .801* -.551 .271 .286
Intercept 1.07 -2.65 -1.98 .990 -1.28 -2.76
Pseudo-R2 (% c) .356(79.4) .458(85.7) .181(82.7) .252(75.1) .322(79.6) .115(87.8)
Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10. % c - Overall percentage correctly predicted. 
a - Consists of an empty cell; thus, a statistical test not relevant.
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less conservative on the political issues. Second, the attitudinal variables 
employed here did not uniformly account for the effects of age on voting. For 
example, the effects of the 40s age cohort remained virtually unchanged, whereas 
the effects of the 20s and the 30s age cohorts were substantially accounted for by 
the attitudinal controls. This suggests that the tendency of anti-regime voting 
largely occurred among the younger age cohorts. In 1992 in particular, the anti- 
regime voting exercised by the younger voters mostly benefited Kim Dae-jung 
and his DP. In addition, the tendency of anti-regime voting was also associated 
with other socialisation and socio-economic attributes, although the degree of 
association may have been limited. For example, the effects of gender and 
university education (and managerial/professional occupation especially in 1992) 
on voting were accounted for somewhat by controls of the attitudinal variables.
Overall, however, the component of age effects on voting accounted for by 
the attitudinal variables was surprisingly small. It may be important to reflect on 
why this should be so. One answer could be that there may be other intervening 
variables that explain some portion of the unaccounted effects. In this regard, 
collection of data regarding life-cycle effects might be rewarding, as the data 
employed here measured the differences in the voters’ political attitudes, which 
may have largely resulted from the generation differences. Another answer may 
lie partly in that the voters were less polarised across the attitudinal dimensions
than might be expected, with the assumption that the attitudinal variables on the 
list were sufficient although it cannot be claimed that they were exhaustive.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has gone through queries about the urban-rural dimension of 
voting. There are a few findings to be emphasised in a broader context. First of 
all, what are the implications of the finding that the urban-rural difference in 
voting was a reflection of the difference in socio-economic compositions between 
the urban and rural areas? From a theoretical perspective, the finding suggests 
that there is negligible difference in voting between urban and rural areas, which 
might result from concerns specific to urban or rural settings. These concerns 
might include urban problems such as overcrowding, insufficient housing, crime, 
pollution, etc. that may have contributed to the urban dwellers’ discontent with 
the government; 15 or the opposition party’s inadequate organisation in the rural 
areas vis-d-vis the government party’s advantages of mobilising administrative 
networks there. 16 The contention Kim Chong-lim made one and half decades ago 
that “in the long run the regime must face up to a situation in which there would 
no longer be a broad enough social basis of mobilized voting,.... which has so far
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15 See Choi, Sung-il and Lee, Chae-jin, “Environment, Policy, and Electoral Participation: A  
Comparison o f Urban and Rural Areas,’’ in Kim, Chong-lim (ed.), Political Participation in 
Korea: Democracy, Mobilization and Stability, Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980, pp. 176-77.
16 See Han, Y.C., “Political Parties and Elections in South Korea,” in Kim, Se-jin and Cho, 
Chang-hyun (eds.), Government and Politics of Korea, Silver Spring: The Research Institute on 
Korean Affairs, 1972, p. 138.
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supplied approximately 10 per cent or more of the total electoral votes cast for 
the regime,”17 is clearly upheld by the findings.
The succeeding section attempted to unravel the nature of the differences in 
voting preference based on socialisation attributes, which seemed to be dominant 
over other socio-economic characteristics of the voters, let alone the effects of 
regional attributes. The factor of age in voting preference is plausible, given that 
Korea has gone through rapid, large-scale socio-economic change in the last few 
decades, and thus the younger age cohorts, with less experience of war, poverty 
or social disorder than their older counterparts, may have preferred “change” to 
“stability.” Undoubtedly, the widespread educational opportunity for the 
younger age cohorts may have accentuated the effects of age on voting. One 
aspect of socialisation influence was tested in the above section by incorporating 
the variables of voters’ value orientations; however, the finding suggests that 
there is still more to be explained about the age effect in voting, although there 
was a clear indication that voters’ political orientations - which may lead to 
making a different voting choice - were varied across the age cohorts. At best, 
the voters’ political orientations provided a partial explanation for the process by 
which the voters in different age groups exhibited different political preferences.
17 See Kim Chong-lim, “Political Participation and Mobilised Voting,” in his op.cit., 1980, p. 
138.
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Chapter 5. Regional Differences in Electoral Support:
A New Cleavage?
1. Introduction
With regard to voter alignments in elections since 1987, one of the most 
frequently observed tendencies has been voting patterns based on regional lines. 
The election returns of the presidential election of 1992 revealed that the parties 
and presidential candidates alike fared best in the regions with which they were 
personally affiliated. Each of the candidates enjoyed overwhelming electoral 
support in their own home provinces - or rather in the regions they hailed from - 
and the parties also won heavy support in the National Assembly elections from 
the regions with which their leaders were affiliated. To be sure, no parties of 
importance were regionalistic if viewed in terms of their organisations - the 
parties maintained regional branches down to the level of National Assembly 
districts, and also with few exceptions competed for every single seat nationally.
The alliance of region and party has been so vividly illustrated in the 
election statistics of recent times that there is little dispute in recognising it as a 
major factor in voters’ decisions. After all, the tendency of regional voting, that 
is, voters’ favouring of candidates from their home region, has not been a new 
phenomenon in Korean electoral politics, particularly in presidential elections.
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Figure 5-1. Map of Korea: Provinces and the Special Cities
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This tendency was manifest throughout the presidential elections of the third 
Republic until the direct election of the president was abrogated in 1972: Park 
Chung-hee started to draw heavy support from his Kyongsang provinces in 1963, 
consolidated it in 1967, and reinforced it in 1971, whereas Yun Po-son had been 
favoured strongly in his home regions of Seoul and Kyonggi both in 1963 and 
19671, and Kim Dae-jung was most favoured in his Cholla provinces in 1971 (see 
Table 5-1).
In the 1987 presidential election, held after sixteen years’ suspension, the 
tendency of regional voting was reproduced on an expanded scale. The three 
viable candidates fared best in their respective regions: Roh Tae-woo in 
Kyongbuk (North Kyongsang), Kim Young-sam in Kyongnam (South 
Kyongsang), and Kim Dae-jung in Chonnam and Chonbuk (South and North 
Cholla). The fourth candidate, Kim Jong-pil also won disproportionately strong 
support from his home region of Ch’ungnam (South Ch’ungch’ong). The 
regional voting pattern of Kim Dae-jung was noteworthy, in that not only was his 
regional vote the biggest of all, but also he won the least support in the other 
candidates’ strongholds. The electoral fortunes of Roh Tae-woo as a ruling party 
candidate may have lain in his ability to hold support in the “neutral” regions of 
Kyonggi, Kangwon and Ch’ungbuk, except for Seoul in which the opposition
1 With regard to Yun’s better performance in Seoul and Kyonggi, the effect of regionalism might 
have been smaller, as the region with which Yun identified happened to be the most urbanised 
area, where the opposition was traditionally strong. According to Kim and Koh’s aggregate level 
analysis, however, the effect of regionalism remained fairly strong when urbanisation was 
adjusted for, indeed, not much less than that of 1971, especially in 1967. See Kim, Jae-on, and 
Koh, B.C., “Electoral Behaviour and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data 
Analysis of Presidential Elections,” The Journal of Politics, 34(3), 1972, pp. 852-853.
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parties have been so far successful. In the National Assembly elections of 1988, 
the pattern of regional voting was repeated virtually intact. One minor, but 
important, exception may have been that Kim Jong-pil’s NDRP strengthened its 
support mainly in the “neutral” regions, including Ch’ungbuk in its stronghold, 
largely at the expense of the ruling party votes.
In 1992, Kim Young-sam as a candidate of the new ruling DLP won most 
of his support in the Kyongsang provinces, securing most of the votes of 
Kyongbuk. The regional voting pattem for Kim Dae-jung was similar to that of 
1987, except that he slightly improved his support in Ch’ungch’ong, former 
stronghold of Kim Jong-pil and his NDRP. The second runner-up, Chung Ju- 
young fared relatively well in the other “neutral” regions, in addition to 
performing best in his native Kangwon. A similar pattem of regional voting was 
maintained in the National Assembly elections held early that year, although the 
regional variation of the votes was less marked. What was most distinctive about 
regional voting in the recent elections was not only its extent but the fact that it 
occurred in the National Assembly elections. Indeed, no such regional patterns 
of electoral support had been apparent in the past National Assembly elections: 
for example, in the 1971 National Assembly election, held shortly after the 
presidential election of that year in which regionalism was a factor, no such 
patterns of regional voting had emerged.2
2 See Kim, C.I. Eugene, “The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattem of Political 
Development,” Asian Survey, 12(3), 1972, pp. 213-224, atp.200 (Table 4).
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If regional differences in party support are not only a profound but also a 
consistent influence in recent elections, what forms the basis of it? That is, what 
are the underlining factors that render the regional identity or regional sentiment 
which the voters might be expected to possess susceptible to partisan 
mobilisation? Furthermore, what are the causes of the observed regional 
differences in political support? These are a few of the complex of questions to 
be explored in this chapter. Nonetheless, there still remains a more fundamental 
question: that is, how strong is the influence of regional attributes on a voter’s 
choice? This issue will also be discussed in this chapter in relation to other 
significant electoral cleavages.
2. The Pattern of Regional Voting: The Bases
The administrative regions or provinces in Korea, often used as a unit of 
analysis, largely reflect long-standing historical and geographical divisions. The 
present regional divisions are inherited from the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), 
which divided the country into eight regions.3 Following the division of the 
country in 1945, South Korea fully commands three out of the former eight 
regions - that is, Ch’ungch’ong, Cholla, and Kyongsang, including Cheju - and 
shares two regions of Kyonggi and Kangwon with North Korea, which fully
3 See Eckert, Carter J., Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, Young-ick, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward 
W., Korea Old and New: A History, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990, pp. 109-115.
commands the remaining three regions in the north. The regions of 
Ch’ungch’ong, Cholla and Kyongsang were further partitioned into two each - 
that is, North and South Ch’ungch’ong, North and South Cholla, and North and 
South Kyongsang. In the foregoing analysis, a convention is made: separating 
out Seoul from Kyonggi, putting North and South Ch’ungch’ong, and North and 
South Cholla together, but leaving North and South Kyongsang separate.
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The basis of the region-party alliance which is most often cited is that 
Korean voters have strongly maintained a sense of collective regional identity, 
that is, regionalism or regional consciousness, as a facet o f political culture that 
values personal inter-connections or ties in societal life .4 It is argued that 
regionalism or regional consciousness became a source o f regional antagonism 
based upon sentiments of regional prejudice, and experiences of regional 
disparities in the political and economic sphere. 5 Further, the sense of regional
4 See Chapter 2 for a review.
5 See, for example, Moon, Sok-nam, “Chiyokkyokch’a-wa Kaldung-e-gwanhan Han-Yon’gu: 
Yong-Honam, Tu Chiyog-ul Chungshim-uro (A Study of Regional Disparities and Conflicts: 
Focusing on the Two Regions of Kyongsang and Cholla),” Han’guk Sahoehak (Korean 
Sociology), 18,1984, pp. 184-209; Kim, Kwang-soo, “Han’guk-chongch’i-e-itsoso-ui Cholla-do 
(The Cholla Region in Korean Politics),” Hariguk Chongch’i Hakhoebo (Korean Political 
Science Review), 20(1), 1986, pp. 85-107; and Kim, Chin-kuk, ‘‘Chiyokkamjong-ui Shilsang-gwa 
Ku-Haesobangan (The Reality of Regional Sentiment and Some Suggestions for Its 
Dissolution),” in Han’guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association of Psychology), ed., Shimrihag- 
eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiment from the Psychological Perspective), Seoul: 
Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 221-254. Also see, for the studies of regional prejudice and stereotypes, 
Lee, Chin-suk, “P ’aldoin-ui Songgyok T’uksong-e-daehan Sonipkwannyom (Prejudice on the 
Characteristics of Localities in the Eight Regions),” Sasanggye, Dec. 1959, pp. 74-87; Kim, 
Chin-kuk, ‘‘Yong-Honam Taehaksaeng-ui Sanghogan Ch’aijigak Yon’gu (Kyongsang and Cholla 
University Students’ Perceptions of the Differences between Kyongsang and Cholla People),” 
Sahoe-shimrihak Yon’gu (Studies in Social Psychology), 1987, 3(2), pp. 113-147; and Kim, 
Hye-suk, ‘‘Chiyokkan Kojong-gwannyom-gwa P’yon’gyon-ui Shilsang (The Reality of 
Stereotypes and Prejudice among the Regions),” in Han’guk Shimrihakhoe (Korean Association 
of Psychology), ed., Shimrihag-eso-bon Chiyokkamjong (Regional Sentiments Viewed from the 
Psychological Perspective), Seoul: Songwonsa, 1988, pp. 123-169. Also see, for the studies of
attachment is said to relate more to the place of origin than to place of residence 
(especially for those who live in Seoul and Kyonggi, a vast majority of whom are 
more or less recent arrivals from the other regions), as it may be acquired during 
the early stage of the socialisation process through family, school or peer groups, 
and it is also highly likely to be a subject for generation transference.* 6
In Table 5-2, the regional (residential and region of origin) distributions of 
the 1992 votes based on the survey data are recorded.7 In addition, the regional 
distribution of votes is further disaggregated by the variables o f age and mobility 
- mobility is measured by the years of residency in a local community, the unit 
smaller than a region. This operation is aimed at detecting any interactions
- 152-
regional disparities in the economy and in the political recruitment of ruling elites, Kim, Man­
heim, “Han’guk-ui Chongch’i-gyunyol-e-gwanhan Yon’gu: Chiyokkyunyol-ui 
Chongch’igwajong-e-daehan Kujojok Chopkun (A Study on Political Cleavage in Korea: 
Structural Approach to the Political Process of the Regional Cleavages),” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Seoul National University, 1991; Kim, Yong-hak, “Elite Ch’ungwon-T’allag-ui Chiyokkyokch’a
(Regional Disparities in the Recruitment or Exclusion of the Elite),” in Kim, Chong-chul and
Choe, Chang-jip, et al., Chiyokkamjong Yon gu (Studies of Regionalism), Seoul: Hagminsa,
1991, pp. 258-288; and Choe, Won-kyu, “Kyongjegaebal-ui Kyokch’a-wa Chiyokkamjong
(Disparities in Economic Development and Regionalism),” in Kim, Chong-chul and Choi, Chang- 
jip, et al., Chiyokkamjong Yon’gu (Studies of Regionalism), Seoul: Hagminsa, 1991, pp. 310- 
333.
6 See Cho, Kyong-kun, “Chongch’i-sahoehwa-ui Shigag-eso-bon Yong-Honam-gan-ui 
Chiyokkamjong Shiljae-wa Akhwa-mit Ku-Haeso (Existence, Aggravation, and Dissolution of 
the Regionalism Between Kyongsang and Cholla: From the Perspective of Political Socialisation), 
Haptong Haksuldaehoe Palp’yo Nonmunjip (Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the Korean 
Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North 
America), 7,1987, pp. 107-126. Also see Kim, Hye-suk, op.cit., 1988.
7 The native region of the respondents was measured by asking the place of origin - i.e., the 
region where a respondent’s grandfather come from. Admittedly, this is a crude measure of a 
person’s sense of regional attachment, and there may be various alternative ways of tapping the 
sense of regional attachment However, any single measure of this kind may contain merits as 
well as demerits in itself in grasping a person’s sense of regional belongness or identification: 
e.g., if it is measured with the place of birth, then it has merits of being more accurate in 
measuring a person’s regional identification, especially for the first generation of migrants, but at 
the cost of losing a measurement of the evident inter-generation transference of regional 
identification, especially for the second and the third generation of migrants.
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between age (and mobility) and regionalism in voting, as they are the variables 
that may be expected to negate or enhance the effect of regionalism. One might 
expect that younger voters are less prone to regional voting than the older, and so 
are those who show a high level of physical mobility, if regionalism is 
understood as a sense of community attachment, regardless of political 
propensity.
The regional (residential) distribution of the votes, first of all, shows a close 
proximity to the official returns shown at Table 5-1. A few exceptions can be 
found in the case of Kangwon and Ch’ungch’ong, in which votes for Kim 
Young-sam were slightly over-represented at the expense of votes for Kim Dae- 
jung. Not surprisingly, the distribution of the votes according to region of origin 
is also as good an indicator of regional voting as is residential region. Indeed, it 
is more graphic in revealing the pattern of regional voting. Kim Dae-jung 
performed best only among the voters of Cholla origin, and Kim Young-sam, the 
president elected, not only won most of the votes of Kyongsang origin but also 
performed the most successfully, though not overwhelmingly, in gaining support 
of the voters originating from the other regions. Chung Ju-young fared relatively 
well - indeed, better than Kim Dae-jung - among the voters whose native regions 
were other than Cholla and Kyongsang. In addition, the above observations were 
also appropriate to the case of the regional voting patterns in the 1987 
presidential election, reported at Table 5-3.
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Table 5-3. The Major Candidate Votes in the 1987 Presidential Election: Distributed by Region 
of Residence and Origin with Additional Controls of Age (%, the Minor Candidate Votes not 
Shown)
Roh Tae-woo Kim Young-sam Kim Dae-jung Total (N )
Age Age Age Age
All You- Old All You- Old All You- Old All Young Old
nq nq nq
Total 36.7 25.8 49.5 28.1 33.6 21.6 27.1 30.6 22.9 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0
( 1007) (546) (461)
Resident
Seoul 34.2 23.0 49.4 27.8 27.6 27.9 30.5 40.1 17.5 25.1 26.6 23.3
Kyonggi 42.1 30.1 62.0 22.7 28.4 13.4 27.5 34.7 15.3 15.2 17.5 12.5
Kangwon 56.4 31.4 75.8 19.9 32.7 10.1 18.7 30.4 9.6 4.1 3.3 5 .0
Ch’ungch'ong 37.0 24.8 47.2 25.9 31.0 21.7 10.0 7.4 12.1 11 .8 9.9 14.1
Cholla 7.7 2.9 11.2 1.7 4.2 0.0 89.7 92.9 87.3 12.9 9.9 16.4
Kyongbuk 66.2 51.4 84.5 27.3 38.4 13.5 1.4 2.6 0.0 11 .8 12 .0 11.5
Kyongnam 32.4 21.6 48.0 54.0 58.2 48.1 8.5 12.7 2.5 19.2 2 0 .8 17.2
Origin
Seoul 64.7 62.0 67.4 25.0 30.8 19.4 10.3 7.2 13.2 2.3 2.1 2 .6
Kyonggi 49.2 35.6 65.0 38.7 52.5 22.8 7.0 4.9 9.4 7.9 7.8 8 .0
Kangwon 41.2 19.8 68.6 30.0 38.9 18.7 23.1 34.3 8.7 5.8 6 .0 5.5
Ch’ungch'ong 38.3 27.8 50.3 23.2 27.2 18.6 13.2 15.8 10.1 18.1 17.8 18.5
Cholla 10.6 5.9 16.5 4.7 5.2 4.2 82.8 86.3 78.3 24.8 25.5 23.9
Kyongbuk 59.1 45.9 74.2 29.6 38.1 20.0 3.5 5.1 1.7 16.3 16.0 16.7
Kyongnam 38.8 26.6 50.8 55.7 63.4 47.9 2.3 4.5 0.0 18.4 17.1 2 0 .0
The Others 39.8 28.0 62.5 35.2 44.2 17.7 17.6 21.7 9.6 6.4 7.8 4.8
Note: Age Young - less than 40; Old - 40 and over.
Source: The 1991 Survey.
It may be plausibly maintained, therefore, that Kim Dae-jung’s better 
performance in Seoul is partly due to the fact that Seoul accommodated a large 
portion of migrants from Cholla (see Table 5-4), let alone the fact that Seoul 
consisted of more younger voters. Though it may be tempting to express this 
hypothesis, however, a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from this observation 
alone. Rather, it should be the subject of a multivariate approach, which will 
follow later in this chapter. At this point, nonetheless, it is noteworthy that 
studies of regionalism in Korea need to recognise two different levels in
operationalising regionalism - i.e., the residential and native region - which might 
differ in their implications. For example, on the one hand, if we are interested in 
the hypothesis that regional voting is an expression of the voters’ perceptions of 
regional economic disparities, then the residential region may be a more proper 
unit of analysis, and on the other hand, if our interests lie in emotional factors as 
such, the native region may be a more proper unit.
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Table 5-4. The Regional Distribution of the Population: Distributed by Region of Origin (%)
R e s id e n t s
Origin
Seoul Kyonggi Kangwon Ch’u n g­
ch ’ong
Cholla Kyongbuk K yongnam Sub-total
(N)
Seoul 9.1 5.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.8 (57)
Kyonggi 10.8 31.1 1.4 2.9 1.5 0.0 1.2 9.6 (144)
Kangwon 7.3 6.1 64.5 2.5 0.0 1.0 2.7 6.4 (96)
C h’u n g ch ’on g 23.1 19.2 5.0 79.4 3.2 2.1 3.8 18.7 (281)
Cholla 28.5 16.7 2.8 6.6 93.0 1.2 8.8 24.7 (370)
Kyongbuk 8.6 9.5 18.1 4.4 0.8 86.6 13.5 17.8 (267)
Kyongnam 6.5 3.4 1.9 0.0 1.0 7.2 66.7 14.7(220)
The Others 6.2 9.0 6.2 1.1 0.4 1.8 2.1 4.3 (65)
Sub-total 25.8 19.6 3.9 9.5 12.6 11.8 16.9 100.0
(N) (387) (294) (58) (142) (189) (177) (254) (1500)
Note: The others includes those who are originated from North Korea, Cheju, and overseas.
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
Another point to be noted is that Kim Dae-jung was the least favoured in 
regions other than Cholla. This was clearly observable from the regional 
distribution of the votes based on the variable of region of origin. This is quite 
surprising, given that he was a well-known career politician as a freedom fighter, 
he did almost win the presidency in 1972, and he was after all the first runner-up
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in 1992. If regional voting is a manifestation of the regional sentiments or 
prejudices of the voters, this observation clearly supports the argument put 
forward by Kim Chin-kuk that “regionalism in Korea is more of a relationship 
between Cholla (a minority) and the others (a majority) than a conflict between 
certain regions [Kyongsang and Cholla].”8
Now let us examine voting patterns of the sub-groups further divided by age 
and mobility in addition to the regional variables. (See Table 5-2 and 5-3.) First 
of all, the rows which report the mean scores of the votes show that the younger 
and the more mobile were less likely to have voted for the governing party 
candidates.9 The tendency of the younger voters’ favouring the opposition was 
discussed in Chapter 4. Regarding the tendency of less electoral support for Kim 
Young-sam among those who were more physically mobile, it is likely that some 
of the factors which make people move from an area to another area, such as 
home ownership or job opportunity, may have influenced voting choice.10 In 
addition, the columns which report the total scores show that Seoul and Kyonggi 
consists of more younger and mobile voters. No notable regional variations are 
found in the case of the region of origin, however.
Is it the case, then, that younger and more mobile voters, who might be 
expected to exhibit less tendency towards regional voting, behave differently
8 See Kim, Chin-kuk, op.cit, 1988, pp. 236.
9 In case of the 1987 votes, the mobility variable is not available.
10 A preliminary analysis revealed that mobility had no independent effect on voting, once the 
voters’ socio-economic characteristics were taken into account (the results are not shown).
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above and beyond their observed electoral propensity against the ruling party 
candidates? In other words, were there any significant interaction effects of 
regionalism and age (or mobility) on voting choice? The tables suggest the 
answer is a negative one. The relationship between regionalism and age (or 
mobility) on the voting choice seems to be nothing more than additive. Across 
the age groups, for example, Kim Young-sam support in 1992 was 
proportionately higher in those regions where his support was stronger overall. 
Similar observations can be made in the case of Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju- 
young votes in 1992 as well as the votes of 1987. An important implication of 
this is that regional voting may have been prevalent across the society even to the 
extent that the least likely affected groups were also prone to it.
The next step taken here is to measure or to recognise the effects of 
regionalism at both the level of residential and of native regions. For this 
purpose, OLS regression equations are estimated of voting choices in 1987/1988 
and 1992, first, with the region of origin variable and, second, with the addition 
of the residential region variable (see Table 5-5). From the second model, it 
appears that differences in voting based on regional origin remained largely 
significant, after taking into account the effects of residential region, which also 
exerted some significant additional effects.
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Table 5-5. The OLS Estimates of the 1987/1988 and the 1992 Vote: 
Residential and Native Region (b’s)
A: 1987/1988
Roh YS DJ DJP RDP PPD
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Origin
(Seoul/
Kyonggi)
Kangwon -.091 -.152A -.051 -.037 .134* .160** -.025 -.069 -.040 -.099 .043 .127*
Ch’ungch'ong -.119* -.093 -.122* -.159* .028 ,083A -.200** -.157* -.070 -.135* .005 .091*
Cholla -.399** -.322** -.306** -.301** .735** .637** -.402** -.325** -.267** -.280** .695** .593**
Kyongbuk .080 .0002 -.056 -.079 -.052 .021 -.047 -.168* .026 -.017 -.058 .062
Kyongnam -.114A -.036 .212** .075 -.080* -.027 -.127* -.060 .211** -.017 -.097* .024
Other
Residential
-.104 -.075 .001 -.044 .077 .086 -.155* -.126 .088 -.002 .039 .076
(Seoul)
Kyonggi .049 -.077A .017 .054 -.144** .049
Kangwon .215* -.147A -.032 .166A -.044 -.130*
Ch'ungch’ong -.003 -.005 -.106* -.036 -.019 -.134**
Cholla -.100 -.1 12A .240** -.099 -.150** .286**
Kyongbuk .200** -.060 -.097* .273** -,105A -.132**
Kyongnam -.081 .138** -.060 -.064 .220** -.130**
Intercept .502 .467 .352 .401 .097 .092 .507 .469 .324 .412 .117 .096
R-squared .118 .143 .144 .167 .532 .559 .094 .126 .125 .175 .505 .553
B :1992
YS DJ JY DLP DP UNP
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Origin 
(Seoul/ 
Kyonggi)
Kangwon .020 -.030 -.132** -,102A .070 .116* -.084 -,134A -.030 .049 .031 .015
Ch’ungch'ong .045 -.003 -.039 -.028 -.031 .002 .082 .020 -.113* -.056 -.034 -.015
Cholla -.343** -.301** .639** .502** -.235** -.160** -.307** -.269** .480** .398** -.153** -.120**
Kyongbuk .211** .146* -.141** -.113* -.087* -.031 .178** .140* -.203** -.131* -.022 -.020
Kyongnam .324** .128* -.180** -.111* -.161** -.050 .227** .155* -.237** -.111* -.071A *.082A
Other
Residential
.051 .031 -.053 -.046 .065 .083 -.082 -.089 .049 .045 .025 .022
(Seoul)
Kyonggi -.013 -.073* .106** .118** -.125** -.008
Kangwon .083 -.1 16A -.020 .213* -.281** .031
Ch’ungch'ong .118* -.095* .007 .270** -.260** -.060
Cholla -.116* .241** -.066 .015 .081A -.079*
Kyongbuk .057 -.071 -.005 ,120A -.165** -.017
Kyongnam .257** -.139** -,081A .180** -.252** .007
Intercept .408 .403 .250 .294 .259 .206 .429 .349 .357 .441 .178 .186
R-squared .216 .245 .459 .492 .076 .096 .158 .183 .314 .355 .035 .041
Note: ** - p < .01; * - p < .05; and A - p < .10 in a two-tailed test.
Source: The 1991 Survey; and the 1992 Post-election Survey.
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N ow let us examine the second model more closely. First, across all the 
models, region of origin was a more significant factor than residential region 
mainly for the voters who had regional ties with Cholla, in which Kim Dae-jung 
and his parties were favoured. A similar pattern also appeared in the case of 
those voters among Chung Ju-young’s supporters in 1992 who had regional ties 
with Kangwon. Apart from these, the other candidates and parties were far more 
successful in pulling support from their respective home regions than from those 
who shared the same regional backgrounds but who were living elsewhere: the 
voters of Kyongbuk origin in 1988 showed quite an extreme example of this11 - 
that is, they were less likely to have voted for the DJP, the party led by their 
fellow regional leader, than the voters of Seoul/Kyonggi origin (to be sure, the 
voters of Kyongbuk origin were far more likely to have voted for the DJP than 
the voters of Cholla origin) - but in general the voters showed a tendency to 
favour the candidates and the parties of their regional origin wherever they lived. 
Second, the votes of Kim Dae-jung and his party were the most regionalistic of 
all, and further, he and his parties fared better only among the voters of Cholla
11 There were two more notable cases showing opposite directions of support between the 
regional attributes of origin and residency. That is, the Kangwon origin voters showed a lesser 
electoral propensity for Roh Tae-woo in 1987 (and more for Kim Dae-jung), but the Kangwon 
resident voters were more likely to have supported Roh; and the Ch’ungch’ong origin voters were 
more likely to have supported Kim Dae-jung (and less likely for Kim Young-sam and Roh Tae- 
woo), but the Ch’ungch’ong resident voters were less likely to have supported Kim Dae-jung. 
Thought no firm explanations can be provided, it can be speculated that the Kangwon and 
Ch’ungch’ong origin voters, who were mostly living in Seoul/Kyonggi, may have developed 
different views in politics from their counterparts who were living in their regional hinterlands 
(see Table 4-12, in which the effects of residential region (of Kangwon and Ch’ungch’ong) 
became insignificant when the voters’ socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes were 
taken into account).
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origin and those living in Cholla across the models. The voters of Kangwon and 
Ch’ungch’ong origin showed a tendency of favouring Kim Dae-jung and his 
party in 1987/1988 but only compared to the voters of Seoul/Kyonggi origin, who 
were the least likely to have supported him and his party. If compared to the 
other groups of voters, their leaning towards Kim Dae-jung and his party was 
minimal. This pattern became more acute in 1992, where Chung Ju-young, who 
pulled more support from among the voters of Kangwon origin and the Kyonggi 
resident voters at the expense of erstwhile supporters of Kim Dae-jung, entered 
the electoral contests. Third, Kim Young-sam and his DLP in 1992 were largely 
successful in retaining the regional strongholds of the coalition partners and in 
further mobilising the support of Kim’s own regional bases. It might have been 
easier for him to retain Roh’s regional strongholds because of their geographical 
and cultural proximity. Fourth, the regional voting manifest in the behaviour of 
those voters who had ties with Cholla and Kyongsang either by origin or by 
residency was the strongest of all. Notwithstanding their regional rivalry, this 
may be partly due to the fact that both regions continued to produce viable 
presidential candidates in 1987 and in 1992.
What, then, are the factors that made the voters susceptible to partisan 
mobilisation in accordance with regional attributes? In other words, what is the 
explanation for why such regional variations in voting should occur? In this 
following section, this question will be explored by introducing controls of 
additional variables that might account for regional variations of voting. The
analysis will be limited to the voting choices in 1992, as the 1991 survey data set 
is short of the variables that permit further exploration.
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3. Causes of Regional Voting: A Multivariate Assessment
There are five groups of variables controlled for: each of them is distinct in 
nature, and thus each may provide alternative explanations for regional voting. 
The first group of variables consists of socio-economic variables, and the second 
political attitude variables, the same variables already employed in Chapter 3. 
Two economic evaluation variables, that is, retrospective and prospective, are 
controlled in the third models; and the party disposition variables are controlled 
in the fourth models. (A detailed discussion on the newly added variables can be 
found in Chapter 6). The economic evaluation variables are measured by a four 
scale item relating to the voter’s economic evaluations at a regional level; and the 
party disposition variables measure the voter’s self-designated partisan leaning 
toward the ruling party or the opposition.12 The fifth group of variables contains
12 This is a concept similar to party identificatioa Although Korean parties have been fluid as a 
result of frequent regime changes from the forces outside of party system, it has been rare for 
party maneuvers to occur across the ruling and the opposition camp, except for the recent 
example of the formation of the DLP. Thus, it is feasible that the voters may have been 
accustomed to distinguish the party in office or in power against the party out of office. See, for 
similar attempts to incorporate the concept in Korean context, Park, Chan-wook, “Korean 
Voters’ Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election,” Korea & World Affairs, 17(3), 
1993, pp. 432-458, at pp. 441-442; and Cho, Chung-bin, “Yukwonja-ui Yoya-songhyang-gwa 
T’up’yohaengt’ae (Voters’ Government-Opposition Disposition and Voting Behaviour),” in Lee, 
Nam-young (ed.), Han guk-ui Son’go (Elections in Korea), /, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, pp. 49-65.
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the index variables that measure a voter’s evaluations of the candidates on 
various items.13
By introducing controls for these variables stepwise, it is aimed to identify 
which group or groups of variables are most successful in accounting for the 
effects of regional attributes, and to measure the extent to which these effects are 
accounted for by the additional controls, thus providing for an insight in to the 
mechanism by which regional voting is substantiated. Tables 5-6 and 5-7 report 
the OLS partial regression coefficients of the five models, corresponding to the 
five groups of additional controls stepwise for the voting choices in the 1992 
presidential and National Assembly elections. The observed changes in the value 
of the coefficients indicate the portion of the effects of regional attributes 
accounted for by the newly added variables. At Table 5-8, the logit estimates are 
also reported but only for the final models.
Let us briefly examine the effects of the newly added variables first. 
Overall, most of the variables appear to be significant, and to an expected 
direction, in the final models. For example, those who possessed the most liberal 
views on political issues were, other things being equal, about 14 per cent less 
likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam, and about 8 per cent more likely to
13 The respondents were asked to choose a candidate who would be the most capable of delivering 
each of the following seven issue items - i.e., democratisation, economic equality, social stability, 
economic development, solution of regional disparity, unification, and solution of comiptioa 
The variables were indexed in a manner that a voter who favours the most a certain candidate 
gets a score of seven and favours the least gets a score of zero. Then it was divided by 7 so that 
it ranged 0 to 1.
have voted for Kim Dae-jung, as compared with their most conservative 
counterparts (see Table 5-6). Those who claimed their partisan disposition to be 
towards the ruling party were about 18 per cent more likely to have supported 
Kim Young-sam (and about 6 per cent less likely to have supported Kim Dae-
jung) than those who had no particular partisan disposition^ net o f -other things.
to -Ike pefeepfr)* . . .  . . . .  . . .
Those whose perception was strongest that their region would be economically
better-off in the near future were, all other things being equal, about 14 per cent 
more likely to have voted for Kim Young-sam, and were about 15 per cent less 
likely to have voted for Chung Ju-young (rather than Kim Dae-jung), as 
compared with their counterparts whose perception of their region’s future was 
that it would be worse-off. This indicates that economic voting may have been 
particularly important for supporters of Kim Young-sam and Chung Ju-young.14 
The effects of the candidate evaluation variables showed that each of the 
candidates were most strongly preferred to the other candidates by those who 
evaluated each of them the most favourably. These patterns were also 
maintained in the National Assembly votes with a few exceptions (see Table 5- 
7): that is, the economic evaluation variables were not significant, and if 
compared to those in the presidential votes, the effects of candidate evaluation 
were smaller in their magnitude, whereas the effects of partisan disposition were 
bigger in their magnitude.
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14 As will be shown in Chapter 6, economic evaluations based on personal, regional, and national 
levels are closely correlated.
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N ow let us examine the pattern of the changes in regional effects on voting, 
model by model. In the first models, in which the effects of socio-economic 
variables were adjusted for, there are few notable changes in the effects of 
regional attributes. The effects of regional attributes remained virtually intact 
across all the models. The first models can be seen as a baseline for further 
controls, i.e., a model of total causal effects, as the effects of causally prior (or in 
the same rank) variables are partialed out. At this point, however, it is 
noteworthy that regional differences in voting cannot be attributed to differences 
in social composition among the regions or among those who had the same 
regional backgrounds.
In the second models, in which the political attitude variables were 
additionally controlled, the effects of Cholla residency and origin showed a slight 
but notable change, in that their magnitudes were somewhat reduced (roughly 3 
to 4 per cent each) for votes for Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung and their 
respective parties. There also emerged a small but notable decrease in the 
magnitude of the effects of native regions in particular. In the third models, in 
which the effects of the evaluation of regional economy were additionally taken 
into account, however, no notable changes occurred. In the fourth models, where 
the variables of party disposition were additionally controlled, there emerged a 
few notable changes again for the two Kims and their parties. Most of the effects 
of regional attributes were uniformly reduced, and their degree of decrease was
roughly proportional to their magnitude, although varied in the absolute sense. 
There were two exceptional cases: that is, the effects of Kyonggi and Kyongnam 
residency for Kim Young-sam, in that the effects were somewhat strengthened. 
It is also noteworthy that the effect of Ch’ungch’ong residency on Kim Dae- 
jung’s vote became insignificant.
In the final models, where the candidate evaluation variables were 
additionally controlled, the changes of the effects of regional attributes were 
remarkable across all the models. For example, the effects of Cholla origin were 
nearly halved by the introduction of candidate evaluations across all the models. 
Similar changes were found regarding the effect of Cholla residency on the Kim 
Dae-jung vote, and regarding the effects of Kyongnam residency and origin on 
the Kim Young-sam vote. It is also noteworthy that the effects of Kyongbuk 
origin were somewhat reduced across all the models. The effects of Kyonggi 
residency, however, remained as they were before or were even somewhat 
strengthened.15 The effect of Kyonggi residency was positively reflected in the 
Chung Ju-young votes, which was also (negatively) reflected in the choices of 
Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. A caution is needed for this interpretation, 
however, given the somewhat different estimates of the logit models, especially 
for the Kim Dae-jung vote: that is, the effects of Kyonggi and Kangwon
- 168-
15 The reason for this is not clear from this analysis. But one feasible, and partial, explanation 
may be that the effect of Kyonggi residency was suppressed somewhat, as the voters of Kyonggi 
origin, who form a majority of Kyonggi residents, showed a negative tendency of support for 
Chung Ju-young. Nonetheless, Kyonggi voters were less inclined to support Kim Dae-jung, with 
and without controls.
residency, which appeared significant in the OLS model for Kim Dae-jung, were 
insignificant in the logit model, whereas the effect of Ch’ungch’ong residency for 
his vote, which were insignificant in the OLS model, became significant, after 
holding constant the other variables on the list.16 (See Table 5-8). The logit 
estimates for the other models are nonetheless largely identical to those of the 
OLS estimates.
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Table 5-8. Regionalism, Political Attitude, Economic Evaluation, Party Disposition and Candidate 
Evaluation:
Controlling for Social Structure (A Multivariate Assessment (logit)) for the 1992 vote
YS DJ JY DLP DP UNP
Regional Attributes
Origin (Seoul/Kyonggi)
Kangwon .171 -.695 -.312 -1.04* 1.10* -.418
Ch’ungch’ong .071 -.202 .121 -.010 -.099 -.381
Cholla -.691 1.71** -1.93** -.382 .752* -1.19*
Kyongbuk .757 -1.17A -.028 .403 -.549 -.109
Kyongnam .178 -.794 -.355 -.027 -.154 -.538
Others .230 -.284 .801* -.733 .439 -.117
Resident (Seoul)
Kyonggi -.739A .031 1.48** .422 -.180 -.563
Kangwon -.300 .281 .508 .592 -1.07 -.251
Ch’ungch’ong -1.11* 1.28* .628 .542 -1.09* -.383
Cholla -2.04* 2.64** -6.06 a .278 .362 -5.96 a
Kyongbuk -.747 .942 .277 .541 -.639 -.364
Kyongnam 1.18** -.388 -.769 .739* -1.41** .095
Political Attitudes
Political Efficacy .151 -.348 .099 -.425 -.241 .223
Self-assigned Ideology .965A -1.30A .214 -.081 .121 .139
Issue Standings -1.65** 1.20* .593 -.865* .317 .424
16 There was another difference in the estimates between the OLS and the logit models for Kim 
Dae-jung in case of the income variable, which appeared significant in the logit model, especially 
when the candidate evaluation variables were additionally controlled for, but insignificant in the 
OLS model. No firm answers can be provided for these inconsistencies, although this evidence 
leads us to a caution in the interpretation of the estimates of the OLS model for Kim Dae-jung 
vote. Perhaps, the more polarised distribution of the vote propensity for Kim Dae-jung, and the 
voters’ evaluations on him, may have resulted in such differences in the estimation between the 
linear probability and the logit models. See, for a discussion on comparisons of the logit and the 
OLS measures, Denk, Charles E., and Finkel, Steven E., “The Aggregate Impact of Explanatory 
Variables in Logit and Linear Probability Models,” American Journal of Political Science, 
36(3), 1992, pp. 785-804.
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Regional Economy
Retrospective Evaluation .345 -.132 -.484 -.217 -.156 -.444
Prospective Evaluation 1.65* -.436 -3.43** .173 .173 .637
Party Disposition (None)
Governing Party 1.14** -1.22* -.229 .899** -.959** -.397
Opposition Party -.707* 1.00** .289 -1.47** 1.32** .306
Candidate Evaluation
Favourite, YS 3.83** -3.12** -1.56* 1.48** -.656 -1.18*
Favourite, DJ -2.08** 5.83** -2.91** -1.13** 2.26** -2.17**
Favourite, JY -4.19** -4.00** 10.23** -.523 -1.96** 2.78**
Urban/Rural(Metro)
City .098 .084 -.388 -.263 -.197 .561
Rural -.058 .272 .383 .476 -.134 -.388
Socialisation
Gender(Female)
Male -.162 .491 .048 -.187 -.025 .140
Age (50+)
20s -1.41** -.258 1.14* -.533 .361 .488
30s -.767A -.292 1.83** -.722* .268 .765A
40s -.585 .112 1.30* -.108 .105 .724
Religion (No/Others)
Buddhist .237 -.142 .585A -.047 .327 -.282
Protestant .513A .439 -.562 .342 -.121 .270
Catholic -.217 .427 .086 -.639 .117 .284
Education(Primary)
Middle School .583 .555 -1.45* -.164 .208 .224
High School .379 -.094 -.823 .219 .177 -.735
University .237 .128 -1.17A -.011 .585 -.639
SE Interests
Job(Self-employed)
Farmer .465 1.10 -1.11 .162 -.638 .624
Manual Worker -.225 .630 .802* .404 -.291 .298
Non-manual .333 .799 -.568 .424A -.404 .337
Manager/Prof .846 -2.22A -1.12 .981A -.835 -1.70A
lncome(< 500,000)
500 - 990,000 -.692 1.38* .620 -.248 -.244 .378
1,000- 1,490,000 -.678 1.56* .253 -.459 -.408 1.01A
Over 1,500,000 -.594 1.17A .792 -.439 -.290 .652
Housing (Owner)
Monthly Rent -.106 .562 -1.78* .650 -.770 -.196
Long-term Lease -.388 .966** -.383 .132 .088 -.239
Intercept -.705 -3.24 -1.66 .509 -.846 -2.73
Pseudo-R2 (% c) .598(884) .727(92.9) .579(91.2) .396(81.5) .474(84.6) .233(88.7)
Note: ** - p<.01; * - p<.05; and A - p<.10. % c - Over percentage correctly predicted. 
a - Consists of an empty ceil; thus, a statistical test not relevant.
Another notable pattern which emerged is that changes in the effects of 
regional attributes for the National Assembly votes were in general far smaller 
than those for the presidential votes, except for the effects of Cholla origin: in the
case of the DLP vote, a larger portion of it was accounted for when the partisan 
disposition variable was controlled, but for the DP vote a larger portion of it was 
accounted for by the candidate evaluation variables. However, it should be also 
noted that a substantial portion of the effects of regional attributes still remained 
to be accounted for. For example, there still remained about 28 per cent 
difference in the estimated votes of Kim Dae-jung between the voters of 
Kyongbuk origin and Cholla origin, even after controlling for the variables on the 
list. For Kim Young-sam, the largest gap remained between Cholla and 
Kyongnam residents, that of about 23 per cent.
From the above analysis, there emerge several points to be emphasised with 
regard to possible explanations for the causes of regionalism.17 First, let us 
discuss the economic aspects of regional voting with reference to the above 
evidence. It is a widely held notion that the geographically skewed pattern of 
economic development, particularly since the Park Chung-hee regime, favoured 
the Kyongsang provinces and worked relatively disadvantageous to the Cholla 
provinces, and thus the voters showed geographically distinct patterns of party 
support accordingly. In this regard, it is proper to look at the indirect effects of 
residential regions via the economic evaluation variables rather than the effects of 
region of origin. The evidence provided here was, however, not a resounding one 
for economic explanations of regional voting. The indirect effects of residential 
region via the economic evaluation lent some support to the economic
- 171-
17 See Chapter 2, for a detailed discussion on the propositions that have been developed to explain 
regional voting.
explanation of regional voting, but the effects accounted for were small in their 
magnitude.
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It was rather the so-called favourite son effects that accounted for the 
largest portion of the effects of regional attributes. This is especially so for those 
voters who had ties with Cholla, and Kyongnam residents, indicating that they 
may have evaluated the candidates largely on regional lines. What this tells us is 
that Korean voters, whose prime concern lies in the personality or personal 
competence of the candidates when they decide for whom to vote, 18 may have 
resorted to the regional backgrounds of the candidates as a yardstick of their 
voting decision. As Henderson once put it, “the value of sending a local son to 
the capital through the examination system could be transferred with lightening 
speed to the value of sending him by election. ” 19
The indirect effects of regional attributes via political attitudes or party 
dispositions were also notable, especially for those who had ties with Cholla
18 See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion. For example, when the respondents were asked about 
a major reason for voting choices, nearly 56 per cent of them picked that of personality-based 
responses in this survey, which followed by 23 per cent of policy-related responses. Similar 
results had been found in the surveys which tapped this kind of questions in the past: for example, 
in 1972 the comparable figure by Chung Chul-soo was about 74 per cent - which might have 
been higher than the national one because the survey was carried out in the Kyongbuk region; and 
in 1963 that was 66 per cent according to the survey by Yoon Chun-joo and Kil Soong-hoom. In 
the National Assembly elections, the comparable figures were somewhat lower, in 1978 it was 55 
per cent according to Yoon and Kil, and in 1985 it was about 47 per cent according to the survey 
by Ahn Byong-man, Kil Soong-hoom and Kim Kwang-woong. Chung Chul-soo also found that 
the comparable figures in the National Assembly elections were lower by about 10 per cent. See 
Chung, Chul-soo, “T’up’yohaengdong-ui Sahoeshimrijok Yon’gu (A Socio-psychological Study 
of Voting),” Mulli Nonch’ong, VoLl, 1973, pp. 15-43, at p.21; and Ahn, Byong-man, Kil, 
Soong-hoom, and Kim, Kwang-woong, Elections in Korea, Seoul Computer Press, 1988, p.196.
19 See Henderson, Gregory, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968, p.218.
either by origin or residency, indicating that their regional voting was partly due 
to their differences in value orientations, and partisan leanings. An exceptional 
case was Kyongnam, where the voters seemed not to be differentiated by party 
disposition in voting for Kim Young-sam. Indeed, regional voting based on 
differences in political attitudes and partisanship was more a matter of origin than 
of residency.
If we view the unaccounted effects as a manifestation of regional 
antagonism or regional sentiment, it becomes clear that the voters in the other 
regions may also have acquired a sense of regional consciousness that is highly 
susceptible to partisan mobilisation; such mobilisation being most visible in the 
differences between Cholla and Kyongsang voters. There were also clear 
evidences that the DP led by Kim Dae-jung had suffered the most from the 
consequence of regional voting based on regional antagonism, which was all 
directed against the DP other than in its regional stronghold.
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4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined differences in electoral support among 
regions, which showed a highly acute pattem of region-party alliance since the 
1987 presidential election. The analysis with the survey data of the 1992
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elections revealed that regional voting was largely embedded in the phenomenon 
of the favourite son effect: that is, the regional attributes may have provided an 
important cue for the voters’ evaluation of the candidates. Regional voting in the 
National Assembly elections may have been in large part a spill-over effect of the 
perception of the party leadership, although it may also have been due partly to 
partisan dispositions that may have varied across the regions, especially between 
Cholla and Kyongsang, given that one has been the base of the opposition since 
the 1970s while the other has been the base of the government.
A rather surprising finding is that regional voting was hardly due to the 
economic evaluations of the voters, which originally had been expected to vary 
from region to region. These findings lead to a conclusion similar to that of Kim 
Chin-kuk who argued in his study of regional sentiments that, “the reason why 
Cholla people put forward regional disparities in economic development or elite 
recruitment as a cause of their discontent is not because it is a real cause but 
because it is more persuasive to show the objective and qualitative evidence 
rather than to show a personal experience of social discrimination as a source of 
their discontent.”20
In a country where there are no class oriented political parties of salience, 
or no parties on the ideological dimension, regionalism may have played a 
decisive role in providing a cue for voting choice, especially where the past
20 See Kim, Chin-kuk, op.cit, 1988, p. 238.
pattem of party competition in the authoritarian regimes had little relevance. If 
the observation made by Pye - that Korea’s “cultural instincts for togetherness 
and group solidarity,” which had been exhausted by the leaders of the past, might 
reappear as “more private forms of solidarity” 21 - is upheld, then regionalism will 
remain an influence in politics for some time to come.
21 See Pye, Lucian W., Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, p.247.
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Chapter 6. Parties, Economics, and Candidates
1. Introduction
For Korean voters in 1992, it may have been more difficult to decide for 
whom to vote than in the past. Unlike previous elections, they faced a choice 
without the clear cues that they used to have: i.e., that of the pro-democratic 
versus regime-support dimension of party competition. Let alone the fact that 
democratic measures taken since the late 1980s may have reduced the viability of 
the democratisation issue, this cue of the past may have been blurred by the party 
maneuvers across the ruling and opposition camps. That is, the nomination of 
Kim Young-sam - a long-time opposition figure who had joined in the formation 
of the new ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) early in 1990 - as its 
presidential candidate may have resulted in confusion among the voters who may 
formerly have relied on this cue. After all, the election was bound to result, one 
way or the other, in the creation of a “civilian government,” ending about 30 
years of rule by the military-turned presidents.
However, the evidence provided so far clearly points to the fact that the old 
cleavages of the pro-democratic dimension had not simply withered away. Kim 
Young-sam, as a ruling party candidate, shared a common basis of societal 
support with his predecessors, especially that of his immediate predecessor, Roh
Tae-woo, rather than that of his own in 1987 when he ran as an opposition party 
candidate. Indeed, Kim Young-sam won more support from the old, the less- 
educated, rural dwellers and the like, who traditionally provided the electoral 
basis of the governing party. What this suggests is that some of the voters, at 
least, may have maintained their views of party politics based coherently on this 
dimension, and made their voting decisions accordingly, despite the seemingly 
different nature of the future government and its leader. That is, it may have 
been the cue of pro-democratic versus regime-support dimension that brought the 
voters to their final alignment.
Another factor that may have provided the voters with a consistent cue in 
1992 was the regional traits of party politics, which had arisen since the elections 
of 1987 and onwards. This cue of regional traits, which clearly formed a basis 
for the voters’ appraisal of the candidates, seemed to have become a factor in the 
short-term stability on the part of the voters in 1992, as the two viable candidates, 
i.e., Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, had also competed in the elections of 
1987-1 Although the ascribed nature of regional traits may have undoubtedly 
provided the voters with a stable cue when they decided for whom to vote, it may 
have been the linkage between candidates and regional traits, which had become 
highly visible in the electoral competitions since 1987, that was crucial. The cue
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1 Kim Young-sam won 28.0 per cent of the total votes, whereas Kim Dae-jung won 27.1 per cent 
in 1987. In this election, Roh Tae-woo won his presidency with the votes of 36.7 per cent See 
Table 1-6.
of regional traits may have provided the voters with an easier, if not dominant, 
reference in the candidate-centred contest of the presidential election.
Before we proceed further, it may be worth looking at the distributions of 
voters’ self-claimed cues used for their choice. The respondents were asked to 
nominate the most important factor considered when they made their voting 
choice among the six items provided - namely, regional backgrounds of the 
candidates, personal ties with the candidates, policies/promises of the candidates, 
candidates’ career/ability, candidates’ personality, and candidates’ partisanship, 
with an additional open-ended item.2 Table 6-1 reports the distributions broken 
down by voting choices in 1992. Over a half of the voters said that they 
considered qualities of a candidate, that is, either personality or career/ability of 
the candidate as the most important when they decided for whom to vote; about 
23 per cent said policies or promises; and about 10 per cent said the party 
affiliation of a candidate. About 8 per cent of the voters said that the regional 
attachment of a candidate was the most considered cue.
Although the directions of the cues - i.e., either positive or negative in using 
the cues for their choice - were not explicitly measured, the cross-tabulation of 
the data with voting choice may give us some insights regarding the direction of 
such cues. Kim Young-sam scored first among those who said that the 
candidate’s career/ability was their most obvious concern in making their voting
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2 See Appendix 1 for the wordings o f the questionnaire.
decision, and those who designated the party affiliation of a candidate. Kim Dae- 
jung scored the first, apart from the other minor party candidates (Park Chan-jong 
especially) who also performed the best, among those who said candidate 
personality (or personal dignity) were the most important. Regional attachment 
of a candidate was also more important for the choice of Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Young-sam than for the others. Chung Ju-young scored the best among those 
who said that the policies and promises of a candidate were the most considered 
for their decision, which was followed by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. 
These results suggest that Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, to about the same 
degree, benefited from their personality factors and regional attachments, 
whereas Chung Ju-young’s strength lay with his policies/promises even if this 
strength was not overwhelming. There is also an indication that Kim Young-sam 
benefited most among those who considered party affiliation the most important, 
and the other minor party candidates benefited most among the personality driven 
voters.
Table 6-1. Voters’ Yardstick of their Voting Decision, and Voting Choice in 1992: 
Column Percentages
YS DJ JY Other Total
Candidates’ Personality 22.3 36.6 9.3 71.6 29.0%(370)
Candidates’ Career 34.6 25.0 20.5 12.3 27.3%(348)
Policies/Promises 15.9 18.8 57.2 7.6 23.0%(294)
Party Affiliation 15.4 6.6 7.8 4.6 10.3%(132)
Regional Backgrounds 8.2 12.3 3.4 0.0 8.2%(105)
Other 3.5 0.6 1.7 3.9 2.3%( 29)
Total (N) 41.6%(532) 34.1%(435) 16.4%(209) 7.9%(101) 100%(1277)
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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In short, the cues outlined above may have forged the main paths which 
conveyed the voters’ choice in 1992. What is to be pursued further in this 
chapter is an examination of the more immediate variables that explicitly measure 
the process by which those cues are affected, and also a test of the impacts and 
directions of those cues on individual voting choice. The political tendency 
variables are considered in the first section with particular attention to partisan 
orientations. The second section reviews the economic concerns of voters, which 
may have emerged as a new dimension that guided the voters’ choices in the 
elections of 1992 as a result of economic difficulties encountered, together with 
the presence of a new political alternative. The third section examines the 
patterns and the manner in which voters perceive the candidates with reference to 
their comparative evaluations of the candidates over various issues. The final 
section summarises the effects of various determinants of voting choice in 
bringing about the final outcomes of the 1992 presidential election in a causal 
sequence model.
2. Partisan Orientation, Ideology and Political Attitudes
Of the variables which can measure the pro-democratic versus regime- 
support dimension, this study collected data on partisan orientation, ideological
leaning, and issue attitudes. 3 The question for partisan orientation was: “Have 
you usually supported the party in power (yodang) or the party out of power 
(yadang) in elections?”. The question, “do you consider yourself ‘progressive’ or 
‘conservative’ for political and social matters?”, was asked for ideological 
leaning. And a battery of questions on such matters as protest marches or 
demonstrations, the teachers’ union movement, US Army withdrawal, and 
citizens’ private-level contact with North Korea were also asked.
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Let us begin by deliberating on the meaning of the partisan orientation 
variable. First of all, are the political parties relevant for Korean voters when 
they decide for whom to vote? Although it is doubtful, given the frequent 
changes in the Korean party system, that the voters hold a sense of long-standing 
socio-psychological attachment toward a specific party (as in most of the 
Western democracies4)» however, this does not rule out the possibility of partisan 
driven forces in electoral choice and their role in evaluating political information. 
The ruling parties’ proximity with the incumbent governments, which had been 
under the tight control of strong presidential leadership, may have provided the 
voters with a clear picture regarding the parties, that is, whether the party was for 
the government or against. Even though the life span of the parties themselves
3 See Appendix 1 for the questionnaires.
4 See, for the concept of party identification, among others, Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip 
E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter, New York: Wiley, 1960; 
Converse, Philip E., “Of Time and Partisan Stability,” Comparative Political Studies, 2 ,1969, 
pp. 139-71; Crewe, Ivor, “Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain,” in Budge, 
Ian, Crewe, Ivor, and Farlie, Dennis (eds.), Party Identification and Beyond, London: Wiley, 
1976; and Niemi, Richard G., and Weisberg, Herbert F., “Is Party Identification Meaningful,” in 
Niemi and Weisberg (eds.), Controversies in American Voting Behaviour, 2nd ed., Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984.
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had been short, it is likely that the distinction between yodang (party in power) 
and yadang (party or parties out of power) had become a meaningful source of 
political judgment among the voters.
The images of yodang or yadang that the voters might have developed are 
relatively clear cut. The voters could have developed a framework for assessing 
the political parties and their candidates, as the pervasive pattern of political 
competitions in the past authoritarian regimes had been between the yodang - 
whose greatest assets lay in the nation’s economic achievements under the 
regime, and thus argued for the maintenance of the regime - and a main yadang 
which used to put the issue of regime legitimacy at the forefront. The voters, 
therefore, could have held consistent expectations when they expressed their 
preferences in elections.
The distribution of voting choices based on partisan orientations on various 
occasions, reported at Table 6-2, show a close association between partisan 
stance and voting choice. For example, Kim Young-sam in 1992 won far more 
votes (about 73 per cent) among those who said that they were governing party 
supporters than his national average (about 37 per cent), but gained about 13 per 
cent among those who were the opposition party identifiers. By contrast, Kim 
Dae-jung won about 55 per cent of the votes from the opposition party 
identifiers, and won a mere 4 per cent among the governing party identifiers in 
1992. As a new comer in this election, Chung Ju-young’s votes seemed not to be
differentiated by partisan stance, although he had slightly more support from 
those who were not identified with either yodang or yadang than the identifiers.
Table 6-2. Partisan Orientations and Voting Choice: Column Percentages
Governing Party None Opposition Party Total
Total (N) 26.4 (n=387) 31.6 (n=463) 42.0 (n=616) N=1446
1992 Presidential
Kim Young-sam 73.2 % 37.8 % 12.6% 36.5 %
Kim Dae-jung 3.6 17.6 54.5 29.4
Chung Ju-young 12.1 16.6 13.9 14.3
The Others 1.7 10.6 7.4 6.9
Non-voter 9.3 17.5 11.7 12.9
1992 National Assembly
DLP 69.6 % 38.9 % 11.0% 35.3%
DP 6.6 17.6 58.4 31.9
UNP 6.9 11.0 12.1 10.4
The Others 3.2 8.8 4.8 5.7
Non-voter 12.7 23.1 13.4 16.3
Not-eligible 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.6
1987 Presidential
Roh Tae-woo 68.4 % 38.4 % 12.7% 35.5%
Kim Young-sam 10.9 19.6 18.7 16.9
Kim Dae-jung 1.3 12.4 46.0 23.6
Kim Jong-pil 4.9 5.0 2.5 3.9
Non-voter 5.3 13.4 5.4 7.9
Not-eligible 9.1 11.2 14.6 12.1
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
According to this survey data, there were more opposition party identifiers 
than those o f the governing party, and the non-identifiers were in between (see 
the first line of Table 6-2).3 An immediate question to be raised is, then, what
5 Basically similar results were found in the post-election survey of the 14th National Assembly 
election on March 1992 by the Institute for Korean Election Studies. About 23 per cent of the 
respondents said that they were close to yo, about 34 per cent ya, and about 43 per cent on the 
middle, with the question of: “We are talking about yodang or yadang in our daily lives. Do you 
think you are close to yo or y a T  See Cho, Chung-bin, “Yukwonja-ui Yoya-songhyang-gwa 
T’up’yohaengt’ae (Voters’ Government-Opposition Disposition and Voting Behaviour),” in Lee
would be the reasons for the successive electoral victories of the governing party 
and its candidates? In looking at the evidence from the table, there are a few 
possibilities that can be put forward. First, the strength of the partisan 
orientations may have differed. As shown on the table, the governing party and 
its candidates had gained a relatively solid degree of support from the governing 
party identifiers, whereas the support of the opposition party identifiers had not 
been so. Indeed, the change of its leadership to Kim Young-sam of the governing 
party had little impact on the preferences of the governing party identifiers. On 
the contrary, the numerical superiority of the opposition party identifiers 
nevertheless could not guarantee its success in the elections because of the party 
fragmentation on the side of the opposition, even if there had been a relatively 
small portion of cross-votes (about 11 to 13 per cent) among the opposition party 
identifiers. Perhaps, it is rather the very existence of several opposition parties, 
that is, those out of power, that had kept some of the voters on the side of 
opposition. Second, the governing party and its candidates were more successful 
in winning the votes of the non-identifiers. The non-identifiers lent more support 
to the governing party and gave far less support to the main opposition party than 
the national average. They were also far more likely to abstain from voting than 
the identifiers, and tended to give more support to the minor parties. The ability
Nam-young (ed.), Han’guk-ui Son’go (Elections in Korea), /, Seoul: Nanam, 1993, p. 51. The 
data collected for the 14th Presidential election by the same Institute were, however, somewhat 
different This time with a five scale measure, the survey found the distributions of yo 18 per 
cent, somewhat close to yo 21 per cent, middle 27 per cent, somewhat close to ya 23 per cent and 
ya 11 per cent. See ibid., p. 52, footnote 2.
of the governing party to lure the likely floating votes of non-identifiers to its side 
may have contributed to its successive electoral victories.
Table 6-3. Partisan Orientations and the Flow-of-the-Votes, 1987 -1992: Column Percentages
1987 Roh Tae- Kim Kim Dae- Kim Jong- Non- Not-
1992 woo Young-sam iung Pil voter eligible
G overning  Party (n) 68.4  (26 5 ) 10 .9 (4 2 ) 1.3 (5 ) 4.9  (19 ) 5.3  (2 1 ) 9.1 (3 5 )
Kim Young-sam 76.3  % 8 3 .8 % 1 2 .9 % 65.1 % 41.7  % 68.6  %
Kim Dae-jung 2.2 5.0 55.0 0.0 11.7 2.8
Chung Ju-young 12.0 3.8 32.1 25.3 7.8 16.0
The Others 1.2 1.7 0.0 0.0 10.0 1.9
Non-voter 8.3 5.7 0.0 9.6 28 .9 10.8
None (n) 38 .4  (178 ) 19 .6 (9 1 ) 12.4  (5 8 ) 5.0  (2 3 ) 13 .4 (6 2 ) 11 .2 (52 )
Kim Young-sam 51.4  % 53.3  % 4.1 % 34 .6  % 23.0  % 20 .6  %
Kim Dae-jung 10.1 7.1 72.9 13.5 9 .4 12.2
Chung Ju-young 21.5 20.8 2.6 16.2 5.8 20 .7
The Others 8.5 9.8 2.9 27.9 9.8 20 .6
Non-voter 8.5 9.0 17.5 7.8 52.0 25 .9
Opposition  Party (n) 12.7  (78 ) 18.7  (115 ) 46.0  (28 3 ) 2.5  (15 ) 5.4  (3 3 ) 14 .6 (9 0 )
Kim Young-sam 22.6  % 37 .2  % 1 .6 % 1 2 .9 % 1 4 .8% 5.7  %
Kim Dae-jung 21.8 16.5 84 .9 19.6 28.1 51.3
Chung Ju-young 34.6 22 .6 5.2 39.3 6.0 10.7
The Others 10.1 11.4 1.9 12.3 5.5 16.9
Non-voter 10.8 12.3 6.3 15.8 45 .7 15.5
Total (n=1446) 36 .5  (52 1 ) 16.9  (24 8 ) 23 .6  (3 4 6 ) 3 .9  (57 ) 7 .9 (116 ) 12 .1 (177 )
Kim Young-sam 59.7  % 5 1 .0 % 2.2  % 38 .9  % 23.9  % 22 .6  %
Kim Dae-jung 7.8 11.1 82 .5 10.7 15.2 30 .2
Chung Ju-young 18.6 18.8 5.2 25 .4 6.2 14.7
The Others 5.1 9 .2 2.0 14.5 8.6 15.0
Non-voter 8.8 10.0 8.1 10.5 46.1 17.6
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
Table 6-3, which reports the flow-of-the-votes from 1987 to 1992 broken 
down by the partisan orientation variable, shows how the partisan orientations of 
the voters mediated the electoral choices that would have been highly volatile as
a result of the party maneuvers between the ruling and the opposition camps. In 
looking at the table, the natural focus is on the movement of the votes of the DLP 
segments, as they are likely to be more volatile. Overall, Kim Young-sam in 
1992 had the biggest in-flow-votes from the Roh Tae-woo votes of 1987, and 
managed to hold slightly more than a half of his own votes of 1987 (see the rows 
of totals at Table 6-3).6 He also won the biggest share of the former votes of Kim 
Jong-pil, who also joined in the ruling coalition DLP. Kim Dae-jung retained his 
former votes virtually intact, but seemed to have failed in attracting the defecting 
votes of the DLP segments. It was rather Chung Ju-young who gained a fair 
share of the defecting votes.7
The table clearly shows that partisan orientation was one of the factors that 
mediated the voters’ movement in the subsequent elections. For example, Kim 
Young-sam won the biggest share of in-flow votes among the governing party 
identifiers, regardless of where the in-flow votes originated from, the second 
largest share among the non-identifiers, and the third largest share among the 
opposition party identifiers. On the contrary, Kim Dae-jung, and Chung Ju- 
young alike, won the most among the opposition party identifiers, the second 
among the non-identifiers, and the third among the governing party identifiers in 
due sequence. To be sure, it was Chung Ju-young who accommodated the
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6 In the survey, Kim Young-sam’s votes of 1987 were about 10 per cent under-represented. If 
this under-representation results from his change of partisan stance in 1990, it is likely that the 
portion of his own in-flow votes could have been smaller.
7 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on the meanings of the flow of the votes.
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biggest portion of the defecting votes from the former supporters of the DLP 
segments.
What is revealing from the above observation is that the partisan 
orientations of the voters came into play when they made voting decisions in 
such a way that the partisan stance of the candidates was counted. It is hard to 
grasp the nature of Kim Young-sam’s successful shifting of electoral bases - that 
is, that of retaining substantial portions of the former votes of Roh Tae-woo and 
Kim Jong-pil - without referring to the partisan orientations the voters might 
hold. It should be also noted, however, that partisan orientations were not all 
encompassing. Kim Young-sam, for example, still retained the following of a 
substantial portion of his former supporters who were identified with the 
opposition. Further, the more successful accommodation of the former 
supporters of DLP segments by Chung Ju-young as compared to that gained by 
Kim Dae-jung, especially among the opposition party identifiers, indicates a 
limitation on the role played by partisan orientations. That is, this result points to 
the fact that there may have been other factors, such as regional antagonisms for 
example, which hindered a full realisation of the partisan driven forces of 
electoral choice.
In short, for some of the Korean voters who were willing to identify their 
partisan orientations (about 68 per cent of the total), the cue of partisan 
orientations toward yodang or yadang may have been a meaningful source in
shaping their voting choices. If we say a voter has a partisan stance of yo or ya, 
then what does this mean for his or her political life other than the fact that he or 
she would be influenced by his or her partisan stance when making voting 
decisions? Can this be seen as a manifestation of his or her long-term views on 
politics derived from his or her past political experiences? More specifically, to 
what extent is the distinction between yo or ya related with the voters’ 
evaluations on political issues? To shed light on these questions, Table 6-4 
explores the relationships between the voters’ partisan orientations and their 
stances on political issues. By looking at these relationships, the nature of the 
partisan orientation variable can be firmly reiterated.
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Table 6-4. Partisan Orientations and Issue Standings: Column Percentages
Governing Party None Opposition Party Total
Total (N) 26.4 (n=387) 31.6 (n=463) 42.0 (n=616) N=1446
Demonstrations
Oppose 81.3% 61.1 % 39.5 % 57.4 %
No Opinion 9.4 19.2 19.4 16.7
Approve 9.3 19.7 41.1 25.9
Teachers’ Union
Oppose 63.1 % 50.3 % 29.8 % 45.1 %
No Opinion 18.5 23.0 16.8 19.2
Approve 18.4 26.7 53.4 35.7
US Army Withdrawal
Oppose 74.7 % 65.7 % 52.5 % 62.5 %
No Opinion 11.5 20.1 15.9 16.1
Approve 13.8 14.2 31.6 21.4
P riv a te -le v e l E x c h a n g e s
w ith  N o rth  K o re a
Oppose 47.6 % 38.7 % 28.7 % 36.8 %
No Opinion 9.0 17.8 11.6 12.9
Approve 43.4 43.5 59.7 50.3
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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Let us first examine the overall distribution of the responses on each of the 
issue items (see the column of total). All of the items queried were either 
activities outlawed by the government or different from those expressly approved 
by the government. However, they were not election specific issues of 
contention between the parties, they were rather prepared to measure the voters’ 
attitudinal characteristics in general. Except for the issue of allowing private- 
level contacts with North Korea, there were more of the responses affirmative to 
the official positions. About 63 per cent of the respondents were against the 
withdrawal of American troops residing in Korea, about 57 per cent said that they 
were opposing the practices of demonstration or protest march, and about 45 per 
cent were against the activities of the outlawed teachers’ union. There were also 
about 13 to 19 per cent of the respondents who declined to express their 
standings on the items. Thus, it is fair to say that on the average Korean voters 
were somewhat inclined to conform with officially endorsed positions on key 
issues.
Nonetheless, the table exhibits clear differences in the issue positions of the 
respondents depending on their partisan orientations. That is, the governing party 
identifiers were far more likely to be concordant with the positions of the 
government on all of the issue items than the others, while the opposition party 
identifiers were far less likely to be in agreement with the government positions. 
The positions of the non-identifiers were quite similar to those of the national
average, but they were slightly more inclined to depress their opinion at the cost 
of disapproving the official positions. What emerged from this analysis is that 
the voters’ partisan orientations toward yo or ya differentiated their standings on 
the issues that were likely to be a manifestation of their basic beliefs and values.
Apart from the partisan orientation variable, which seemed to form a basis 
for organising the voters’ views on politics coherently, an ideological dimension 
is also considered in Table 6-5. In the survey, the respondents were asked to 
place themselves in a four scale measurement of ideology, running from 
‘conservative’ to ‘progressive’.8 In general, the self-placed conservative can be 
said to be against change while the progressives are in favour of change in 
politics and society.
Overall, most of the respondents assigned themselves to the middle of the 
range, and their distribution was quite even on this dimension (see the row of 
overall distribution in Table 6-5). There emerged a clear pattern of associations 
between self-assigned ideology and their standings on the issues. Those who saw 
themselves as conservative as opposed to progressive were more likely to 
disapprove of demonstrations, the activities of the teachers’ union movement, and 
private-level exchanges with North Korea. On the issue of US army withdrawal,
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8 Although most of the respondents (about 85 per cent of the total) were willing to locate 
themselves on this ideological continuum, the meanings of it may have varied: some might have 
viewed this ideological continuum of ‘conservative’ versus ‘progressive’ in terms of the 
‘traditional’ versus ‘modem’ dimension in societal sphere, or others the ‘authoritarian’ versus 
‘democratic or liberal’ dimension in political sphere, and for some others this dimension may 
have meant the ‘right’ versus ‘left’ dimension.
this pattern was also held by and large. The implications of this evidence are 
straight forward: that is, Korean voters engaged in ideological thinking in such a 
way that substantial individual differences in their attitudes on key issues 
reflected placement along a conservative-progressive ideological continuum.
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Table 6-5. Issue Standings and Partisan Orientations Distributed by Self-assigned Ideology: 
Column Percentages
Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Total
Conservative Conservative Progressive Progressive
Total (N) 7.0 (n=89) 42.7 (n=549) 43.9(n=561) 6.5 (n=83) N=1279
Demonstrations
Oppose 65.7 % 66.6 % 48.4 % 40.7 % 56.8 %
No Opinion 16.4 14.5 17.2 17.6 16.0
Approve 17.9 18.9 34.4 41.7 27.1
Teachers' Union
Oppose 50.8 % 50.9 % 41.5 % 33.4% 45.6 %
No Opinion 20.4 18.0 14.6 10.2 16.1
Approve 28.8 31.1 43.9 56.4 38.2
US Army Withdrawal
Oppose 60.1 % 67.3 % 61.6 % 56.0 % 63.6%
No Opinion 16.7 13.1 34.4 8.6 14.1
Approve 23.3 19.6 23.0 35.4 22.4
P riv a te -le v e l E x c h a n g e s
w ith  N o rth  K o re a
Oppose 46.8 % 42.5 % 35.9 % 26.9 % 38.9 %
No Opinion 11.3 11.5 10.0 7.1 10.5
Approve 41.9 46.1 54.1 65.9 50.6
Partisan Orientations n=1254
Governing Party 35.7 % 31.2 % 23.1 % 14.8% 26.8 %
None 28.2 31.0 29.7 22.4 29.7
Opposition Party 36.2 37.8 47.3 62.8 43.5
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
The association of self-assigned ideology and partisan orientation appeared 
to be also significant and consistent in that there were more of the opposition
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party identifiers toward the progressive end of the ideological spectrum, whereas 
more of the governing party identifiers saw themselves as conservative (see the 
bottom rows of the table). No clear patterns emerged for the non-identifiers. The 
association between ideology and partisan orientation, however, seemed to be 
asymmetric in that the relationship between them became sharper towards the 
progressive end of the ideological spectrum.
What, then, does the observed association between partisan orientation and 
ideology imply? Does this relationship suggest that the distinction between yo or 
ya among the voters is being curtailed or modified by their ideological leanings? 
A prerequisite for the answer to this question is to determine whether the voters 
perceive the yodang or the yadang in terms of ideology. A direct test for this 
cannot be provided here, but it is likely that ideology is less a matter of concern 
when the voters distinguish yo or ya , given that ideological confrontation in past 
electoral competitions had been rare since the 1960s. Thus, for the following 
analysis, no causal assumptions are made between them. What is suggested 
though is that there may be a common basis between partisan orientation and 
ideology. They may share common intervening variables that result in some 
overlap: for example, those who said they were progressive may have placed 
more value on ‘democratisation’ as such, as did the yadang identifiers.
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Table 6-6. The Impact of Ideology and Partisan Orientations on Issue Attitudes (Betas):
Controlling for Social Background
Ideo PO Demo Union US North Index
Ideology, Self-assigned mm .113** .061* .029 .099** .114**
Partisan Orientations - — -.231** -.201** -.137** -.117** -.260**
Urban/Rural (Metro)
City .053 -.040 .053 .024 -.029 -.027 .008
Rural .038 .005 .038 .043 -.051 -.028 .002
Gender (Female)
Male .140** -.105** .031 .033 -.078** .041 .013
Age (Over 50)
20s .121** -.162** .322** .236** .234** .040 .310**
30s .085* -.130** .166** .174** .128** .060 .199**
40s .055 -.017 .008 .026 .017 -.021 .011
Religion (None/Others)
Buddhist .014 .032 -.027 -.069* -.084** -.025 -.076**
Protestant .036 .027 -.026 -.015 -.069* -.043 -.057*
Catholic .004 -.023 -.009 .006 -.056A -.014 -.026
Education (Primary)
Middle School -.042 -.002 -.028 -.048 -.010 -.005 -.035
High School -.079 -.054 -.015 .037 -.075 -.077 -.049
University -.005 -.123** .077A .178** .044 -.023 .104*
Job (Self-employed)
Farmer .060 -.001 -.014 -.039 .023 .014 -.007
Manual Worker .007 .015 -.004 .029 -.012 -.011 .001
Routine Non-manual .080* .014 -.016 -.014 -.023 -.001 -.020
Manager/Prof .040 .065* -.009 -.020 -.029 -.058A -.045A
Income (Under 500,000)
500 - 990,000 .085A .041 -.087* -.024 .050 -.051 -.045
1,000 -1,490,000 .086A .022 -.025 -.051 .066 -.069 -.033
Over 1,500,000 .050 .018 -.039 -.007 .031 -.034 -.020
Housing (Owner)
Long-term Lease .049 -.062* .023 .020 .005 .055A .041
Monthly Rent .033 -.022 -.021 -.016 .006 .024 -.002
Region of Origin
(Seoul/Kyonggi)
Kangwon .046 -.024 -.004 .014 -.028 -.028 -.028
Ch’ungch’ong .065 -.019 .048 .025 -.063 -.071A -.024
Cholla .173** -.265** .066 .045 -.044 -.003 .026
Kyongbuk .127** .050 .007 -.001 -.034 -.015 -.016
Kyongnam .018 .105** -.062 -.033 -.001 -.006 -.038
The Others .035 -.004 .021 .018 -.046 -.030 -.014
Residential Region (Seoul)
Kyonggi -.050 .079* -.055 -.023 .047 .072A .016
Kangwon -.039 .017 -.001 -.001 .034 .045 .029
Ch’ungch’ong -.053 .112** -.020 -.007 .053 .088* .044
Cholla -.134** -.062A -.016 .018 .145** .101* .091*
Kyongbuk -.051 .058 .018 .052 .054 .051 .066A
Kyongnam .012 .007 -.029 -.008 -.005 .016 -.009
R-squared .070 .244 .255 .224 .117 .069 .289
Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. Dependent Variable Coding: 
Ideo (1=very progressive, 0.66=somewhat progressive, 0.33=somewhat conservative, 0=very 
conservative): P 0  (1=governing party, 0.5=none, 0=opposition party): Demo, Union, US, North 
(1=approve, 0.5=no opinion, 0=oppose); and Index ( [Demo+Union+US+NorthJ/4).
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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So far we have elaborated the relationships among the variables of partisan 
orientation, ideology, and attitudes on issues, that is, the variables designed to 
measure those political tendencies of the voters that would be attained for a 
relatively longer period of time. Now let us examine the input sides of this 
relationship, that is, the process of the voters’ attaining such political tendencies. 
In Table 6-6, socio-economic indicators were employed to provide some insights 
on the process by which such political tendencies were attained. The table 
reports the standardised (beta) estimates of the socio-economic variables in the 
OLS regression models: that is, the first two columns report the effects of socio­
economic indicators on ideology and partisan orientation, and the second five 
columns the effects on attitudes towards issues with additional controls of 
ideology and of partisan orientation. By performing this analysis, causal 
assumptions are made, in that the respondents’ self-placed ideology and partisan 
orientation are prior to the formation of attitudes on issues. The beta coefficients 
show the relative impacts of the indicator variables on the dependent variables.
The coefficients for the analysis of ideology show that men, the younger 
and the lower segment of non-manual workers were more likely to place 
themselves as progressive on the ideological continuum than women, the older 
and the self-employed, net of other things on the list, and the middle income 
earners were more likely to be progressive than the lower. The respondents 
whose origins were other than from the Seoul/Kyonggi region were more likely
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to assign themselves as progressive, especially those from Cholla and Kyongbuk, 
than those from Seoul and Kyonggi. The Cholla residents appeared to be more 
‘conservative’ than the others, which seemed to be somewhat odd given the 
Cholla origin respondents’ progressive leaning: indeed, the directions of all the 
residential region variables were opposite to those of the origin variable, except 
for those of Kyongnam. What this may suggest is that Seoul residents are in 
general more ‘progressive’ than those in other regional hinterlands; and among 
them, those who originated from the other regions are more ‘progressive’ than 
those from Seoul/Kyonggi. No further explanation for this can be provided here, 
however.
The coefficients relating to partisan orientation indicate that men, the 
younger and the more educated were less likely to be governing party identifiers, 
while managers and professionals and owner occupiers were more likely to be 
governing party identifiers, independent of other things. Those who originated 
from Cholla were far less likely to be governing party identifiers, whereas those 
of Kyongnam origins were more likely to identify with the governing party than 
those from Seoul and Kyonggi. Residents of Kyonggi and Ch’ungch’ong were 
more likely to identify with the governing party, while Cholla residents were less 
likely to be governing party identifiers.
Now let us examine the coefficients relating to attitudes towards issues. 
First of all, it is apparent that partisan orientation and ideology alike had an
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impact in structuring the voters’ attitudes on issues, but partisan orientation was 
stronger than ideology (about twice as strong) in shaping attitudes towards issues. 
Second, age emerged as having the strongest impact on attitudes towards issues, 
except for the issue of allowing private-level contacts with North Korea. Third, 
religious affiliation also resulted in attitude differences, in that Buddhists were 
somewhat more likely to disapprove of the activities of the teachers’ union, and 
those affiliated with Buddhism and Christianity alike were less likely to favour 
the withdrawal of the US army than those who had no religion (and those 
affiliated with other minor religions). Fourth, university graduates were in favour 
of demonstrations and the teachers’ union movement. Fifth, it seemed unlikely 
that the variable of regional attachment resulted in the attitude differences 
observed, except for the Cholla residents who substantially favoured the 
withdrawal of the US army. Finally, the coefficients of the index variable, which 
measured the consistency of the attitudes towards issues, largely confirm the 
patterns observed above.
In short, the above analysis indicates that, first, among the variables under 
study the variables of socialisation, especially that of age difference, are the main 
factors in determining the individuals’ political tendency. Second, differences in 
regional attributes are more likely to be concerned with ideological self­
placement and partisan orientation than standings on issues, suggesting that there 
are no substantial regional differences in determining the individuals’ political 
attitudes once the individuals’ partisan orientations and ideological leanings are
controlled. Finally, it needs to be noted that the relatively low scores of R- 
squared across the models indicate that there are more factors to be explained 
than are explained by the variables listed for the formation of the voters’ political 
tendencies. This is particularly so for ideology and attitudes on the issues of the 
US army withdrawal and of North Korean contact.
- 197-
3. Economics
In the period leading up to the elections of 1992, there was widespread 
agreement that the Korean economy needed innovative policies given that it had 
reached its structural limits in sustaining high growth rates.9 The sluggishly 
growing economy, and soaring real-estate values and housing rentals seemed to 
reflect the economic mismanagement of the Roh government. As a commentator 
put it, this called for “a president of the economy.”10 If the governments of the 
past authoritarian regimes claimed credit for economic achievement, then equally 
they could be blamed for economic failure. Further still the electoral 
participation of Chung Ju-young, a most successful businessman in Korea, and 
his party, may have provided the voters with a new alternative in the economic
9 See Lee, Hong-yung, “South Korea in 1991: Unprecedented Opportunity, Increasing 
Challenge,’’ Asian Survey, 32(1), 1992, pp. 64-73; also his “South Korea in 1992: A Turning 
Point in Democratisation,’’ Asian Survey, 33(1), 1993, pp. 32-42.
10 See Ahn, Bu-keun, “6 Kong 4 Nyon’gan-ui Yoronbyonhwa Ch’usebunsok: Yoron-un Kyongje 
Taet’ongryong-ul Wonhanda (An Analysis of the Public Opinion Trend during the First Four 
Years of the 6th Republic: Public Opinion Calls for An Economic President),” Wolgan C ho son, 
Dec. 1991.
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issue space. In addition, the diminishing importance of political issues such as 
‘democratisation’ may have elevated economic issues to occupy a place of 
importance in partisan choice.
Although these economic difficulties may have been well perceived among 
the voters and politicians alike, however, this had not resulted in specific 
economic policies and policy differences among the parties. Rather the point of 
contention in the 1992 presidential election became who would be the most 
suitable as a manager of the economy.11 Nonetheless, this did not necessarily 
rule out the possibility of economic voting among the voters, especially if the 
effects of economic conditions upon voting are said to be more related to 
“incumbency-oriented” evaluations than “policy-oriented” ones.12 After all, the 
voters may have been more interested in outcomes than policies. As Fiorina put 
it, “in order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, 
citizens need only calculate the changes in their own welfare.”13
In this section, the linkages between the economy and the individuals’ 
voting choice are explored by looking at relationships between the voters’ 
evaluations on economic conditions and voting. The variables measured in this 
study consist of a two sets of six variables. Each set asks about the perceptions
11 See Park, Kyong-san, “Han’guk Son’go-ui Chongch’i-gyongjehak (Political Economy of 
Korean Elections),” in Lee, Nam-young (ed.), Han’guk-ui Son’go, I (Elections in Korea, I), 
Seoul: Nanam, 1993, p. 393.
12 See Kiewiet, D. Roderick, Macro-economics and Micro-politics: The Electoral Effects of 
Economic Issues, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
13 See Fiorina, Morris P., Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981, p. 5.
of the relative economic conditions of the respondents’ household, region, and 
the country as a whole, with the first set relating the economic conditions 
“retrospectively” to the past few years and the second set relating “prospectively” 
to the future few years in a “simple” structure.14 Thus, collective or “sociotropic” 
and personal or “pocketbook”15 motivations are measured in the time horizon, 
along with a group level of measurement - that is, that of region, which as has 
been shown became a salient reference category since 1987.
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Table 6-7. Economic Views of Respondents (%): Personal vs Collectives, and Past vs Future
Far
Better
Somewhat
Better
About the 
Same
Somewhat
Worse
Far Worse Total (N) 
100%
Retrospective
Household 2.7 % 27.0 % 40.0 % 19.9% 10.4% n=1497
Region 3.5 24.9 37.2 24.4 10.0 n=1471
Country 2.6 20.6 21.6 37.3 17.9 n=1470
Prospective
Household 3.6 % 55.1 % 32.3 % 7.5 % 1.5% n=1478
Region 3.7 51.9 34.2 8.4 1.7 n=1464
Country 4.2 55.4 30.5 8.3 1.7 n=1444
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
14 See, for a discussion about the features of economic voting, Lewis-Beck, Michael S., 
Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies, Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1988, pp. 34-42.
15 See Kinder, Donald R., and Kiewiet, D. Roderick, “Economic Discontent and Political 
Behaviour: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in 
Congressional Voting,” American Journal of Political Science, 23(3), 1979, pp. 495-527;and 
“Sociotropic Politics: The American Case,” British Journal of Political Science, 11(2), 1981, 
pp. 129-41.
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Table 6-7 reports the responses of voters, that is, the way voters assessed 
economic conditions in the three levels of aggregation both retrospectively and 
prospectively. At first glance the table indicates that the voters were more critical 
in judging the past than forecasting the future. The voters were overall highly 
optimistic (nearly 60 per cent of the total answered) about the future economic 
conditions of their household, region, and nation. Compared to this, their 
evaluations of past economic conditions were rather bleak.
In terms of their retrospective evaluations, there emerges a clear pattern that 
evaluations of the respondents’ household situation are less negative than that of 
the region, and the country, in due sequence. Indeed, about 55 per cent of the 
respondents evaluated the economic conditions of the country as having 
deteriorated, whereas about 30 per cent of them responded as such for their 
household’s situation. The retrospective evaluations of their household’s 
economy were rather balanced overall, whereas the evaluations of the regional 
and national economy were less positive. No such patterns emerge for the 
prospective evaluations.
On what grounds, then, did the voters evaluate their economic 
environments? What is the actual process whereby such evaluations are formed? 
To shed light on this question, the socio-economic characteristics of the voters 
are considered in relation to these economic evaluations, even if this attempt may
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be far from being perfect to disentangle the myriad of such economic 
considerations. Nonetheless, long-term background factors may help to 
determine the individual’s informational environment: that is, people with a 
similar background may share a common basis in how they evaluate their 
economic environment. Table 6-8 report the estimated partial impacts of socio­
economic interests upon economic evaluations.
Let us begin by looking at the beta coefficients on the retrospective 
evaluations. Among the variables listed, the variables of urban/rural, gender, age, 
occupation, income and residential region appear to be significant. That is, the 
big city dwellers were less positive in evaluating the past economic conditions of 
their household, region and the nation as a whole than their counterparts in small 
cities and rural areas; male voters were less positive in this respect than female 
voters; the age cohort of over 50 were more positive than its younger 
counterparts; the self-employed were less positive than the other occupational 
groups; the lower income earners were less positive than those of higher incomes; 
and Seoul residents were more positive than the residents of other regions, 
especially at the levels of household and region. There were no significant 
differences in the evaluations among the other regions, except that Kyongnam 
residents were quite distinct in their negative evaluations on the past economic 
conditions, especially at the regional and the national levels.
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Table 6-8. The Impact of Socio-economic Interests on the Economic Evaluations (Betas)
Retro -
House
Retro -
Region
Retro -
Nation
Pro -
House
Pro -
Region
Pro -
Nation
Retro -
Index
Pro -
Index
Urban/Rural (Metro)
City .049 .075 * . 116 * * -.036 -.017 -.017 . 176 * * -.022
Rural . 146 * * . 179 * * -.009 .038 .081A .066 .046 .074
Gender (Female)
Male -.015 - .068 * - .047A -.016 -.041 -.030 - .050A -.036
Age (Over 50)
20s .026 -.049 - . 123 * * .051 .010 -.062 -.061 -.002
30s -.022 - .077 * - . 180 * * -.010 -.048 - .090 * - . 118 * * -.058
40s - .062A - .057A - .070 * - ,058A -.051 - .075 * - .075 * - .069 *
Religion (None/Others)
Buddhist .002 .013 .001 .031 .025 -.015 .008 .012
Protestant .037 .048A .005 .052A .047 .031 .033 .053A
Catholic -.003 .001 .006 .009 .023 .041 .004 .031
Education (Primary)
Middle School -.018 .010 -.041 -.001 -.024 .008 -.026 -.006
High School -.016 -.043 -.065 . 103 * .043 .069 -.057 .080
University - .080A -.041 -.069 .009 -.014 -.009 - .083A -.005
Job (Self-employed)
Farmer .017 .054 . 106 * - ,083A - . 150 * * - .081A .074 - . 117 *
Manual Worker .065A . 125 * * . 107 * * -.025 -.040 -.021 . 125 * * -.036
Routine Non-manual . 127 * * .089 * * .054 .005 -.026 .027 . 112 * * -.002
Manager/Prof .091 * * .053A .069 * -.025 .001 .046 .088 * * .007
Income (Under 500,000)
500 - 990,000 .085 * .057 .055 .039 -.006 -.038 .078A -.005
1 ,0 0 0 -1 ,4 9 0 ,0 0 0 . 125 * * .047 .072 .084A .066 -.006 . 101 * .049
Over 1,500,000 . 117 * * .092 * .056 .078A .028 -.024 . 108 * .027
Housing (Owner)
Long-term Lease -.014 -.030 .020 .046 .026 .024 -.011 .035
Monthly Rent -.034 .031 .047A .029 .028 -.001 .025 .023
Region of Origin
(Seoul/Kyonggi)
Kang won .052 . 101 * * .022 .027 .004 - .058A .071 * -.013
Ch’ungch'ong .030 .045 .056 -.020 - .074A -.015 .057 -.046
Cholla -.046 .002 -.011 -.038 -.066 -.053 -.023 -.067
Kyongbuk .002 .067 .062 -.011 - .076A .005 .053 -.034
Kyongnam -.029 .069 .034 .001 -.039 .023 .038 -.012
The Others .001 -.018 .003 -.004 - .065 * - .059A -.004 -.055*
Residential Region(Seoul)
Kyonggi -.061 - .078 * -.039 .014 .055 .023 - .074A .033
Kangwon - . 116 * * - . 178 * * .029 -.012 .002 .095 * * - . 108 * * .030
Ch’ungch'ong - . 112 * * - .091 * -.018 -.044 .004 - .0 0 1 - .088 * -.014
Cholla - .074A - . 140 * * -.011 -.038 - .090 * - .092 * - .087 * - .087 *
Kyongbuk - . 105 * * - . 180 * * -.018 -.006 ,070A .038 - . 129 * * .039
Kyongnam - . 168 * * - .2 80 * * - . 169 * * .008 .095 * .061 - .260 * * .070A
R-squared .072 .097 .110 .068 .067 .058 .099 .065
Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test.
Dependent Variable Coding: Retro-house, Pro-house, Retro-region, Pro-region, Retro-nation, 
and Pro-nation (1=far better, 0.25=somewhat better, 0.5=about the same, 0.75=somewhat 
worse, 0=far worse): Retro-index ( [Retro-house+Retro-region+Retro-nation]/3); Pro-index 
( [Pro-house+Pro-region+Pro-nation]/3).
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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On the prospective evaluations, there are only a few significant variables. 
First, of all the occupational groups, farmers projected the future economic 
situation as the most gloomy. Second, higher income earners were more positive 
in their evaluation of the future economic situation (though only for their 
households) than their lower income counterparts. Third, the age cohort of over 
50 were also more positive in evaluating the future economy than the others, 
especially at the national level. Finally, Cholla residents postulated the future 
economy of their region and the nation as being bleaker than the others, whereas 
the Kyongnam and Kyongbuk residents foresaw brighter futures for their regional 
economies. Kangwon residents were the most positive in their future economic 
evaluations for the nation.
From the above analysis, a few points need to be emphasised. First, 
Kyongnam residents showed an interesting pattem in their evaluation of the 
economic situation. They were the least positive in their retrospective evaluation, 
but the most positive in prospect. It seems likely that the electoral victory of Kim 
Young-sam, who had a regional attachment with Kyongnam, contributed to the 
switch over economic evaluation on the part of the Kyongnam residents. The 
most negative evaluation of the prospective economy made by Cholla residents 
can also be explained as such: they might have no reasons to convert their bleaker 
views on the economy into a brighter one, given the defeat of Kim Dae-jung, 
their regional favourite. Second, the effects of income, which seems naturally to
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be related with economic evaluation, operated mostly at the micro-level, 
especially at the level of the individual’s household. Third, among the 
occupational groups, the self-employed were the most negative in their 
retrospective evaluations, but farmers were the most negative in their prospective 
evaluations. Finally, the different economic evaluations among the age cohorts 
were more operative toward the larger levels of the nation or the region.
The next step taken here is to examine the relationships amongst the set of 
six economic evaluation variables. A correlation matrix is reported in Table 6-9, 
together with correlations with voting choice in the 1992 presidential election. A 
clear pattem of relationships amongst the variables emerges from the table: 
overall, the retrospective items clustered together, whereas those items of the 
future tied together in another set. The correlation among the prospective items 
showed higher associations than those of the retrospective. There was also a 
modest but significant linkage between past evaluation on a particular level and 
future expectations on that same level (see the correlation scores in bold in the 
table). The voters views on the economy are, in short, oriented broadly to the 
past and toward the future with some linkages between them.
There also appeared another interesting pattem of relationships between the 
levels of evaluations. Both in the retrospective and prospective clusters, the 
association of the household evaluations with the regional evaluations is higher in 
its degree than that with the national ones, and the association of the national
evaluations with the regional evaluations is stronger than that with the household 
ones. This suggests that the voters’ evaluations of the regional economy may 
have played a central role in the economic judgments concerned by linking both 
the more immediate economic concerns and the more remote ones together.
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Table 6-9. Correlations among the Economic Perception Variables, and Voting Choice in 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Retrospective
(1) Household
(2) Region
(3) Country 
Prospective
(4) Household
(5) Region
(6) Country
.533**
.381**
.272**
.182**
.162**
.551**
.197**
.255**
.185**
.112**
.162
.227**
.625**
.551** .736**
Voting Choice 
Kim Young-sam .011 .078** .068* .116** .205** .243**
Kim Dae-jung -.030 -.033 -.008 -.106** -.164** -.192**
Chung Ju-young .028 -.069* -.080** -.043 -.099** -.102**
Note: ** - p < .01; and * - p <.05 in a two-tailed test.
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
Now let us examine the voting effects of economic perceptions, shown in 
the bottom lines of Table 6-9 by means of simple correlation. (See the final 
section of this chapter for a multivariate assessment of the effects.) Overall, there 
appears to be a stronger association between voting behaviour and prospective 
evaluations than retrospective ones, and evaluations at the national and the 
regional rather than the household level are more associated with voting 
behaviour. As could be expected, positive evaluations are associated with the
Kim Young-sam vote, and negative judgments are related to the Kim Dae-jung 
and Chung Ju-young vote. There is no association between the Kim Dae-jung 
vote and the retrospective evaluations at any of the levels, however. Korean 
voters in 1992 seemed to have relied more on future forecasts, which showed a 
highly optimistic pattern of distribution, than judgments of the past as a guide in 
making their vote choices, and these choices were guided more by collective 
concerns than personal concerns. The latter aspect is largely consistent with the 
findings of studies of Western democracies, that is, personal economic 
circumstances seldom guide the voting choice of an individual,16 but Korean 
voters seem to be guided more by prospective evaluations than their Western 
counterparts, who may give relatively equal weight to retrospective and 
prospective evaluations.17
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Table 6-10 further tests the process of the formation of prospective 
evaluations, which showed a stronger association with vote, in a causal sequence 
model. We anticipate, first, that retrospective evaluations of economic conditions
16 The studies on economic voting are nearly unanimous in this regard: see, for example, Kinder 
and Kiewiet, op.cit., 1979; Lewis-Beck, Michael S„ “Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy,’’ American Journal of Political Science, 30(2), 1986, pp. 315-346; 
Marcus, Gregory B., “The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the 
Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science, 
32(1), 1988, pp. 137-154; and Kinder, Donald R., Adams, Gordon S., and Gronke, Paul W., 
“Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election,” American Journal of 
Political Science, 33(2), 1989, pp. 491-515; but also see, for a study posing some reservations 
on confirmation of the sociotropic economic voting, Gopoian, J. David, and Yantek, Thom, 
“Cross-pressured Economic Voting in America: The 1984 Election,” Political Behaviour, 10(1), 
1988, pp. 37-52.
17 See Lewis-beck, Michael S., “Economics and The American Voter: Past, Present, Future,” 
Political Behaviour 10(1), 1988, pp. 5-21; and Conover, Pamela Johnston, Feldman, Stanley, 
and Knight, Kathleen, “The Personal and Political Underpinnings of Economic Forecasts,” 
American Journal of Political Science, 31(3), 1987, pp. 559-583.
may have some effect on prospective judgments. Second, individuals’ political 
attitudes and their partisan orientations are also expected to have some effects on 
prospective evaluations in such a way that they may bias the process of making 
prospective judgments. 18 The index variables of economic evaluations are used, 
as the items were highly correlated within the set of the same time frame. Socio­
economic background variables, which may influence both retrospective and 
prospective evaluations, are also controlled. No causal assumptions are made 
between political variables and retrospective evaluations.
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Table 6-10. The Prospective Economic Evaluations: Economy or Politics? 
(Betas: Controlling for Social Background)
(Note: The variables not significant are not listed.)
(1) (2) (3)
Retrospective Economy Index .310** - .297**
Issue Attitude Index . . -.112** -.095**
Partisan Orientations — .139** .123**
Ideology — .061* .055*
R e g io n a l/S o c io -e c o n o m ic  In te re s ts
Origin the Others -.054A -.058A -.056A
Kangwon Residency .064A .033 .064A
Kyongbuk Residency .079A .040 .078A
Kyongnam Residency .150** .067 .144**
Education High-school .098* .088A .104*
Job Farmer -.140** -.121* -.142**
Job Manual Worker -.074* -.039 -.075*
House Long-term Lease .039 .048 .049A
R-squared .151 .096 .175
Note: Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. (1) - With controls of the 
retrospective economy index; (2) - With controls of Issue Attitude Index, Partisan Orientations, 
and Ideology; (3) - With controls of (1) plus (2).
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
18 See Conover, Feldman and Knight, op.cit., 1987.
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The first model controls for the retrospective index variable in addition to 
socio-economic background, and the second model controls for political 
variables. In the final model, the effects of retrospective and political factors 
upon prospective evaluations are considered. The final model indicates, first of 
all, that retrospective evaluations exert the strongest influence on prospective 
economic judgment, nearly two and half times stronger than that of partisan 
orientations. Those who judged past economic situations to be gloomy were also 
more likely to foresee future economic situations as such. The voters’ political 
tendencies are also likely to have an impact on judgments of future economic 
conditions. For example, governing party identifiers were more likely to foresee 
a brighter future, and those who had more liberal views on the issues of 
demonstrations, teacher’s union, US army withdrawal and North Korean contact 
were more critical in making their judgments on the future economy. Those who 
assigned themselves as progressive were slightly more likely to view the future 
economy positively. In short, the data in the table show that the economic 
predictions of the voters (which is likely to be a more complex process than that 
attempted here), were largely dependent upon their retrospective judgments, but 
their predictions were also somewhat influenced by their political tendencies and 
socio-economic backgrounds that thus biased their judgments in a certain
direction.
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4. Candidate Evaluations
Most studies of Korean voting behaviour have almost unanimously found 
that candidate qualities are the factor which is most considered by voters when 
they decide for whom to vote, not only in presidential elections but also in 
national assembly elections.19 As shown in Table 6-1, the voters in the 1992 
presidential election were no exceptions. These results, however, convey only a 
limited amount of information about the way in which the concerns regarding the 
qualities of the candidates crystallise and manifest themselves in voting 
decisions. It is one thing to know that the voters’ perception of candidate 
qualities becomes an important cue in voting, but it is a quite another matter to 
ascertain the manner in which this cue takes a particular direction. This section 
explores the process whereby the voters perceive candidate qualities by 
examining, first, the distribution of the perceptions of candidate qualities over 
some immediate political issues, and second by pondering the factors that 
influence these perceptions. The effects of candidate perceptions will be 
explicitly assessed in the following section.
19 See, for a review of the sample survey results, Cho, Ki-suk, “Habrijok Yukwonja Model-gwa 
Han’ guk-ui Son’go (A Model of Rational Voters and Korean Elections),” in Lee, Nam-young 
(ed.), Han’guk-ui Son’go (Elections in Korea), /, Seoul: Nanam, 1993. According to a 
comparable study by Chung, Chul-soo, voters made about 10 per cent more candidate-oriented 
choices in presidential elections than in national assembly elections, although candidate-oriented 
choices were the most scored in both cases. See Chung Chul-soo, “T’up’yohaengdong-ui 
Sahoeshimrijok Yon’gu (A Socio-psychological Study of Voting),” Mulli Nonch’ong, Vol.l, 
1973, pp. 15-43, at p. 21.
Table 6-11 reports data on the respondents’ assessments of the presidential 
candidates in 1992. The respondents were asked to designate a candidate who 
would be the most capable of dealing with seven selected problems. The table, 
thus, basically measures the candidates’ comparative images as perceived by the 
public, involving an assessment of the relative merits of the alternative 
candidates.
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Table 6-11. Assessments of the Presidential Candidates on Each of the Issue Items: 
Row Percentages
Kim Young- 
sam
Kim Dae- 
iung
Chung
Ju-young
The
Others
None of 
Them
Total
(N)
Social Stability 62.5 22.6 3.8 7.6 3.6 100%
(1309)
Political Democracy 39.6 36.5 1.9 19.0 3.1 100%
(1277)
Economic Growth 31.4 24.6 36.3 4.3 3.4 100%
(1259)
National Unification 29.5 36.3 17.9 6.7 9.6 100%
(1123)
Dissolving the Regional 
Disparities
29.2 32.4 12.3 18.7 7.4 100%
(1198)
Clearing up the 
Corruption
28.6 33.1 4.0 26.1 8.2 100%
(1179)
Bridging Gap between 
the wealthy and poor
22.4 38.4 17.4 13.5 8.4 100%
(1203)
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
Let us examine the distribution of the responses in detail. Kim Young-sam 
achieved an outstanding score on the issue of maintaining social stability, and 
scored first on the political democratisation issue, which scores were closely 
followed by those of Kim Dae-jung. On the items other than these two, Kim
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Young-sam scored the second. Kim Dae-jung scored the best on the items of 
wealth redistribution, national unification, clearing-up corruption and mitigating 
regional disparities, on which issues Kim Young-sam scored second with a small 
(about 3 to 7 per cent) gap. Chung Ju-young scored highest on the economic 
growth issue, which score was closely followed by Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Dae-jung in due sequence. Chung Ju-young was also positively evaluated on the 
items of national unification and wealth redistribution in which he scored third. 
The other minor candidates also scored well on the items of clearing-up 
corruption, political democratisation and mitigating regional disparities, on which 
Chung Ju-young’s scores were dismal. It is also noteworthy that there were 7 to 
10 per cent of respondents who said none of the candidates would be capable of 
dealing with such issues as national unification, wealth redistribution, clearing-up 
corruption and mitigating regional disparities, on which issues Kim Dae-jung 
scored first.
The above analysis suggests that the three main candidates may have 
occupied relatively distinct issue spaces, though with some overlap. The general 
picture that emerges regarding the candidate images perceived by the voters is 
that Kim Young-sam was accredited for his potential for maintaining stability as 
a ruling party candidate, with additional credits for his past career as a 
democratic opposition leader; Kim Dae-jung had the more credentials on the 
issues of delivering social justice and his potential for dealing with the 
unification issue; and Chung Ju-young had most credentials in his capacity to
- 212-
handle the economy. Chung Ju-young, as a new participant in politics, was quite 
successful in occupying his own issue space, but his success was rather limited to 
the economic issue; that is, the voters were rather hesitant to render him credits 
for his unproved areas. As noted, however, the candidate images viewed on these 
issue spaces are relative rather than absolute in their magnitudes.
The next step is to examine the processes whereby voters assess the 
qualities of the candidates. The main thrust of the following analysis is to test 
whether there are systematic biases in the voters’ assessments of the candidates, 
which seemed to have been good predictors of the vote, and to further test the 
relative impacts of such influences that incline the voters to a certain direction in 
the formation of candidate perceptions. The effects of voters’ socio-economic 
backgrounds, political tendencies and economic evaluations are estimated on an 
index of the candidates’ perceptions. Three models of OLS regression 
coefficients are employed to provide estimates of the three index variables, which 
measure the voters’ propensities towards their perceptions of the three main 
candidates.20 At Table 6-12, the regression coefficients of statistical significance 
are reported.
20 Each of the biasedness or propensity index variables has a maximum of 7 points: the 
respondents who were the most committed to a particular candidate - i.e., those who chose the 
candidate all of the seven items - get scores of 1, while those who were the least committed get 
scores of 0. Then the scores were divided by 7, so that the index ranged from 0 to 1.
Table 6-12. Impact of Ideology, Partisan Orientations, Issue Standings, and Economic 
Evaluations on Candidate Evaluations: Controlling for Social Background
( Note: The coefficients not significant across the models are not listed.)
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Index of YS Index of DJ Index of JY
b beta b beta b beta
Self-assigned Ideology .070* .050 .077* .051 -.030 -.040
Partisan Orientations 2 2 8 * * .279 -.165** .186 -.006 -.014
Issue Attitude Index -.161** -.139 .098** .078 -.042* -.066
R e tro sp e c tiv e  E c o n o m y  In d e x .038 .024 -.007 -.004 -.059* -.068
P ro s p e c tiv e  E c o n o m y  In d e x .271** .136 -.153** -.071 -.060A -.055
Region of Origin
(Seoul/Kyonggi)
Kangwon -.031 -.023 -.069A -.047 .052A .070
Ch’ungch’ong .068* .080 -.012 -.013 -.006 -.013
Cholla -.078* -.101 .311** .373 -.056** -.134
Kyongbuk .089* .102 -.046 -.049 -.020 -.041
Kyongnam .069A .073 -.027 -.026 -.015 -.030
Other .053 .032 -.025 -.014 .012 .013
R e s id e n tia l R e g io n (S e o u l)
Kyonggi -.026 -.031 -.014 -.016 -.022 -.048
Kangwon .006 .003 -.041 -.022 -.057A -.061
Ch’ungch’ong .053 .047 -.018 -.015 .015 .024
Cholla -.050 -.050 .184** .170 -.049* -.089
Kyongbuk -.086* -.083 -.028 -.025 -.030 -.054
Kyongnam .109** .123 -.062A -.065 -.071** -.146
Age (Over 50)
20s -.124** -.173 .048A .061 .068** .173
30s -.061* -.082 .034 .042 .031A .077
40s -.024 -.027 .016 .016 .005 .010
Education (Primary)
Middle School .063* .071 .015 .016 .034A .069
High School .036 .053 .011 .015 .069** .188
University .053 .064 .004 .004 .048* .108
Religion (None/Others)
Buddhist .002 .002 -.022 -.028 .025* .063
Protestant .020 .024 -.003 -.003 .010 .022
Catholic .036 .025 .040 .026 .014 .018
Intercept .014 — .258 — .162 -
R-squared .350 .507 .146
Note: ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. Dependent Variable Coding: YS 
(1 for the most and 0 for the least committed of Kim Young-sam in a 7 interval scale); DJ (1 for 
the most and 0 for the least committed of Kim Dae-jung); JY (1 for the most and 0 for the least 
committed of Chung Ju-young)
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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Let us begin by examining the patterns of the coefficients of the political 
and economic variables. First, those who assigned themselves as progressive on 
the ideological dimension were more likely to evaluate both Kim Young-sam and 
Kim Dae-jung positively, but not Chung Ju-young, net of other things on the list. 
Second, the governing party identifiers were more likely to evaluate Kim Young- 
sam positively and less likely to evaluate Kim Dae-jung than the opposition 
identifiers, but were indifferent towards Chung Ju-young, after taking into 
account other effects. Third, those who exhibited more liberal stances on the 
issues of demonstrations, the teachers’ union, US army withdrawal and North 
Korean contact were less likely to have positive evaluations of Kim Young-sam 
(and Chung Ju-young), but more likely to evaluate Kim Dae-jung positively, 
independent of other things. Fourth, those who forecast the economic situation 
more positively were more likely to be favourable in the evaluations of Kim 
Young-sam, but less likely for the other two candidates. Finally, when the other 
factors on the list were considered, the respondents’ past economic evaluations 
were not likely to have an impact on candidate evaluations, except for the 
evaluation of Chung Ju-young.
Some of the social background variables also appeared to be significant 
regarding candidate evaluations, after taking into account all of the other effects. 
First, those who had regional ties - i.e., either family origin or residential - with 
Cholla were more likely to have a positive evaluation of Kim Dae-jung, but were
less likely to be positively inclined towards the other two. The respondents 
whose origin was Kyongsang (that is, Kyongbuk and Kyongnam) and 
Ch’ungch’ong were more likely to evaluate Kim Young-sam positively. Similar 
patterns emerged for the Kyongnam residents, who also evaluated Kim Young- 
sam more positively, but responded negatively towards the other two candidates. 
The Kyongbuk residents were not favourable towards Kim Young-sam, indeed, 
less favourable than the other two; and the Kangwon residents were also not 
favourable to Chung Ju-young who was most favoured by the Kangwon origins . 21 
In short, each of the candidates was the most favoured by those who shared the 
same regional background; and those who also showed less propensity towards a 
positive evaluation of the other. Second, age also differentiated the evaluations 
of the candidates. The younger were less likely to have a positive evaluation of 
Kim Young-sam, but more likely to be positive towards the other two candidates. 
Finally, religion and education also had a small but significant impact: Buddhists 
were more likely to have a positive evaluation of Chung Ju-young; and those who 
had only primary education were less likely to have a positive evaluation of him 
(this being the case also with Kim Young-sam to a lesser degree).
In short, the data in the table revealed that the voters were inclined to use 
their shared social and political perspectives with a candidate when they made 
judgments on the merits of the alternative candidates. It is not so surprising that 
the voters resorted to the use of “stereotype-related criteria as a heuristic,” as
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21 It seems to be quite odd that there were discrepancies in the estimations between the same pair 
of regional attributes. No firm explanations, however, can be provided here.
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Riggle et al. noted, in making such cognitively demanding judgments.22 The 
process of making the judgments may have, however, differed considerably 
depending on which criterion was in use. Social traits, especially those related to 
regional attributes, were used most for the evaluation of Kim Dae-jung; and 
political tendencies, especially that of partisan orientation, issue standing and 
age, including prospective economic judgments, were more salient for the 
evaluation of Kim Young-sam. For the evaluation of Chung Ju-young, there was 
far more to be explained than could be explained by the variables employed here.
5. Candidate, Economic, and Partisan Effects on Voting:
On the Meaning of the 1992 Presidential Election
In the earlier sections in this chapter, we have discussed the meaning of 
various determinants of individual voting choice. This section attempts to 
overview the relative importance of such determinants in bringing about voting 
choices in the 1992 presidential election. In doing so, a causal sequence is 
specified among the groups of determinants. Social background is assumed to be 
prior to political tendencies; political tendencies are prior to economic 
evaluations; and economic evaluations are prior to candidate perceptions in a
22 See Riggle, Ellen D., Ottati, Victor C., Wyer, Robert S., Kuklinski, James, and Schwarz, 
Norbert, “Bases of Political Judgments: The Role of Stereotypic and Nonstereotypic 
Information,’’ Political Behavior, 14(1), 1992, pp. 67-87.
causal funnel leading toward voting choice. The effects of these determinants are 
decomposed into direct and indirect components by applying four successive 
“reduced-form” OLS regression models on the three main candidate choices.23 
The direct effect of a variable is given by its coefficient in the final model, 
indirect components of effects are given by differences between coefficients of a 
variable in the two models, and the total effect of a variable is its coefficient in 
the model in which it first appears. The results are summarised in Tables 6-13 to 
6-15 in terms of standardised (beta) coefficients.24
Let us examine the tables in turn. At Table 6-13, the various effects of 
candidate perceptions, economic evaluations, political tendencies and socio- 
ecDnomic backgrounds on the Kim Young-sam vote are reported. The column of 
direct effects shows the relative importance of the determinants on the vote after 
taking into account the effects of the others on the list. Not surprisingly, the 
candidate perception variables, especially those of Kim Young-sam, exerted the 
strongest impact of all, and the partisan orientation variable provided the second 
strongest impact. Attitudes towards issues and prospective economic evaluations 
also had some independent impact. Among the social background variables, 
mignitudes of the effects of which were drastically reduced by the addition of 
atutudinal and candidate evaluation variables, age and regional attributes
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23 See, for a methodological discussion, Alwin, Duane F., and Hauser, Robert M , “The 
De:omposition of Effects in Path Analysis,” American Sociological Review, 40,1975, pp. 37- 
47
24 Tie logit estimates for the final models are not reported here, because they are almost identical 
to hose in Table 5-8.
remained significant in exerting effects on the vote. Again, relating to social 
background proper, those who lived in long-term leased houses were less likely 
to have voted for Kim Young-sam.
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Table 6-13. The Effect of Candidates, Economics, Political Tendencies, and Socio-economic 
Interests on Kim Young-sam Vote in 1992 (Betas):
A Decomposition of Causal Effects from the Four-step Structural Models
(Note: The socio-economic variables not significant in the first-step are not listed.)
Direct Indirect Effects via Total Zero-order
rbeta (1) (2) (3) beta
(1) Candidate Effects
Favourite, YS .300** .300** .634**
Favourite, DJ -.137** - - - -.137** -.501**
Favourite, JY -.184** - -.184** -.220**
(2) Economic Voting
Prospective .074** .061 - - .135** .228**
Retrospective n.s. n.s. — — n.s. .065A
(3) Political Tendencies
Issue Attitude Index -.078** .040 .015 - -.133** -.400**
Partisan Orientations .214** .112 .018 - .344** .553**
Ideology n.s. n.s. n.s. -- n.s. -.068A
Regional Interests
Origin Cholla -.071* .056 .004 .102 -.233** -.412**
Origin Kyongbuk .082* .045 -.007 .023 .143** .188**
Origin Kyongnam .046 .032 -.005 .045 .118** .262**
Cholla Residency -.081** .022 .008 .038 -.149** -.315**
Kyongnam Residency .075* .073 .009 .004 .161** .291**
Socialisation
Age 20s -.120** .092 -.008 .101 -.305** -.214**
Age 30s -.080** .044 .002 .075 -.201** -.071*
Age 40s -.033 .013 .009 .007 -.062* .094**
Male -.029 .004 .003 .040 -.076** -.098**
University Education -.027 .001 -.003 .060 -.085A -.114**
Religion Protestant .027 .004 .005 .019 .055* .002
Socio-economic Interests
Job Professional/Manger .025 .008 -.001 .031 .063* .079*
House Long-term Lease -.061** .014 -.006 .028 -.097** -.143**
Note: (1) ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. 
(2) The R-squared for the final model is .615.
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
- 219-
A comparison between the total and the direct effects reveals that there 
were notable reductions of strength of variables by the introduction of additional 
controls. The columns of indirect effects display how these differences are 
distributed to the groups of variables. First, about one third of the total effects of 
economic and political tendency variables on the Kim Young-sam vote were 
mediated via candidate evaluations. Second, there was little evidence of the 
indirect effects of political tendencies and socio-economic interests that were 
mediated by economic evaluations. Third, of the indirect effects of social 
background variables - regional attributes, socialisation and socio-economic 
interests variables alike - there appeared a general indication that the indirect 
effects were the more mediated by the political tendency variables than candidate 
evaluations, although a substantial portion of them was also moderated by 
candidate evaluations. Notable exceptions were found in those cases where the 
variables were Kyongbuk origin and Kyongnam residency, where the indirect 
effects were more mediated by candidate evaluations.
Table 6-14 and 6-15, which report the decomposition effects of the 
determinants on the votes of Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young, respectively, 
also show a similar pattern to that of Kim Young-sam, in that candidate 
evaluations predominated in making voting decisions. One notable exception, 
with regard to their direct effects, is that the prospective economic evaluation 
variable appeared insignificant for Kim Dae-jung but significant for Chung Ju-
young. It is also noteworthy that more regional attribute variables appeared to be 
significant for Kim Dae-jung, and far less social background variables were listed 
as significant in the case o f Chung Ju-young. The total variance explained by the 
determinants was far smaller for Chung Ju-young.
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Table 6-14. The Effect of Candidates, Economics, Political Tendencies, and Socio-economic 
Interests on Kim Dae-jung Vote in 1992 (Betas):
A Decomposition of Causal Effects from the Four-step Structural Models
(Note: The socio-economic variables not significant in the first-step are not listed.)
Direct Indirect Effects via Total Zero-order
rbeta (1) (2) (3) beta
(1) Candidate Effects
Favourite, DJ .417** .417** .785**
Favourite, YS -.137** - - - -.137** -.503**
Favourite, JY -.134** — - - -.134** -.238**
(2) Economic Voting
Prospective -.014 .041 - — -.055* -.182**
Retrospective n.s. n.s. — — n.s. -.025
(3) Political Tendencies
Issue Attitude Index .050** .060 .006 - .116** .338**
Partisan Orientations -.118** .115 .006 -- -.239** -.516**
Ideology n.s. n.s. n.s. - n.s. .084*
Regional Interests
Origin Kangwon -.038A .026 -.002 .008 -.070* -.121**
Origin Cholla .170** .187 .002 .080 .439** .666**
Origin Kyongbuk -.075** .029 -.004 .011 -.111** -.226**
Origin Kyongnam -.051A .017 -.002 .032 -.098** -.235**
Kyonggi Residency -.067** .004 .003 .011 -.087** -.067*
Kangwon Residency -.042* .002 .003 .003 -.050A -.101**
Ch’ungch’ong Residency -.016 .017 .000 .027 -.060* -.093**
Cholla Residency .049* .090 .002 .023 .164** .529**
Kyongnam Residency -.076** .024 .008 .002 -.110** -.222**
Socialisation
Male -.008 .012 .001 .035 .040A .034
Age 20s .019 .026 -.004 .084 .125** .074*
Age 30s -.004 .019 -.001 .061 .075* -.010
Religion Buddhist -.009 .020 .000 .017 -.046A -.172**
Socio-economic Interests
Job Professional/Manger -.016 .016 -.002 .021 -.052* -.100**
Job Farmer .027 .030 .008 .001 .066A .016
House Long-term Lease .071** .009 -.003 .023 .100** .079*
Note: (1) ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. 
(2) The R-squared in the final model is .731.
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
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Table 6-15. The Effect of Candidates, Economics, Political Tendencies, and Socio-economic 
Interests on Chung Ju-young Vote in 1992 (Betas):
A Decomposition of Causal Effects from the Four-step Structural Models
(Note: The socio-economic variables not significant in the first-step are not listed.)
Direct Indirect Effects via Total Zero-order
rbeta (1 ) (2) (3) beta
(1) Candidate Effects
Favourite, JY .558** .558** .622**
Favourite, YS -.080** - - - -.080** -.133**
Favourite, DJ -.108** — - - -.108** . 227**
(2) Economic Voting
Prospective -.092** .033 - - -.125** -.100**
Retrospective n.s. n.s. - - n.s. -.053
(3) Political Tendencies
Issue Attitude Index n.s. n.s. n.s. - n.s. .017
Partisan Orientations -.056* .010 .019 - -.085* -.018
Ideology n.s. n.s. n.s. - n.s. -.022
Regional Interests
Origin Kangwon .026 .045 .001 -.003 .069A .117**
Origin Cholla -.095 .107 -.004 -.016 -.182** -.216**
Kyonggi Residency .161** -.022 -.001 -.005 .133** .177**
Kyongnam Residency .006 .085 .000 .001 -.080A -.104**
Socialisation
Age 20s -.006 .103 -.005 .008 .100* .049
Age 30s .069* .044 .006 .007 .126** .124**
Education High-school .008 .090 .000 .007 .105* .128**
Religion Buddhist .063** .038 .000 -.003 .098** .056
Socio-economic Interests
House Monthly-rent -.033 I .020 .004 -.001 -.056A -.036
Note: (1) ** - p < .01; * - p <.05; and A - p <.10 in a two-tailed test. 
(2) The R-squared in the final model is .463.
Source: The 1992 Post-election Survey.
There also emerged a few notable exceptions in the patterns of the indirect 
effect of social background. Both for Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young, the 
indirect effects of regional attributes tended to be more mediated by candidate 
evaluations than political tendencies, unlike in the case of Kim Young-sam. By 
contrast, socialisation variables showed quite a similar pattern to those of Kim 
Young-sam in that they were the more mediated by political tendencies than was 
the case of candidate evaluations regarding Kim Dae-jung. In the case of Chung 
Ju-young, however, these were far more likely to be mediated by candidate
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evaluations. These patterns indicate that the choice of Chung Ju-young was the 
most likely to be based on the personality factor, the choice of Kim Young-sam 
was the least likely to be thus based, and the choice of Kim Dae-jung was in 
between them.
From the above analysis, a few conclusions can be drawn about the reasons 
why people chose to vote for a particular candidate (or conversely not to vote for 
the candidate) in the 1992 presidential election. First of all, this analysis 
confirms that personality factors are the foremost of those under consideration in 
making voting decisions. Nonetheless, it also provides evidence that the voters 
relied on various sources when they made judgments on the candidate. Not only 
their shared regional proximity with a candidate, which may have been a highly 
charged emotional factor, but also their shared political tendencies resulted in the 
voters coming to different judgments over the candidates. Second, the voters’ 
political tendencies, especially partisan orientations, had quite an impact on their 
voting decisions. The voters may have firmly developed a coherent cue of 
viewing political competitions in terms of yo or ya (party in power or out of 
power), regardless of the frequent changes in the party system, and this cue was 
used for choosing one candidate rather than the others. Indeed, the past career of 
Kim Young-sam as an opposition party leader withered away in the voters’ 
perceptions as he changed his partisan stance. Finally, it also provided evidence 
for the phenomenon of economic voting. Here, however, the voters used their 
future economic forecasts, which were inevitably more likely to be contaminated
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by their hopes and politicised guesses rather than their retrospective judgments, 
in making their voting decisions. The limited one-term presidency could have 
been a major factor that posed a structural limitation on the voters utilising 
retrospective evaluations for their choice. In addition, the governing party 
candidate, Kim Young-sam’s great efforts to distance himself from the foregoing 
Roh Tae-woo government during the election campaigns may also have imposed 
a similar limitation.
Given these results, how can we interpret the electoral victory of Kim 
Young-sam? What is significant in the victory of the opposition-tumed- 
goveming party candidate? Above all the question needs to be posed, on what 
grounds was this election, which represented a watershed event for democracy in 
Korea as it brought the first genuinely civilian-controlled government in some 30 
years, fought, and how was this election different from those of the past? If 
viewed in terms of the basis of his support, Kim Young-sam’s electoral victory 
signifies ‘continuity’ rather than ‘change.’ He won more support from those who 
were the less inclined towards change, that is, from the older, female, the less 
educated, the governing party identifiers, the ‘conservative’ issue standees, and 
from those who foresaw the future economy positively. Although these 
traditional sectors of the population were in decline in their relative size, 
however, Kim Dae-jung’s limited ability, or perhaps that of the opposition as a 
whole, to solidify the tendency of anti-government voting behind his candidacy 
may have reduced his chances of winning. The voting patterns based on
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regionalism also depict a significant ‘continuity’: that is, given Kim young-sam’s 
regional background that was similar to that of his predecessors - Kyongsang - he 
could also easily expand his regional basis of support, which was once limited to 
the southern part of it, to the northern part of the region which formerly provided 
the governing party with solid support. In this regard, he enjoyed an enormous 
advantage over the main opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung, whose regional 
basis was limited to Cholla, a regional rival of Kyongsang. Furthermore, while 
Kim Dae-jung suffered most in the other ‘neutral’ regions, except in Seoul, Kim 
Young-sam was somewhat successful in nullifying negative voting based on 
regionalism. There was also further evidence of ‘continuity’ reflected in the 
candidate evaluations, which exerted the strongest impact on voting choice: Kim 
Young-sam was perceived as far better in delivering ‘social stability,’ and 
somewhat better on the issues of ‘economic growth’ (Chung scored the first on 
this issue) and ‘political democracy,’ than was Kim Dae-jung, whereas Kim Dae- 
jung scored somewhat better on the items that represented ‘change’ - that is, 
‘unification,’ ‘regional disparity mitigation’ and ‘distribution equality,’ and 
‘corruption liquidation.’
Even though Kim Young-sam’s victory signifies ‘continuity’, the new 
president introduced several reforms which have generated great popularity since 
the inauguration of his presidency in February 1993. Various opinion polls were 
undertaken regarding his performance, and the support for his performance
reached 70 to 90 per cent after one hundred days of his presidency.25 One of the 
most important contributing factors for this high popularity was the clean-up 
campaign - that is, the disclosure of the personal assets of the president, and high 
ranking civil servants, ministers, and members of parliament, which forced many 
of them, who had unexplainable assets, to resign. More consequential reform 
measures, such as adopting the real-name financial transaction system, were later 
introduced again with wide popularity among the public. Within this context, the 
discussions, which revealed continuity rather than change in the meanings of the 
1992 presidential election, may operate only within a limited time frame. Future 
elections, and the voters’ responses to his reforms in the meantime may affect the 
extent to which voters are still inclined to favour ‘continuity’ over ‘change.’
25 See Ahn, Bu-keun, “San-i Nop’umyon Kol-i Kipta (The Higher the Mountains, the Deeper the 
Valley),” Wolgan Choson, July 1993, pp. 100-107.
PART 3. KOREAN VOTERS IN THE TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY
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Chapter 7. Democratisation, Elections, and the Voters
1. Introduction
More than four decades have passed since the first government of South 
Korea was created by a popular election in 1948. With the introduction of 
democratic institutions, which were implanted after the second World War as in 
most of the new-born nations,1 the ordinary Koreans of the southern half were 
empowered to choose who would run the country for the first time in the nation’s 
13 century old history as a single political entity.2 Until recently, however, the 
democratic experiments in Korea have failed to provide a sustained system of 
workable democracy.3 *
1 See, for a review on the process of transplanting democratic institutions during the period 1945- 
48, Oh, Byung-hun, “Trial of Liberal Democracy in Korea,” Koreana Quarterly, 9(1), 1967, pp. 
21-40; and Gordenker, Leon, “The United Nations, the United States Occupation and the 1948 
Election in Korea,” Political Science Quarterly, 73(3), 1958, pp. 426-450.
2 See, for a discussion on the historical significance of Unified Silla, whose territory and people 
formed the mainstream of subsequent Korean history, Eckert, Carter J., Lee, Ki-baik, Lew, 
Young-ick, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward W., Korea Old and New: A History, Seoul: 
fichokak, 1990, pp. 42-44. Also see Lee, Chong-uk, “Han’guk Ch’ ogigukka-ui
Chongch’ ibaljon-dan’ gye-wa Chongch’ ihyongt’ ae (Stage of Political Development of the 
Korean Early States and Their Political Forms),” in Lee, Chong-uk, Lee, Ki-baik, Shin, Ho-chol, 
Chung, Man-jo, and Yu Young-yol, Hariguksa-sang-ui Chongch9 ihyongt’ae (Political Forms in 
Korean History), Seoul: fichokak, 1993.
3 A minimal or “realistic” definition of democracy was given by Schumpeter, who said that “the
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote
(p.269),” in such a way that “the reins of government should be handed to those who command
more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams (p.273).” Dahl also defined
political democracies as a system in which public are “entitled to participate on a more or less
equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of government: to participate, so to speak, in
- 228-
The first experiment under the Rhee Syngman government (1948-60), 
which was bom with a democratic constitution, ended in failure, often marred by 
election riggings, irregularities in constitutional changes, and coercive repression 
of the opposition. The Rhee government, which became increasingly dictatorial 
by resorting to the police and its bureaucratic apparatus for its perpetuation of 
power, was at last toppled by the student uprisings in April 1960, which was 
prompted by massive-scale election fraud in March. The second experiment by 
the Chang My on government (1960-61), which adopted a parliamentary system  
of government under the Democratic Party leadership, failed in consolidating its 
liberal democracy only nine months after its inauguration as a result o f the
the system of public contestation (p.4).” In a democracy, as Przeworski put it, “no one can win 
once for all: even if successful at one time, victors immediately face the prospect for having to 
struggle in the future (p.57),” and therefore, described democratisation as “a process of 
institutionalising uncertainty (p.58).” Huntington went on to argue that “the sustained failure of 
the major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises questions concerning the 
degree of competition permitted by the system (p.8),” with his procedural definition of 
democracy, viewing “the central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through 
competitive elections by the people they govern (p.6).” See Schumpeter, Joseph A , Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy (5th ed.), London: Allen and Unwin, 1976; Dahl, Robert A , 
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; Przeworski, 
Adam, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in O’Donnell, Guillermo, 
Schmitter, Philippe C , Whitehead, Laurence (eds.), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; and Huntington, 
Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Also see , for a review of models of competitive 
democracy, Storm, Karre, “Democracy as Political Competition,” in Marks, Gary, and Diamond, 
Larry (eds.), Reexamining Democracy, Newbury Park: Sage, 1992.
See, for a historical review of Korean democratic experiments, Han, Sung-joo, “South Korea: 
Politics in Transition,” in Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J., and Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds.), 
Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989. Also see Park, 
Sang-sop, “The Failure of Liberal Democracy in Korea, 1945-79,” in Kim, Kyong-dong (ed.), 
Dependency Issues in Korean Development: Comparative Perspectives, Seoul: Seoul National 
University Press, 1987.
military coup led by Major General Park Chung-hee in May 1961.4 The military 
junta, which came to power by the coup, eventually transformed itself into a 
political machine seeking popular support and legitimacy by means of 
competitive elections. From 1963 to 1972, i.e., during the period before it 
adopted the Yus hin Constitution that abolished popular elections for the 
presidency along with several measures that strengthened presidential power,5 
Park Chung-hee and his Democratic Republican Party had been successful in 
securing three consecutive terms in office through competitive elections, albeit 
making use of the so-called “yodang (party in power) premium” such as 
mobilising administrative networks, and monopolising the absentee votes mainly 
from the army, for example. The later years of rule under Park (1972-79) soon 
deteriorated into “Korean-style democracy,” a euphemism for authoritarian 
government under the Yus hin system, and ended with the violent death of Park at 
the hand of his chief intelligence aide.
The collapse of the Park regime seemed to open a renewed chance for 
restoring democracy, but it eventually echoed the observation made by Pastor in
4 See Kim, Se-jin, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1971. Also see Han, Sung-joo, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
5 Under the Yushin (revitalising reform) Constitution - which was adopted in a national 
referendum allegedly to promote national unification and effective socioeconomic development in 
the changing international situation - the president, for example, was to be indirectly elected by an 
easily manipulable electoral college, without restrictions on the presidential terms - the fixed-term 
presidency used have been a major legal obstacle in prolonging one-man rule, and thus become a 
main cause for constitutional amendments - and to appoint one-third of the National Assembly 
members. See Kim, Ki-bom, “Revisions of the Korean Constitution (II),” Korea Journal, 14(8), 
1974, pp. 18-25. Also see, for a discussion on regime characteristics of the Yushin system, Lee, 
Kang-ro, “Bureaucratic-Mobilisation Regime: The Yushin System in South Korea, 1972-1979,” 
Asian Perspective, 14(2), 1990, pp. 195-230.
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the Latin American context: “People then were mistaken in equating the fall of 
tyrants with the rise of democracy. They were separate events, and the second 
did not always follow from the first.”6 The new military junta led by Major 
General Chun Doo-hwan staged a “coup-like incident” in December 1979 in the 
course of the investigation of Park’s assassination, and Chun briskly ascended to 
the presidency in August 1980 through the rubber stamp electoral college set up 
under the Yus hin system, purging all the established politicians and banning all 
the parties of the past, forcing dismissal of the interim government under then 
President Choi Kyu-hah (who had reaffirmed a new constitution and a fair 
general election) and violently suppressing civil unrest heightened by the 
Kwangju massacre.7 In February 1981, Chun reassumed his 7 year one-term 
presidency by a new electoral college set up under the new constitution, and his 
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) secured a simple majority in the National 
Assembly elections held in March that year.8
In short, since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 up until 
the early 1980s, there had been two critical moments of regime transition toward 
competitive democracy. That is, during the period of authoritarianism, there 
were two instances of regime collapse: one followed the student uprising in 1960, 
and the other the sudden death of Park Chung-hee in 1979. Both chances were,
6 See Pastor, Robert A., “Introduction: The Swing of the Pendulum,’’ in his (ed.), Democracy in 
the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989, p.6.
7 See Lee, Chong-sik, “South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of A New Authoritarian Order,” 
Asian Survey, 21(1), 1981, pp. 125-143.
8 See Suh, Dae-sook, “South Korea in 1981: The First Year of the Fifth Republic,” Asian 
Survey, 22(1), 1982, pp. 107-115.
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however, nullified by the interventions of the military, which had grown rapidly 
as an indispensable institution in response to apparent external threats 
exemplified by the Korean War. There are, nonetheless, two aspects that may 
sharply differentiate the two cases of military intervention if viewed in terms of 
their processes. First, when initially staging the coups, Park eradicated a 
democratically launched government, while Chun simply took over the 
government in a power vacuum created by Park’s assassination. Second, in 
respectively projecting their rule, Park sought popular support through validation 
by electoral contests (although later Park also resorted to an indirect electoral 
method), whereas Chun made little effort in becoming a popularly elected leader 
- “even if he had,” Han Sung-joo judges, he “probably would not have 
succeeded.”9 The society of the 1980s may have been substantially different 
from that of the 1960s, given the social and economic changes that had taken 
place, and thus had difficulty accepting “the objective institutional needs” of the 
military.10
A test for the Chun government - which was scheduled to step-down by 
February 1988 at the latest - was given in the 1985 National Assembly elections, 
where the newly formed New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) consisting 
mainly of once banned opposition politicians emerged as the number one 
opposition party, attracting little fewer votes than that gained by the ruling DJP,
9 See Han, Sung-joo, op.cit., p.283.
10 See Graham, Norman A., “The Role of The Military in the Political and Economic 
Development of the Republic of Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 26(1-2), 1991, 
pp. 114-131.
in effect repudiating the established opposition parties under the early years of 
the Chun regime and challenging the regime with its phenomenal success at the 
polls.11 Soon after the new opposition led a campaign pushing for a 
constitutional revision which allowed for direct elections of the president. The 
campaign met with a deadlock in negotiating constitutional revision with the 
ruling party, which at last decided to defend the existing constitution, thus 
deviating from its initial position of preferring, if any revision had to take place, a 
parliamentary system of government. The deadlock, subsequently accompanied 
by civil unrest which reached its peak in June 1987, was finally resolved as Roh 
Tae-woo, the DJP’s presidential nominee designated by President Chun and a 
former member of the new military junta, acceded to the opposition’s demands 
for restoring popular elections of the president along with several other 
democratisation measures.12 By “convoking” direct presidential elections, the 
deadlock, which had compelled the government to a choice between violent 
repression or co-optation, was quickly resolved, and the initial process of 
democratic transition, which began with the emergence of a structured opposition 
demanding a more representative form of government, was settled into a 
‘ reforma-pactadaf in which the rules of the authoritarian regime - the rules of
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11 See Koh, B.C., “The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey, 25(9),
1985, pp. 883-897. Also see Kim, C.I. Eugene, “South Korea in 1985: An Eventful Year Amidst 
Uncertainty,” Asian Survey, 26(1), 1986, pp. 66-77.
12 See, for a discussion on the events leading up to the June 29 declaration, Lee, Man-woo, The 
Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987-1990, New York: Praeger, 1990, pp. 19- 
44. Also see Cotton, James, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” Political 
Studies, 37(2), 1989, pp. 244-259; and West, James M., and Baker, Edward J., “The 1987 
Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence,” Human 
Rights Yearbook, 1, 1988, pp. 135-177.
electoral competition in particular - were abandoned without immediately 
removing the incumbents from power. 13
With the reemergence of the electoral process at the centre stage of politics, 
the democratisation process soon moved to competition between those parties 
seeking institutionalised support. As Colomer noted, however, “electoral results 
tend to change the delimitation of the actors and formulate new relevant issues, 
so that the outcome obtained by way of interactions by agreement may then be 
more or less dramatically altered . ” 14 In the following sections, the role played by 
political cleavages - the old and the new - in the “founding” elections, and in the 
aftermath of those elections, will be discussed with particular attention to its 
implications for the party system and the future of Korean democracy.
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13 See, for an application of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s model on democratic transition to Korea, 
Im, Hyuk-baek, “Han’gug-eso-ui Minjuhwa Kwajong Punsok: Chonryak-chok Sont’aekiron-ul 
Chungshim-uro (An Analysis of the Democratisation Process in Korea: From the Perspective of 
Strategic Choice Model),” Hariguk Chongch’i Hakhoebo(Korean Political Science Review), 
24(1), 1990, pp. 51-78. Also see O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Schmitter, Philippe C , Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Linz, Juan J., ‘‘Transitions to Democracy,” The 
Washington Quarterly, 13(3), 1990, pp. 143-164; and Colomer, Josep M., ‘‘Transitions by 
Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way,” American Political Science Review, 85(4), 1991, pp. 
1283-1302.
14 See Colomer, op.cit., 1991, p.1299.
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2. Democratic Founding Elections and the Voters
The “first postauthoritarian” elections in 1987 shared some of the 
characteristics of “founding” elections suggested by O ’Donnell and Schmitten15
Founding elections are ... moments of great drama. Turnout is very high. 
Parties advocating cancellation, postponement, or abstention are swept 
aside by the civic enthusiasm that attends such moments.... Moreover, 
founding elections seem to have a sort of freezing effect upon subsequent 
political developments. Where they are followed by successive iterations of 
the electoral process, few new parties get into the game, and many minor 
ones are likely to drop out.16
The turnout in the 1987 presidential election was the highest since the 
1960s, reaching 89.2 per cent, about 10 per cent higher than that of the last 1971 
presidential election (79.8 per cent).17 Another extraordinarily high turnout, that
15 The term “first postauthoritarian elections,” used by Turner, is interchangeable with “founding 
elections.” The term “transition elections,” “the first national electoral contests which follow the 
restoration of political freedoms,” used by Bermeo is also similar to founding elections. But 
writing in the East European context, Bogdanor cautioned that “it is probably not until there have 
been at least two further free elections held under normal conditions that one will be in a position 
to make meaningful generalisations about the electoral process.” It seems more logical to expect 
more uncertainty or to emphasise the transitional nature of the elections in the regimes that 
experienced sudden collapse. See Turner, Arthur W., “Postauthoritarian Elections: Testing 
Expectations about ‘First’ Elections,” Comparative Political Studies, 26(3), 1993, pp.330-349; 
Bermeo, Nancy, “Redemocratisation and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and 
Portugal,” Comparative Politics, 19(2), 1987, pp.213-231; and Bogdanor, Vernon, “Founding 
Elections and Regime Change,” Electoral Studies, 9(4), 1990, pp.288-294.
16 O’Donnell and Schmitter, op.cit., 1986, p.62.
17 See Chungang-son’go-kwalii-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), Che 13 
Dae Taet’ongryong Son’go CK ongram (The 13th Presidential Election Proceedings), Seoul: 
Central Election Management Committee, 1987; and Taehanmin’ guk Son’go Sa (Election 
History of the Republic of Korea), Vol.l, 1973.
of the 1985 National Assembly elections (84.6 per cent) heralded that of 1987.18 
More importantly, however, the pattern in turnout deviated from those of the 
past, where the tojo-ch’on go (urban low - rural high) phenomenon had 
prevailed. For example, the Seoul voters, who had been most notorious for their 
lower turnout, abandoned this tendency, achieving a turnout of 88.1 per cent, far 
above their turnout in 1971 of 71.3 per cent.19 The voters also enthusiastically 
participated in the election campaign, which was restored after 16 years of 
suspension: for example, on some occasions, each of the three main candidates - 
Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung - attracted over a million 
people to their election rallies.20
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The grounds for electoral competition - which would result in the five-year 
one-term limited presidency by simple plurality votes - were, however, largely 
drawn from the past. That is, Roh Tae-woo of the ruling DJP was the successor 
of the Chun regime, thus representing the governing side of the past authoritarian 
regimes; Kim Young-sam of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and Kim 
Dae-jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), whose careers as freedom 
fighters went back to the era of the Park Chung-hee regime, represented the
18 See Chungang-son’ go-kwalli-wiwonhoe (Central Election Management Committee), Che 12 
Dae Kukhoeuiwon Son’go Ch’ongram (The 12th National Assembly Election Proceedings), 
Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1985.
19 The Seoul voters’ turnout was once again lower by 6.5 per cent than that of the national, 75.8 
per cent, in the 1988 National Assembly election, but in the 1992 National Assembly (the gap of 
2.7 per cent) and the 1992 presidential (the gap of 0.5 per cent) elections no such tendency clearly 
appeared.
20 See Choson-ilbo-sa (Choson Daily Newspapers Co.), Che 13 Dae Taet’ ongryong Son’go 
Charyojip (A Collection of Materials in the 13th Presidential Election), Seoul: Choson Daily 
Newspapers Co., 1988, p.25.
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forces of the opposition even though they failed to agree upon a single candidacy. 
Kim Jong-pil of the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), a former Prime 
Minister under Park, and his revitalised party of the defunct Park’s DRP (1963- 
80), joined the three-way race of Roh and the two Kims although he had little 
chance of winning since he represented the governing side from the rather remote 
past. No other parties representing new interests burgeoned in the competition, 
resulting in Roh and the three Kims polling a total of 99.8 per cent of the formal 
votes.
If there was a new factor - more precisely, a renewed one as candidates in 
the past presidential elections had also enjoyed “home region advantages” - that 
came into play, it was the regional cleavages that the political actors actively 
sought to mobilise. By mobilising their relative popularity in the regions where 
they had personal ties, the four candidates sought to secure that firm support from 
their regions that seemed critical in uplifting their chance of winning in the 
simple plurality race of the “three big and one small.” Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Young-sam, who were unable to compromise to represent the democratic 
opposition, made strong appeals to the voters in the regions where they had ties - 
that is, in Cholla (Kwangju) and South Kyongsang (Pusan), respectively - during 
the campaign, which may have been for them a strategy easier than for the other 
candidates because of their renowned political careers. For Roh Tae-woo, a son 
of North Kyongsang (Taegu), where Park Chung-hee had also been strong, a 
similar regional appeal may have posed few difficulties. The election campaign,
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thus, became increasingly regionalistic, and as the campaign became a race of 
regional appeal, Kim Jong-pil also began to solidify his regional basis in South 
Ch’ungch’ong (Taejon).
In this election, the regime successor Roh won the presidency with 36.6 per 
cent of the votes.21 Roh’s victory was, however, by no means a mandate for the 
past authoritarianism. It simply proved how hard it was for the opposition forces 
to gain political power, especially when they were badly divided. Equally, as 
Lee Man-woo put it, “there was no particular reason why the achievement of 
democracy had to be equated with the victory of one of the two Kims.“22 What 
marked this election was that the issue of regime legitimacy, which used to 
sharply divide the opposition from the government, became increasingly less of 
political significance. The apparent inheritor of the past legacy of Park and 
Chun’s authoritarian regimes, Roh Tae-woo had been successful, at least partly, 
in turning aside the thorny issue of legitimacy both by actively promoting his 
stunning concessions of the June 29 declaration on democratisation while 
maintaining the issues of political stability and continued economic growth on his 
side, and by engaging in the emotion-charged regionalistic electoral contests 
pursued by his opponents. The critical decision of the two Kims to split at the 
precise moment of optimum opportunity for victory the democratic opposition 
had enjoyed in decades may have turned their public images as freedom fighters 
into those of self-interested politicians, thus making it even harder to put the
21 See Table 1-6.
22 Lee, Man-woo, op.cit., 1990, p.52.
issue of legitimacy - perhaps the only issue where the opposition had 
overwhelming appeal - in the forefront.
Nonetheless, it was a combination of the old and the new cleavages that 
determined the individual voters’ choice and ultimately the election outcomes: 
for some (and obviously a larger portion of the voters), the regional cleavage - 
which became highly visible during the election campaign - was the most 
important grounds of their decision, while for others, judgments on the past were 
still important. As a result, Roh won his victory on the support of the older and 
the less educated segments of the voters - who could go along with the positive 
side of his past - and on his regional strongholds of North Kyongsang; Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung shared the votes of the younger and the more 
educated segments, 23 who had long been societal bases of the opposition, on top 
of the votes of their respective regional strongholds; and the support of Kim 
Jong-pil was largely limited to his regional strongholds. The role played by the 
regional cleavage in this democratic “founding” election was thus certainly far- 
reaching, in that each of the candidates clearly dominated over the others, rather 
than enjoying only relative advantages, in their respective regional strongholds.
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23 Looking at from the bivariate level associations o f socio-economic characteristics and voting, it 
seemed as if Kim young-sam, rather than Kim Dae-jung who had drawn his support the most 
heavily from the Cholla voters, neatly counter-balanced the societal support o f Roh Tae-woo.
But once the effects o f regional voting were taken into account, the two Kims shared a similar 
pattem o f societal support. See Chapter 4 o f this account
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3. Aftermath of the Founding Elections: The Voters and Political Actors
The outcome of the 1988 National Assembly election, held a few months 
after the 1987 presidential election, on the basis of the first-past-the-post 
electoral system for the 224 contested seats was a virtual replication of that of 
1 9 8 7  24 The turnout was, however, far lower, amounting to 75.8 per cent. 
Moreover, the forces of regional cleavage “spilled-over” into this election, 
expanding to an even greater scale. This was particularly so for the PPD: all of 
its members in Cholla (North and South) and Kwangju - a special city in the 
Cholla region - were elected, but in all other regions none of its members were 
elected, and even its share of the votes was decimated, except in Seoul, where it 
was the strongest of all, and in Kyonggi, where only one of its members was 
elected. In this regard, the other parties fared much the same, winning roughly
80 per cent of the seats in their respective regional strongholds. This pattern 
of region-party alliance was unprecedented in past National Assembly elections, 
where the yoch'on-yado (government rural - opposition urban) phenomenon 
prevailed, being predominant over the urban-rural cleavage, which also exerted 
relatively small but significant effects upon voting choice in the 1988 election.
24 There were also the 75 uncontested (the national-list) seats, making the total of 299 seats, to be 
allocated by the portion of the seats, not by the votes, gained by each party. With the revision of 
the election law in 1994, the national-list seats, constituting one-third of the total, will be 
allocated by the portion of the votes gained by a party in the forthcoming National Assembly 
elections of April 1996. See Table 1-6 for the election outcomes.
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What was distinct in the 1988 election was that the ruling DJP failed to gain 
a simple majority although it won the biggest share of the National Assembly 
seats. It was the first time in the history of Korean electoral politics that the 
ruling party lost its majority status. Unlike the presidential elections, in which a 
pluralist winner takes all, the pluralist position of the DJP in the Assembly 
simply meant that the president and his government needed support from the 
opposition parties to ratify the executive’s program, which in previous assemblies 
was carried through largely by invoking the ruling party’s dominant position. 
Notwithstanding the achievements of the yoso-yadae (small government party, 
big opposition) Assembly exemplified by the assembly hearings on “the Fifth 
Republic irregularities,” including the 1980 Kwangju massacre,25 the four-party 
system of stalemate lasted for less than two years, and ended in January 1990 in 
the creation of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), a grand alliance of parties 
across the ruling (the DJP of Roh) and the opposition (the RDP of Kim Young- 
sam) camps including the NDRP led by Kim Jong-pil, which was generally 
considered to have been the most likely to be involved in such a pact with the 
ruling party.26 The potentially hegemonic ruling DLP emerged as a result of 
decisions in higher level political circles, which was obviously incongruent with 
the electoral verdict of the Korean voters who had “refused to allow the 
emergence of a ‘too-strong’ government.”27 The voters’ perception was thus at 
variance with the DLP view that: “the merger would bring political stability and
25 See Han, Sung-joo, “South Korea in 1988: A Revolution in the Making,” Asian Survey, 29(1), 
1989, pp. 29-38. Also see Lee, Man-woo, op.cit., 1990, pp. 110-115.
26 See Park, Jin, “Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance,” 
Asian Survey, 30(12), 1990. Also see Lee, Man-woo, op.cit., 1990, pp. 127-134.
economic growth to the nation, which had been afflicted by unrest and instability 
in the course of democratisation in recent years.”28 Later the same year, the party 
led by Kim Dae-jung - which was left alone in opposition - and the “small” 
Democratic Party formed by a few of the former members of the RDP who 
declined to join the new ruling DLP were merged, naming their party as the 
Democratic Party (DP).
On the assumption that the 1987/1988 elections were fought on the basis of 
the two main electoral cleavages of region and pro-government versus pro- 
democratic reform, it seemed likely that the new ruling DLP would have a far 
more advantageous position in oncoming electoral contests than its immediate 
predecessor, the DJP, not to mention its current competitor, the DP. That is, the 
DLP would have a wider regional basis as a result of the merger of the three 
parties which each once had strong regional appeal, and it could also have been 
expected to broaden the societal basis of its support by the inclusion of Kim 
Young-sam and his party, who had shared the societal basis of the opposition. 
The electoral fortune of the DP may have lain in its advancing, as the sole 
opposition party, into the gaps in the societal basis of traditional opposition 
support which Kim Young-sam’s actions had created. In this way, it could have 
hoped to overcome its solid but numerically limited regional basis of electoral 
support.
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27 See Park, Jin, ibid., p. 1156.
28 See Lee, Man-woo, op.cit., p. 127.
The patterns of the outcomes in the National Assembly and the subsequent 
presidential elections in April and December 1992, however, indicated that the 
DLP only had modest success in maintaining the widened regional basis, 
particularly in the regions where Roh and Kim Jong-pil had been strong, but 
virtually failed in broadening its societal basis of electoral support. Indeed, the 
DLP and Kim Young-sam won more support from those social segments which 
used to support the ruling parties, despite efforts to distance themselves from the 
outgoing government and Kim’s background as a long-time opposition leader. 
As expected, Kim Young-sam and his DLP performed best in his regional 
strongholds. Kim Dae-jung and his DP again failed to gain substantial support 
beyond his regional strongholds (including Seoul), and this was reflected in his 
modest success in winning support from the former opposition supporters. The 
new-comer Chung Ju-young, former chairman of the Hyundai conglomerate, and 
his Unification National Party (UNP) reaped the biggest reward, attracting the 
floating or cross-pressured voters from both opposition and government sides,29 
not to mention their relative success in Kangwon, where Chung claimed personal 
regional ties, and where the ruling parties’ dominance had previously been a 
norm. Overall, the DLP succeeded in securing its rule by winning the assembly 
majority, albeit barely, and by electing its presidential candidate. The election 
turnout in the Assembly election at 71.9 per cent was the lowest ever, while the 
81.9 per cent turnout in the presidential election was also far down from that of 
1987.
- 242-
29 See Chapter 3 of this account
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If there was a single most important variable in shaping the voters’ choice in 
the 1992 elections after the democratic founding election, it appears to have been 
the regional factor rather than the cue of pro-government versus pro-democratic 
political alignment. This proves that the DLP merger, despite its rhetoric, was 
nothing more than a grand regional coalition. In this sense, the parties in the 
opposition were no exception: their sustained existence may have owed much 
more to their ability to occupy a geographical space than to their pro-democratic 
(or liberal) stance in the political sphere.
4. Regionalism and Presidentialism: Towards Coalition Politics?
Few would disagree that it is essential to acknowledge the importance of 
regionalism in voting to understand Korean electoral politics since 1987. Given 
the limited ideological space - i.e., that within the Right - in the political system, 
including the general voting public, no parties of significance had either the 
mandate or the capability to make a specific class appeal. This may have left the 
regional cleavage - always a latent resource for political exploitation even though 
variance of regional attributes is subtle in a society relatively homogeneous in 
race, language and culture - as a central source of partisan mobilisation in the 
wake of electoral uncertainties. Once it assumed a central place, the regional
cleavage continues to prevail in the electoral contests, and the region-party 
alliance has become an enduring pattern.
So far, the region-party alliance, crafted on the basis of the regional traits of 
party leaders as well as those of voters, seems to have promoted electoral 
stability rather than volatility among the voters. This was particularly so for the 
voters of Cholla and Kyongsang, renowned for their regional rivalry, as each of 
the regions produced viable presidential candidates both in the 1987 and 1992 
elections.30 However, this seemingly ‘frozen’ pattern of region-party alliance, 
which has resulted in a electoral stability, may yet have two potential sources of 
volatility. First, given that the regional effects on voting consisted largely in the 
voters’ evaluations of the political leaders, it is likely that sudden changes in 
party leadership may result in a redistribution of partisan support in a relatively 
short period. If one takes into account the current electoral arrangement, in 
which the presidential term is fixed for five years, the potential for electoral 
volatility seems to be increasing. That is, as a change of leadership is predicated 
within the given timetable and with relative frequency, it is more likely that a 
redistribution of partisan support will occur along regional lines unless the 
oncoming party leader shares regional traits with the outgoing one.
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30 In 1987, there were two candidates in Kyongsang, i.e., in the North, Roh Tae-woo and in the 
South, Kim Young-sam, but in 1992 Kim Young-sam was the only viable candidate in the region 
gaining as much strong support in the North as that Roh had once enjoyed.
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Second, once mobilised as a source of political support, the forces of 
regionalism are likely to maintain a central place in political contests, which were 
formerly highly personalised. As voters are regionally conscious and 
increasingly view party politics as a regional contest, it is likely that regional 
voting would spill over to those regions which formerly showed little tendency 
towards regional voting if provided with a viable candidate, and that 
consequently the unit of region-party alliance would reduce in size, from the 
region to the administrative province as such, thus providing a favourable 
atmosphere for a burgeoning of minor parties that would claim regional interests. 
The relative success of the UNP in 1992 (and the NDRP in 1988) may have been 
partly due to the fact that they could draw solid support from their home regions 
and a small but significant degree of support from the other ‘neutral’ regions.
The latter aspect deserves more attention in relation to Korea’s presidential 
system of government. The pattem of region-party alliance, as the regional 
cleavage looms larger, has a centrifugal tendency that may result in a multi-party 
system. The relative success of Kim Jong-pil and his NDRP in 1987 and 1988, 
and Chung Ju-young and his UNP in 1992, can not be fully understood without 
referring to the ever increasing regionalistic nature of the electoral contests. A 
multi-party electoral contest may be unlikely to produce a simple majority for 
any party, as the election outcomes since 1987 have shown, thus imposing a limit 
upon the ability of the president (who may have received far less than a simple 
majority vote) to claim a popular mandate, and inviting executive/legislative
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deadlock whenever the ruling party fails to gamer a majority status in the 
Assembly. In such cases, Mainwaring argues that “immobilism and sharp 
conflict between the executive and the legislature, with potentially deleterious 
consequences for democratic stability and/or effective governance, often result.... 
If, in addition to being highly fragmented, the party system is also polarised, the 
difficulties of governing will be compounded. ” 31
The experiment of the DLP coalition, which arbitrarily reshaped the four 
party system (or more precisely the three and one-half system) into a two party 
system so as to overcome the difficulties of governing as well as to project its 
rule by electoral means, seems to have achieved its immediate goals. That is, the 
DLP with nearly two-thirds of members in the Assembly successfully supported 
the last years’ rule of the Roh government and it yielded a simple majority - 
though its numerical strength was far reduced if compared to the former 
Assembly - in the new Assembly as well as electing its presidential candidate. It 
is fortunate for the new ‘civilian’ government of Kim Young-sam that it 
commands a majority in the National Assembly, maintained by, on the one hand, 
recruiting new members and on the other by selectively curtailing potential 
splintering within the DLP in the course of its popular clean-up campaign, thus 
enabling its implementation of various (and rather aggressive) reform measures.32
31 See Mainwaring, Scott, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult 
Combination,” Comparative Political Studies, 26(2), 1993, pp. 198-228, at pp. 215-216.
32 See, for a discussion of the new government’s reforms, Lee, Chong-sik, and Sohn, Hyuk-sang, 
“South Korea in 1993: The Year of the Great Reform,” Asian Survey, 34(1), 1994, pp. 1-9.
However, the grounds for the DLP coalition are by no means solid. As an 
odd coalition of the former ruling elements - the DJP and the New DRP - and 
Kim’s followers who were once in opposition, the common, perhaps the only, 
interests that kept the coalition partners in a party may have been their reluctance 
“to see the PPD led by Kim Dae Jung monopolise power through direct 
presidential elections.”33 Once past election day, difficulties inevitably arose in 
keeping the coalition partners together.34 Apart from the pushing factor, that is, 
the lack of a power sharing mechanism against presidential autonomy, which 
could be exemplified by the purges of leading figures of former regimes - 
inevitably involving many politicians from Taegu/Kyongbuk - in the course of 
Kim’s ever popular anti-corruption drive, the centrifugal tendency of regionalism 
may provide a major pulling cause of electoral incentives for the coalition 
partners to break up. The fact that the DLP failed in filling the three vacant 
assembly seats of Taegu/Kyongbuk, regional strongholds of the former DJP, in 
the by-elections held in August 1993 and August 1994 may contribute to this 
tendency unless new incentives for keeping the coalition together are provided 
for President Kim’s coalition partners.
33 See Park, Jin, op.cit., 1990, p.l 158.
34 For example, Mainwaring points out three factors that pose difficulties in building a stable 
coalition in presidential systems in comparison to parliamentary systems: i.e., lack of binding 
mechanism in the post-election period of the coalition that often takes place before the election, 
given the autonomous executive power, the less propensity of individual legislatures’ commitment 
to the party line; and the more electoral incentives of parties to break coalitions, as some remain 
as a silent partner in the coalition without enjoying the benefits but bearing the costs. See his 
op.cit., 1993, pp. 220-222.
If regionalism prevails in the forthcoming elections - which is highly likely - 
then one could expect the emergence of a multi-party system either by a breaking 
up of the existing parties or by the emergence of new parties. This may again 
necessitate coalition building, as the presidential system is more likely to be 
compatible with a two-party system. 35 As Han Sung-joo pointed out, the 
presidential system of government indeed facilitated survival of the two-party 
system in Korea due to “the proclivity of the politicians to gather around two 
major parties - one for and the other against government. ” 36 A coalition based on 
the regional cleavage may not be advisable, as it provides shaky ground for a 
stable coalition because of its centrifugal tendency, but it also endangers (if it 
results in significant regional minorities being permanently excluded from power) 
competition by rendering it a merely formal and empty process. 37 
Notwithstanding the points made by Kim and Koh over two decades ago, that “in 
a society that is otherwise homogeneous, regional pride and identity may provide 
necessary safeguards against growing mobilisation by the centralised 
government, and against the possible dangers of totalitarian manipulation of the 
masses, ” 38 the highly personalised and emotion-charged regionalism hinders, in 
the long-run, the formation of a more responsive political system.
- 248-
35 See ibid., p.200.
36 See Han, Sung-joo, “South Korea: Politics in Transition,” op.cit., 1989, p.296.
37 See Mainwaring, op.cit., 1993, p.223.
38 See Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C., “Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: 
An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections,” The Journal of Politics, 34(3), 1972, pp. 
825-859, at p.854.
In this regard, more care is needed for the political actors and the voters 
alike in crafting a democratic society from the institutionalised democratic 
political system. Given the ideological rigidity of the society on the Right-Left 
continuum, the converting of the old pro-government versus pro-democratic 
cleavage into a conservative versus liberal framework, 39 and, further, the 
rendering of the converted cleavage to a central place in electoral competition, 
can be a viable option in the foreseeable future. This conversion is feasible, as 
those voters who have opted for ‘change’ have remained on the side of the 
opposition, 40 and further strengthening of this converted cleavage may also negate 
the forces that compel electoral choice to be made on the basis of regional 
sentiment, although the positioning of it into a central electoral concern may still 
be difficult to implement.
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39 A similar point was made by Lee Kap-yun in forecasting the political configuration of partisan 
alignment soon after the 1985 National Assembly election. See Lee, Kap-yun, “Electoral 
Connection of an Authoritarian Political System: Republic of Korea (1948-85),” in Political 
Leadership in a Changing Society, Proceedings of the Second Asian-Pacific Political Science 
Association, Seoul, 1986, pp. 151-163, atp.163.
40 See Chapter 6 for an account of this.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the process by which Korean voters come to then- 
voting decision, one of the most neglected topics in the studies of Korean voting 
behaviour, especially in the era of democratisation from 1987. As Korean 
elections, which used to play a secondary role in the political process, merely 
providing the government in power with its needed legitimacy, became 
meaningful contests, the question of how Korean voters made their voting 
decision carried more weight than before, especially given the democratic 
transition of the political system. Nonetheless, this is not to say that there had 
been no meaning to past elections. Past elections also ‘mattered’: in that they 
had been “crucial” on some occasions by producing a viable opposition party (as 
Ahn Byung-man argued);1 in that many contending issues had been reviewed, 
especially that of questioning the authoritarian characteristics of the regime; in 
that the parties had engaged in heated competitions to gamer political support; 
and in that the voters had shown an enduring tendency of alignment on the line of 
regime support versus pro-democratic politics.
Thus, the main focus of this study has been on the political cleavage 
structures that have led Korean voters to behave as such in making their voting
1 See Ahn, Byong-man, “The Process of Political Changes in Korea: An Analysis of Crucial 
Elections and Party Politics,” Korea & World Affairs, 9(4), 1985, pp. 625-646.
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choice. By analysing two sets of sample survey data, which cover the elections 
in the period of democratic transition, i.e., from 1985 to 1992, it has attempted to 
unravel the nature of the two main dimensions of political cleavage, that is, the 
urban-rural and regional differences in electoral support, which are in essence 
descriptions of vote distribution at the aggregate level.
To have an overall view of the electoral importance of these two political 
cleavages, the impact of changes in the party system on the voters during the 
period are discussed. Two major changes in the party system were witnessed, 
namely, the opposition party split immediately before the election of 1987 and 
the unprecedented party merger across the ruling and the opposition camps in 
1990. Their impacts were discussed with reference first to the patterns of 
movement of voters across the subsequent elections and second to the patterns of 
‘changing’ voter alignment on the two main dimensions. The movements of 
voters were in general quite stable along the line of government versus 
opposition: the movement of voters from 1985 to 1987/1988 was the most stable 
for the government party and its candidate, and the split opposition shared their 
former support, as one could expect; however, the stability in the movement of 
voters between 1987 and 1992 was remarkable, given the leadership change in 
the ruling party to a once renowned opposition leader, Kim Young-sam. There 
had also been a similar pattern in electoral support along the urban-rural 
dimension across the elections, which suggests that the past cleavage of regime 
support versus pro-democratic played an important role. If there had been a
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source of volatility in the movement of voters between 1987 and 1992, it may 
have been the regionalism that had provided the political actors with room to 
maneuver. Kim Young-sam, for example, had been successful in maintaining or 
further mobilising his former regional stronghold, and somewhat successful in 
taking up the former regional strongholds of the new ruling party coalition 
partners; Kim Dae-jung had a limited opportunity to expand the regional basis of 
his support beyond Cholla, however; and the new-comer Chung Ju-young may 
have benefited from the floating voters along the regional lines drawn between 
the two Kims. Having appeared in 1987, regionalism has prevailed in electoral 
contests since, although the lines drawn by regional traits have differed from time 
to time.
To unravel the nature of the two main political cleavages, this thesis has 
closely examined the cleavage structures by identifying factors that brought about 
the observed patterns of voter alignment along urban-rural and regional lines. 
The past cleavage of regime versus pro-democratic support, which was often 
reflected in urban-rural differences in electoral support, was found to consist 
more of differences in socialisation. The different composition of age cohorts, 
who exhibit different voting propensities as well as different views on politics 
partly because of their differences in educational attainment or experience in 
societal life, between urban and rural areas, accounts for the yoch’on yado 
(government-rural, opposition-urban) phenomenon.
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More research may be needed for the explanation of difference in voting 
propensity among the age cohorts. A research project specifically designed for 
age-related factors could be rewarding: although some of the difference in voting 
among the age cohorts were the consequence of their differences in political 
attitudes, it remains to be determined whether these differences are due to 
“generation” effects or “life-cycle” effects - which may have different political 
implications for the future. There was evidence that the younger age cohorts 
practised anti-regime voting both in 1987/1988 and 1992. The younger age 
cohorts, with less experience of war, poverty or social disorder than their older 
counterparts, may have preferred “change” to “stability.” Perhaps, given that 
Korea has gone through rapid, large-scale socio-economic changes in the last few 
decades, there may exist “inter-generational cultural discrepancy,” as Ahn 
Chung-si suggested.2 But search for intervening variables that specifically link 
the younger age cohorts’ electoral propensity toward the opposition with its 
sources needs to be continued.
The regional differences in voting, which appeared as a new political 
cleavage in the elections considered in this thesis, are mainly due to 
‘personalism.’ The voters, who heavily rely on personality factors for their 
voting decision, seem to have used the regional traits of the candidates and their 
parties for their candidate evaluations most importantly. This thesis also showed 
that there is some additional evidence that regional voting is partly due to
2 See Ahn, Chung-si, “Political Culture and Political Socialisation of the Post-war Generation in 
South Korea,” Korea Journal, 28(5), 1988, pp. 4-20.
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differences in the political orientations of voters between regions. This may be 
particularly so for the voters of Cholla, who had long been on the side of 
opposition. It is noteworthy, however, that the variables of socialisation, 
especially that of age, are the main factors in determining an individual’s political 
tendencies that exert more immediate impacts on voting choice. There was little 
evidence, however, of regional voting based on “economic interest,” although 
there was some evidence of regional variations on economic evaluations and 
evidence of economic voting, especially based on the future forecast. This 
suggests that regionalism may have been more deeply seated among the voters - 
deriving, perhaps, from their personal experience in societal life or from a 
valuing of personal ties which might result in favouritism to in-groups or 
antagonism to out-groups - than can be accounted for by a functional approach.
Given these empirical findings, the final chapter discussed the political 
implications of the two main political cleavages for the process of 
democratisation in Korea. It has been argued that voter alignment along regional 
lines - lines which are vertically drawn rather than cross-cutting; highly 
personalised and emotion-charged rather than interest oriented; and which exhibit 
a centrifugal tendency - may hinder democratic stability based on 
presidentialism. Presidentialism may be more likely to be compatible with a two- 
party system. 3 Moreover, it would be unfortunate if the current pattern of voter 
alignment along regional lines entails the permanent exclusion of some
3 See Mainwaring, Scott, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult 
Combination,” Comparative Political Studies, 26(2), 1993, pp. 198-228.
populations from political power. The rendering of the past cleavage of regime 
support versus pro-democratic dimension into a conservative versus liberal 
framework - which would be not only feasible, but also one of the compelling 
options in the near future given the ideological rigidity of Korean society - and 
further positioning it into a central electoral concern, could contribute to the 
development of a stable democratic political system if the presidential system in
Korea continues to prosper.
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Appendix 1. About the Survey
1. Survey Design, Financial Support and Fieldwork
The 1991 survey was designed by Professor James Cotton, and the 1992 
post-election survey was designed by the author with advice of the author’s Ph.D. 
course supervisory panel. The latter survey was conducted as part of a research 
project organised by Prof. James Cotton, with the financial support of the 
Australian National University, and the Asia Research Centre of Murdoch 
University, Western Australia. The fieldwork for both of the survey was carried 
out by the Korea Gallup Polls (Ltd.), and the data were collected by person to 
person interviews.
2. Fieldwork Period
The fieldwork for the 1991 survey was implemented during the period of 1 
November to 10 November 1991, i.e., after the formation of the ruling 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP). 
The 1992 survey was conducted just after the 14th Presidential election of 18 
December 1992, i.e., during the period of 22 December to 30 December 1992.
3. Population, Sampling Method and Sample Size
The surveys were based on a nationwide sample of the voting population 
of age 20 and over (excluding the Cheju province), which resulted in a total 
sample size of 1,250 and 1,500, respectively, with a three-stage stratified random 
sampling method. The data in this analysis is weighted by age and sex to reflect 
the general population of the provinces at the time of the survey. Cases are also 
weighted so that they respond to the official election returns in the 1987 and the 
1992 presidential elections, respectively.
4. Variables Used in the Analysis: Coding and Means
A: Voting Choice and Socio-economic Background Variables: 1991 and 1992
V a ria b le s C o d in g M e a n s
1991 1 9 9 2
V o t in g  C h o ic e
1985(n=809)
D J P 8 5 V o te  fo r th e  D JP  in 1 9 8 5 = 1 , O th er= 0 , N onvo ter= . .426 -
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N K D P 8 5 Vote for the NKDP in 1985=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .462 —
DKP 85 Vote for the DKP in 1985=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .077 —
1987
(n=1007/1191)
Roh 87 Vote for Roh Tae-woo in 1987=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .367 .445
YS 87 Vote for Kim Young-sam  in 1987=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .281 .211
DJ 87 Vote for Kim Dae-jung in 1987=1, O ther=0, Nonvoter=. .271 .296
1988 (n=1002)
D JP 8 8 Vote for the DJP in 1988=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .333 —
R D P 8 8 Vote for the RDP in 1988=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .292 —
P P D 8 8 Vote for the PPD in 1988=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. .266 —
1992 (n=1237)
D L P 9 2 Vote for the DLP in 1992 NA Election=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. — .425
DP 92 Vote for the DP in 1992 NA Election=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. — .384
U N P 9 2 Vote for the UNP in 1992 NA Election=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. — .123
1992 (n=1293)
YS 92 Vote for Kim Young-sam  in 1992=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. - .420
DJ 92 Vote for Kim Dae-jung in 1992=1, O ther=0, Nonvoter=. - .338
JY  92 Vote for Chung Ju-young in 1992=1, Other=0, Nonvoter=. - .163
Location (Metro)
City Sm all/M edium  C ity D weller=1, Other=0 .231 .265
Rural Rural Dweller=1, Other=0 .257 .250
Region (Seoul)
Kyonggi Kyonggi R e s id e n ts , Other=0 .166 .196
Kangwon Kangwon Resident=1, Other=0 .040 .039
C h ’ungch’ong C h’ungch’ong Resident=1, Other=0 .102 .095
C holla Cholla Resident=1, Other=0 .115 .126
Kyongbuk Kyongbuk Resident=1, Other=0 .123 .118
Kyongnam Kyongnam R e s id e n ts , Other=0 .186 .169
O rigin (Seoul/
K yonggi)
Kangwon Kangwon O rig in=1, Other=0 .060 .064
C h ’ungch ’ong C h’ungch’ong Origin=1, Other=0 .168 .187
Cholla Cholla O rig in=1, Other=0 .245 .247
Kyongbuk Kyongbuk O rig in=1, Other=0 .175 .178
Kyongnam Kyongnam Origin=1, Other=0 .177 .147
O ther North Korea/Cheju/O verseas O rig in=1, Other=0 .062 .043
Socialisation
Age (50 + )
20 ’s Age 20 to  29=1, Other=0 .322 .306
30 ’s Age 30 to 39=1, Other=0 .269 .278
40 ’s Age 40 to 49=1, Other=0 .175 .170
Gender(FemaJe)
M ale Male=1, Female=0 .501 .497
Rel (No/O ther)
Buddhist Religious Affilia tion, Buddhism =1, Other=0 .286 .286
Protestant Religious Affilia tion, P rotestant=1, Other=0 .205 .206
C atho lic Religious Affilia tion, C atho lic=1, O ther=0 .094 .057
Edu (Prim ary)
M iddle Education, M iddle School=1, Other=0 .171 .166
High Education, High School=1, Other=0 .397 .406
University Education, College and O ver=1, Other=0 .212 .210
SE Interests
Job Respondent’s job  +  Head of household’s job  for those who are
(Self-employed) not engaged in a paid w ork=1, Neither Head o f household ’s
(n=1203) nor Respondent engaged in a paid work=.
Farm er Farm er=1, O ther=0 .204 .187
M anual W orker Manual W orker=1, Other=0 .195 .226
Non-m anual Routine Non-m anual(Service/Sales/C lerical)=1, Other=0 .341 .330
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M anager/Prof M anageria l/Professional=1, Other=0 .058 .032
lncom e( - 500) unit=1,000 won
500 to 990 Household Monthly Income 500 to 990=1, Other=0 .379 .346
1,000 to 1,490 Household Monthly Income 1,000 to 1,490=1, Other=0 .259 .301
1,500 & over Household Monthly Income 1,500 and over=1, Other=0 .099 .183
Status (Low)
Lower-m iddle Subjective Status Lower-m iddle=1, Other=0 .336 —
M iddle Subjective Status M iddle=1, Other=0 .334 -
Upper-m iddle + Subjective Status Upper-m iddle/Upper=1, Other=0 .069 -
Housing(Owner)
Long-term  Lease Housing, Long-term Leased=1, Other=0 - .322
M onthly Rent Housing, Monthly Rented=1, Other=0 - .061
B: Attitudinal Variables: 1991
Variables Coding Means Cases
Regim e Support Index (Fair+Dem ocratised+Party Politics-f-No Changes)/4 .391 1141
Fair, Past Elections? 5 point scale: 1=Very Fair to  0=Very Unfair .354 1248
Democratised, H ow  Far? 4 point scale: 1=Very Democratised to  0=Not at all .576 1241
Democratic, Parties? 4 point scale: 1=Very Dem ocratic to 0=Not at all .386 1150
Society, N eed a Change? 3 point scale: 1=No Need to 0=Need Radical Change .260 1223
Aw areness Index (Regionalism +Opposition M erger+Vote Buying)/3 .719 1246
Regionalism , Serious? 4 point scale: 1=Very Serious to  0=Not at all .806 1249
O pposition Merger? 1=Desirable, 0=Not Desirable .700 1250
Influence of Vote-buying? 1=Negative Influence, 0.5=None, 0=Positive Influence .651 1248
Political Interest Index (Campaign Rally+Political lnterest)/2 .558 1250
Been in C am paign  Rally? 1=Yes, 0=No .592 1250
Interested in Politics? 5 point scale: 1=Very Interested to  0=Not at all .523 1250
M orality  Index (Political Corruption+Personal Experience)/2 .777 1247
Political Corruption 3 point scale: 1=Not Acceptable to 0=lnevitab le .843 1248
Experience of Vote-buying? 1=No, 0=Yes .712 1249
Antl-gov’t Group Index Contribution to Democratisation .527 1044
(Chaeya+Labour Activ ists+Students+Relig ious lnst.)/4
Chaeya(O pposition) 4 point scale: 1=Very Much to  0=Not at all .523 1110
Labour Activ ists As above .543 1138
Student M ovem ent As above .592 1183
Religious Institutions As above .440 1126
Pro-gov’t G roup Index Contribution to Democratisation .270 1040
(Big Business+M ilitary+Am erica)/3
Chaebol(B ig Business) As above .222 1136
The M ilitary As above .247 1119
Am erica As above .358 1104
C: Attitudinal Variables: 1992
Variables Coding Means Cases
Political A ttitudes  
Subjective Tendency 4 point scale: 1 =Very Progressive to 0=Very Conservative .495 1279
Efficacy o f E lections 4 point scale: 1 =Very Much to  0=Not at all .637 1449
Issue S tanding Index (Dem onstration+Union+US Arm y+North Korea)/4 .413 1500
Demonstrations? 1=Approve, 0.5=No Opinion, 0=Oppose .339 1500
Teacher’s Union? As above .450 1500
US Arm y W ithdrawal? As above .296 1500
Contact North Korea? As above .567 1500
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P arty  D isposition (N one)
G o v e rn in g  P arty 1 = G o v ern in g  P arty  Identifier, 0 = O th e r .258 1500
O p p o sitio n  P arty 10 p p o s i t i o n  P arty  Identifier, 0 = O th e r .411 1500
E c o n o m ic  A t t i t u d e s
Retrospective Index (H o u seh o ld + R eg io n + N atio n )/3  in re tro sp e c tiv e .443 1446
H o u s e h o ld ’s E c o n o m y ? 5 poin t s c a le : 1=M uch B e tte r  to  0= M uch W o rse .479 1497
R e g io n a l E c o n o m y ? A s a b o v e .469 1471
N atio n a l E co n o m y ? A s a b o v e .382 1471
Prospective Index (H o u seh o ld + R eg io n + N atio n )/3  in p ro sp e c tiv e .627 1424
H o u s e h o ld 's  E c o n o m y ? 5 poin t sc a le : 1=M uch B e tte r  to  0= M uch W o rse .629 1478
R e g io n a l E co n o m y ? A s a b o v e .619 1464
N atio n a l E co n o m y ? A s a b o v e .630 1444
C a n d id a te  E v a lu a t io n s T h e  m o st c a p a b le  c a n d id a te  o f d e live rin g  th e  fo llo w in g s :
D e m o cra tisa tio n , W ea lth  R ed istribu tion , S o c ia l
S tability , E co n o m ic  G row th, M itigating th e  R eg io n a l
D isparities, N ational U nification, a n d  C lea rin g  u p  th e
C orrup tion
Kim Young-sam  Index 7 poin t s c a le : 1=AII of th e  7 I s s u e s  for Y S to  0 = N o n e .286 1500
Kim Dae-jung Index 7 point s c a le : 1=AII of th e  7 I s s u e s  for DJ to  0 = N o n e .259 1500
Chung Ju-young Index 7  poin t s c a le : 1=AII of th e  7  I s s u e s  for JY  to  0 = N o n e .108 1500
5. The Questionnaire
A: The 1991 Survey (English Translation)
SQ.l. Residential Region
1.Seoul 2.Pusan 3.Taegu 4.Inchon 5.Kwangju 6.Taejon 7.Kyonggi 
8.Kangwon 9.Ch’ungbuk lO.Ch’ungnam ll.Chonbuk 12.Chonnam 
13.Kyongbuk 14.Kyongnam 
SQ.2. Residential Type
1.Metropolis 2.Small/Medium City 3.Up/My on (Rural)
SQ.3. Gender
l.Male 2.Female
SQ.4. Excuse me, but how old are you?
( ) year old
Q.l. How much are you interested in politics ordinarily?
1. Very interested 2.Somewhat interested 3.On the average 4.Not much 
interested 5.Not at all interested
Q.2. There are three basic attitudes toward the society we live in. Which one do 
you think is the closest to your opinion among the followings? 
l.Our society now needs a fundamental change as it has many faults.
2. Even though our society now has many faults, they can be solved within 
our current system.
3.Overall, our society now doesn’t need a big change.
Q.3. How far do you think our country has been democratised?
l.Very democratised 2.Somewhat democratised 3.Not so democratised 
4.Not at all democratised
Q.4. How much do you think the following political parties, leaders and groups 
contributed to the democratisation of our society? Or not contributed?
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First, how much do you think the DLP has contributed to the 
democratisation?
1 .Contributed very much 2.Contributed somewhat 3.Not contributed much 
4.Not at all contributed
Q.4-2. Then, how about the DP?
Q.4-3. How about Roh Tae-woo?
Q.4-4. How about Kim Young-sam?
Q.4-5. How about Kim Dae-jung?
Q.4-6. How about Kim Jong-pil?
Q.4-7. How about the student movement circles?
Q.4-8. How about the Chaeya (the opposition forces)?
Q.4-9. How about the labour movement activists?
Q.4-10. How about the religious associations?
Q.4-11. How about the military (senior officers)?
Q.4-12. How about the Chaebol (big business) owners?
Q.4-13. How about America?
Q.5. Which system of government do you think is more suitable to our country 
between “presidential system” and “parliamentary system”?
1 .Presidential system 2.Parliamentary system 
Q.6. How much do you think the Korean political parties - the DLP and the DP, 
ect. - are democratic/not democratic in their internal management?
1 .Very democratic 2.Somewhat democratic 3.Not so democratic 4.Notat 
all democratic
Q.7. Recently the PPD and the (small) DP has been merged. Do you think the 
merger is a right thing to do or wrong?
1.Right 2.Wrong
Q.8. There often appears reports about bribery-taking or corruption of politicians 
on the newspapers and TV. What do you think of these corruption by 
politicians? Please tell me the closest one of your own among the following 
statements.
1. It is inevitable for a politician.
2. It is unfortunate, but not a big deal as long as it doesn’t obstruct the 
democratic political order.
3. It shouldn’t be permitted as it obstruct the democratic political order.
4. It should be only viewed as an example of individual corruption.
Q.9. How serious/not serious do you think the matter of regionalism is now in
our country?
l.Very serious 2.Somewhat serious 3.Not so serious 4.Not at all serious 
Q.10. Wliich one do you think among the followings is the biggest cause for the 
regionalism?
1.Disparities in industrial and regional development 2.Regionally biased 
personnel management in the political and administrative field 3.Excessive 
regional/region of origin consciousness 4.Regional link system in sports
5. Mal-use by politicians 6.1nfluence of mass media 7.0ther(specify: )
Q.l 1. Have you voted in the 12th National Assembly election of 1985? (If yes)
Wliich party candidate did you vote for?
l.The DJP (Leader Chun Doo-hwan) 2.The NKDP (Leader Lee Min-woo) 
3.The DKP (Leader Yu Chi-song) 4.Other (specify: ) 5.Don’t
know/Can’t say 6.Abstained 7.No voting right 
Q.12. Have you voted in the last presidential election of 1987? (If yes) Who did 
you vote for?
l.RohTae-woo 2.Kim Young-sam 3.Kim Dae-jung 4.Kim Jong-pil 
5.Other (specify: ) 6.Don’t know/Can’t say 7.Abstained 8.No voting
right
Q.13. Then, have you voted in the 13th National Assembly election of 1988? (If 
yes) Which party candidate did you vote for?
l.The DJP (Leader Roh Tae-woo) 2.The RDP (Leader Kim Young-sam)
3.The PPD (Leader Kim Dae-jung) 4.The NDRP (Leader Kim Jong-pil)
5.Other (specify: ) 6.Don’t know/Can’t say 7.Abstained 8.No voting
right
Q.14. (If abstained in Q.13) What was the reason for not voting?
( )
Q.15. Has your current party of support been changed if compared to that in the 
last 13th National Assembly election of 1988? (Consider the DJP/the DLP, 
and the PPD/the DP as the same) 
l.Changed 2.Not changed [Go to Q.18]
Q.16. (If changed in Q.15) If so, how have you changed? (Consider the DJP/the 
DLP, and the PPD/the DP as the same)
1. From the DJP to the DP
2. From the RDP to the DLP
3. From the RDP to the DP
4. From the PPD to the DLP
5. From the NDRP to the DLP
6. From the NDRP to the DP
7. From other (specify: ) to other (specify: )
Q.17. Then, what caused this change in your support?
( )
Q.18. Then, why do you still support the party?
< )
Q.19. Have you voted in the (provincial-level) Local Assembly election of last
June? (If yes) Which party candidate did you vote for? 
l.The DLP 2.The NDP 3.The (small) DP 4.0ther (specify: )
5.Abstained ö.Don’t know/Can’t say 
Q.20. (If abstained in Q.19) What was the reason for not voting?
( )
Q.21. Which party candidate will you vote for in the 14th National Assembly 
election next year?
l.The DLP 2.TheDP 3.0ther(specify: ) 4.1ndependents 5.Don’t
know/Can’t say 6.WÜ1 abstain
Q.22. Who do you think is most desirable to be elected in the presidential 
election next year?
(
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Q.23. Who would you like to be the winner if Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae- 
jung are the only two to run for the next presidential election? 
l.Kim Young-sam 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Don’t know/Can’t say 
Q.24. Then, who would you like to be the winner if Park Tae-jun and Kim Dae- 
jung are the only two to run for the next presidential election? 
l.Park Tae-jun 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Don’t know/Can’t say 
Q.25. What is the most important thing, you consider, when you decide the 
candidate to vote for in the National Assembly or Presidential elections? 
l.Party 2.Policies/Promises 3.Personality/Career/Regional background 
4.Other (specify: )
Q.26. Then, to which do you refer most when you decide the candidate to vote 
for?
1 .Newspaper/TV/Radio 2.Poster/Pamphlet 3.Election information board
4. Campaign speech 5.People around 6.Party workers 7.Family members’
opinion 8.Other (specify: ) 9.Nothing particular
Q.27. Do you think the past elections in our country had been fair or not in 
overall?
l.Very fair 2.Somewhat fair 3.On the average/So so 4.Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair
Q.28. Have you ever been a campaign rally to listen to candidates’ speeches? 
l.Yes 2.No
Q.29. Have you ever received gifts or money from candidates, or been treated by 
them? 
l.Yes 2.No
Q.30. Do you think the gifts, money or the treats provided by a candidate will 
influence the voter’s attitude toward the candidate for better, for worse, or 
no influence?
l.For better influence 2.For worse influence 3.No influence 
Q.31. Which country do you feel is the closest with Korea among the followings? 
Then, please tell me other two countries that you feel the next closest. 
l.USSR 2.USA 3.Japan 4.Indonesia 5.North Korea 6-China 7.Taiwan 
Q.32. How far do you think our domestic market is currently opened for the 
foreign countries/imports?
l.Very open 2.Somewhat open 3.Not so open 4. Not at all open 
Q.33. In general, do you approve or oppose liberalisation for the import of 
foreign agricultural products?
1.Strongly approve 2.Somewhat approve 3.Somwhat oppose 4.Strongly 
oppose
Then, how about the Japanese movies?
Q.34. What do you think of the pace of our country’s unification policy? Do you 
think it is too fast, too slow, or it is about right?
1.Too fast 2.Too slow 3 .About right
Q.35. Which one do you think has priority in pursuing unification of two Koreas 
between the following two policies?
1. Free trade, communication, and travel, etc. - such non-political 
exchanges should come first.
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2. Non-aggression, and nuclear pacts, etc. - such political and military 
agreements should come first.
Q.36. Here are some thinks people say are obstacles to unification. Among these, 
which two do you think are the biggest obstacles to the unification of two 
Koreas?
1. Ideological difference between South and North 2.Mutual distrust 
3.South Korean domestic politics 4.North Korean dictatorship 
5.Difference in unification policies between South and North 6.USA 
7.USSR 8.Difference in economic development between South and North 
Q.37. Do you think international exchanges as follows are advantageous to our 
country or disadvantageous?
First, do you think it is advantageous for our country to participate in the 
international trade organisations?
1 .Advantageous 2.Disadvantageous 3.Don’t Know
Q.37-1. Then, how about the trade with China?
Q.37-2. How about the trade with the USSR?
Q.37-3. How about the trade with North Korea
Q.37-4. How about the formation of an Asia-Pacific economic group?
Q.37-5. How about the entry to the UN?
Q.38. What do you associated with Australia? Pleas tell me anything that comes 
to your mind.
( )
Q.39. Do you think the relationship between Korea and Australia is good or bad?
1.Very good 2.Somewhat good 3.Somewhat bad 4.Very bad 
Q.40. Would you intend to travel to Australia if you can spare money and time? 
l.Yes 2.No
Finally. I am going to ask some questions for the classification of the data.
1. What is your occupation?
1 .Farming, Fishing, Forest 2.Self-employed 3.Sales/Service 4.Skilled 
work 5.Simple manual work 6.Clerical/Engineering work 
7.Managerial/Administarive work 8.Professional work 9.Houswife 
lO.Student 11 .Unemployed 12.0ther( specify: )
2. Where is your grandfather’s hometown?
I. Seoul 2.Kyonggi 3.Kangwon 4.Ch’ungchong 5.Pusan ö.Kyongnam 
7.Taegu/Kyongbuk 8.Kwangju/Chonnam 9.Chongbuk lO.North Korea
I I . 0ther( specify: )
3. How far have you certified for a formal education?
1 .Primary school and under 2.Middle school 3.High school 4.College and 
over
4. How much is your family’s average total monthly income?
( ) 10 thousand won
5. Which class do you think you are belonged to?
1.Lower class 2.Lower-middle class 3.Middle class 4.Upper-middle class 
5.Upper class
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6. Do you have a religion? (If yes) What is your religious faith?
1.Buddhism 2.Protestant 3.Catholic 4.Other (specify: ) 5.No
B: The 1992 Post-election Survey (English Translation)
SQ.l. Address to the district level
( )
SQ.2. Residential Region
1.Seoul 2.Pusan 3.Taegu 4.Inchon 5.Kwangju ö.Taejon 7.Kyonggi 
8.Kangwon 9.Ch’ungbuk lO.Ch’ungnam ll.Chonbuk 12.Chonnam 
13.Kyongbuk 14.Kyongnam 
SQ.3. Residential Type
1.Metropolis 2. Small/Medium City 3.Up/My on (Rural)
SQ.4. Gender
l.Male 2.Female
SQ.5. Excuse me, but did you have voting right in this presidential election? (If 
yes) How old are you?
( ) year old
Q.l. How long have you been living in this area?
1 .Less than a year 2.Two to three years 3.Four to five years 4.Sixtonine 
years 5.More than 10 years
Q.2. How much are you interested in what’s happening in the area you are 
living?
1 .Very much interested in 2.Somewhat interested in 3.Not so interested in
4. Not at all interested in
Q.3. Do you think the “financial situation of your household’’ now is better-off 
compared with what was 2 to 3 years ago or worse-off? 
l.Much better 2.Somewhat better 3.About the same 4.Somewhat worse
5. Much worse
Q.3-2. Then, how about the “economic situation of your area”?
Q.3-3. How about the “economic situation of our country as a whole”?
Q.4. Do you think the “financial situation of your household” will be better-off in
2 to 3 year time or worse off?
l.Much better 2.Somewhat better 3.About the same 4.Somewhat worse 
5.Much worse
Q.4-2. Then, how about the “economic situation of your area”?
Q.4-3. How about the “economic situation of our country as a whole”?
Q.5. Do you think yourself “progressive” in political and social matters or 
“conservative”?
1.Very progressive 2.Somewhat progressive 3.Somewhat conservative 
4.Very conservative 5.Can’t say either
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Q.6. Do you usually approve “protest marches or demonstrations” or oppose?
1.Approve 2.0ppose 3.Can’t say either
Q.6-2. Then, how about the “activities of the Teacher’s Union”?
Q.6-3. How about the “withdrawal of the US troops”?
Q.6-4. How about the “private-level contact with North Korea”?
Q.7. Have you voted in this presidential election? 
l.Yes 2.No [G otoQ .ll]
Q.8. (If yes in Q.7) Who did you vote for in this presidential election?
1.Kim Young-sam 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Chung Ju-young 4.Park Chan-jong 
5.Paek Ki-wan 6.Lee Byong-ho 7.Kim Ok-son 8.Can’t say 
Q.9. Then, what was the most important point you considered when you voted 
for the candidate?
1 .Regional origin of the candidate 2.Personal connections with the 
candidate 3.Policies/Promises of the candidate 4.Career/Ability of the 
candidate 5.Personality of the candidate 6.Party affiliation of the candidate 
7. Nothing particular 8.0ther(specify: )
Q.10. When did you decide to vote for the candidate - how many days/weeks 
from the election day?
1 .On the election day/At the voting booth 2.0ne day before 3.Two to three 
days before 4.Four to six days before 5.0ne week before 6.Two weeks 
before 7.Three weeks before 8.One month before 9.More than 2 months 
before
Q.l 1. Then, who did you think would handle the following problems the most 
appropriately among the presidential candidates?
First, who would handle “political democratisation” the most appropriately? 
l.Kim Young-sam 2.Kim Dae-jung 3.Chung Ju-young 4.Park Chan-jong 
5.Other 6.None of the candidates
Q.l 1-2. How about “bridging the gap between the rich and the poor”?
Q.l 1-3. How about “maintaining social stability”?
Q.l 1-4. How about “economic development”?
Q.l 1-5. How about “mitigating the disparities in regional development”? 
Q.l 1-6. How about “national unification”?
Q.l 1-7. How about “clearing up the corruption”?
Q .l2. Kim Dae-jung, the DP’s candidate, declared his retirement from politics 
along with resignation from his National Assembly membership on last 19 
December. Do you think this is a right thing to do or not?
1 .Right thing to do 2.Wrong thing to do 3.Can’t say either 
Q.13. How much do you think people’s opinion influences the politics of our 
country through elections?
1.Very much 2.Somewhat 3.Notsomuch 4.Notatall 
Q .l4. Have you usually supported “Yodang (party in power)” or “Yadang (party 
in opposition)” in various elections?
1 .Yodang 2.Yadang 3.Haven’t cared for Yodang or Yadang 
Q .l5. Have you voted in the National Assembly election this year on 24 March? 
(If yes) Which party candidate did you vote for?
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l.TheDLP 2.The DP 3.TheUNP 4.The Shinjongdang 5.The 
Minjungdang 6.The Kongmyongdang 7.Independents 8.Abstained 
9.Don’t know/Can’t say 10.No voting right 
Q.16. Who did you vote for in the last presidential election in 1987?
l.RohTae-woo 2.KimYoung-sam 3.KimDae-jung 4.KimJong-pil 
5.0ther 6.Abstained 7.No voting right 8.Can’t say/Don’t know
Classification questions
1. What is your occupation?
1 .Farming, Fishing, Forest 2.Self-employed 3.Sales/Service 4.Skilled 
work 5.Simple manual work 6.Clerical/Engineering work
7. Managerial/Administarive work 8.Professional work 9.Houswife
lO.Student 11 .Unemployed 12.0ther( specify: )
2. How far have you certified for a formal education?
1.Primary school and under 2.Middle school 3.High school 4.College and 
over
3. What is your religious faith?
1.Buddhism 2.Protestant 3.Catholic 4.0ther (specify: ) 5.No
4. Where is your grandfather’s hometown?
1.Seoul 2.Pusan 3.Taegu 4.Inchon 5.Kwangju ö.Taejon 7.Kyonggi
8. Kangwon 9.Ch’ungbuk lO.Ch’ungnam ll.Chonbuk 12.Chonnam 
13.Kyongbuk 14.Kyongnam 15.North Korea 16.Other
5. How much is your family’s average total monthly income?
1. 490,000 won and under 2. 500,000 to 590,000 won 3. 600,000 to
690.000 won 4. 700,000 to 790,000 won 5. 800,000 to 890,000 won
6. 900,000 to 990,000 won 7. 1,000,000 to 1,190,000 won 8. 1,200,000 to
1.490.000 won 9. 1,500,000 to 1,990,000 won 10. 2,000,000 won and over
6. Excuse me, but this house you live in is your “own”, “long-term leased,” or
“monthly rented”?
1.Owner occupier 2.Long-term leased 3.Monthly rented
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